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Abstract 
In 1997, the Assembly of the Poor (AOP) successfully organised a 99-day protest, 
which was widely hailed as ‘a historical moment’ for people's politics in Thailand. 
However, following the creation of the first Thai Rak Thai government in 2001, the 
AOP's political role has gradually declined. 
 This thesis aims to investigate the factors behind the AOP's decline between 
2001 and 2010. It argues that, because of inherent internal weaknesses and the recent 
political changes, the development of AOP in the 2000s has increasingly been 
influenced, if not determined, by external factors. First, the thesis re-examines the 
movement's internal elements in a more critical view, which evidently contrasts with 
early writings on the AOP. It argues that some of the AOP's key features, such as its 
loose structure, are partially to blame for the movement's decline. NGO activists’ roles 
in the movement are also critically reassessed. 
 More importantly, the thesis also systematically explores the external elements, 
known as the political opportunity structure (POS), which have increasingly influenced 
the AOP's development and mobilisation. This approach has been overlooked by most 
literature written on the movement. The study emphasises two sets of elements of the 
POS: stable and volatile components. As for stable elements, which are structurally 
embedded, the list includes the cultural structure, institutional structure, and prevailing 
strategies. These elements have impeded, not only the AOP, but also other people's 
movements for decades. On the other hand, the two influential volatile elements for the 
AOP during this period are the elite divisions and media access. During the Thaksin 
government, his control over the elites significantly restricted the AOP's campaigns, 
while the lack of media access had adverse impacts on the movement during this highly 
polarised period.     
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Chapter I: Introduction 
A. Introduction 
Grassroots movements are an important political means for marginalised groups in the 
developing world to address not only short-term economic problems but long-term 
socio-political issues as well. In modern Thai history, the first grassroots movements 
briefly emerged in the mid-1970s, but later they were brutally suppressed by rightwing 
groups and the military government. A decade later, Thailand saw a sharp increase of 
grassroots mobilisation and protests as response to the socio-economic problems in the 
countryside, which had mostly been caused the state-led development. From that point 
onwards, grassroots politics was strongly associated with people's groups and their 
movements. But it was not until 1997 that grassroots politics achieved new heights 
when the Assembly of the Poor (hereafter: AOP) successfully organised a famous 99-
day protest and won billions of baht in concessions from the government. Although 
some major concessions were later reversed by the later government, the achievements 
of the AOP gained during the 1997 protest are still seen as a historical moment for 
grassroots politics in Thailand. 
Several studies have been devoted to Thai grassroots movements, especially the 
AOP, in different dimensions, but inadequate attention has been paid to understanding 
the influences of the political surroundings. Despite the evidence that some components 
in the political environment partially determine the types of actions and strategies 
chosen by the movements (Meyer 2004: 128), this inadequacy persists. Moreover, it is 
argued that the movements of the marginalised groups in Thailand are fundamentally 
weak, owing to their lack of efficient mobilising structure and the lack of long-term 
commitment of the members (Uchane 2007). The shortcomings of the internal 
components leave the movements vulnerable to external changes. Without analyses on 
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the influence of internal factors, one may not be able to fully understand the dynamics 
of the AOP and other grassroots movements in Thailand. 
External factors have become even more crucial than ever at the present time 
when Thailand is at political crossroads. Back in the 1990s, Thailand underwent major 
political reforms, which resulted in several changes towards a more liberal order (see 
Connors 2002). This has supposedly brought about greater political opportunities for 
the popular movements in the decades to come. But in reality, those expected increased 
opportunities have never really materialised. First, Thai politics in the first half of the 
2000s was marked by political stability under Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) and the 
political dominance of the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (see Naruemon 
2006). But during this period, the country became increasingly divided into two major 
camps. The situation became even more complicated after the military coup of 19 
September 2006; the country then experienced several episodes of political turbulence 
marked by a change of constitution, several changes of governments, the court-ordered 
dissolutions of major political parties, and a series of protests and incidents of political 
violence. From that point onwards, Thailand has become highly polarised. Political 
groups were divided not only pro- or anti-Thaksin lines but also over other issues, 
including pro- and anti-coup, and pro- and anti royal intervention. Changes in Thai 
politics in this period have been taking place rapidly and at times radically.  
This is unfortunate for people's movements, especially the AOP, since their 
political fate is partially determined by these political events. One of the ramifications 
of these changes is that people's groups and their campaigns on environmental, land 
and poverty issues have become increasingly less relevant in the eye of the public. 
More politically and ideologically-oriented movements, namely the yellow- and red-
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shirt1
                                                 
1 The yellow-shirts are also known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy, which kicked off 
its official campaign in early 2006 as anti-Thaksin movement. But after adopting a pro-
monarchy position, the movement has become increasingly yellow-oriented (yellow is 
associated with Monday—the day that the King Bhumibol was born). On the other end, the red-
shirts started off as the pro-Thaksin, but after the coup, the movement has become increasingly 
associated with demands for some radical democratic changes. 
 movements—with more radical strategies, strong connections with the elite, and 
greater number of supporters—have become major instruments for political changes. 
Structural and national political issues, rather than local ones, have become central to 
political manoeuvring. Political activists who had previously worked with AOP in the 
1990s have now been deeply divided over the colour-coded national conflict. As a 
result, the ‘people’s sector’ has been fragmented and weakened. Without full support 
from leading activists, the AOP and other people's groups are now seen less as political 
actors and more as political spectators.  
To understand these changes, this thesis aims to investigate the factors behind 
the AOP's decline between 2001 and 2010. It argues that, because of inherent internal 
weaknesses and the recent political changes, the development of Assembly of the Poor 
in the 2000s has increasingly been influenced, if not determined, by external factors. 
Internally, I explore the AOP's mobilising structure and assess its strengths and 
weaknesses. Moreover, I utilise the concept of political opportunity structure (hereafter: 
POS) as main theoretical instrument in explaining the political development and 
mobilisation of the AOP in this period. The major questions this research seeks to 
answer are:  
1) How has the AOP been organised? 
2) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the movement's structure? 
3) What are the components of the POS that have impacted the AOP's 
development and mobilisation?   
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4) How have these components affected the AOP’s development and 
mobilisation in the 2000s? 
5) And how have the AOP reacted to these impacts caused by the POS?  
The relationships between the POS and the movements can be explained as follows. 
The POS is a set of features of a political system that determines the likelihood that a 
social movement would successfully emerge or mobilise. The POS can act as a 
facilitator or obstacle to the movement. But sometimes the POS can be changed. 
According to McAdam (1982: 41), the POS is shaped by the political events or broad 
socio-political processes that have impacts on the structure of political establishment.2
Moreover, it should be noted that, as opposed to early writings on the AOP, 
such as Suthy (1997) and Prapas (1998), this work takes a more critical view of the 
movement. In this thesis, the movement participants are not always treated as 
 
A change in the POS can be intentional and unintentional. The events, for example, can 
be outcomes of actions taken by individuals or groups for political purposes. 
Sometimes, unplanned developments occur, despite having political meaning attached 
to them. Sometimes, movements could, as a result, change their fate by taking some 
political actions that can consequently affect the POS.  
In the case of Thailand in the 2000s, the political dominance of Thaksin and the 
power struggles of the pro- and anti-Thaksin camps account for a series of short-term 
political events. These events, coupled with other long-term processes, have 
contributed to the changes in the POS of Thai grassroots movements. Consequently, the 
movements felt compelled to respond to the changed POS in ways that may help them 
survive or succeed in relation to the new structure. 
                                                 
2  For example, political events can be government parties winning general elections or a 
formation of an anti-government networks, and broad socio-political processes can include a 
continual change of socio-economic structure in favour of the elite groups or a gradual change 
of socio-political climate that supports the excluded groups. 
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ideologically-motivated actors, using an idealised participatory democratic approach, 
but they are also viewed as political actors with self-interested political actors with 
pragmatic political strategy. The role and the influence of the non-governmental 
individuals (hereafter: NGI), in particular, will be critically analysed more in this 
research since it has been understated early studies on the AOP. In this thesis, the term, 
non-governmental individual is specifically used to refer to those who work for 
development-oriented non-governmental organisations (hereafter: NGO) in Thailand. 
According to Lewis and Kanji (2009: 7-12), there are a number of terms, including 
non-governmental individuals, which are used as references to NGOs and their 
workers, depending on historical and social contexts. As for this study, the term ‘non-
governmental individual’ is chosen to partially emphasise the individualistic nature of 
their working style. As will be demonstrated later in Chapter II, these NGIs do not 
necessarily work for NGOs, but on the contrary, many NGOs have been established to 
facilitate their personal works. This explains why many Thai development-oriented 
NGOs are short-lived (Riska 1999) and have no clear organisational structure.  
Also, unlike most works written on the AOP, which explain the AOP as one 
movement of diverse groups but with shared long-term goals (see Suthy 1997, 2004; 
Prapas 1998; Kanoksak 1999; Baker 2000; Missingham 2003; Naruemon 2006), this 
thesis rather views the movement as a highly fractionalised alliance with a number of 
short-term goals, goals which are not necessarily shared by all the component groups.  
It is essential first to explore the historical background of Thai politics as well 
as the struggle of grassroots groups. The next section will also provide the political 
backdrop of the emergence of people's groups, notably the AOP in the 1990s.  
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B. Background 
The elites have been the dominant force in Thai politics. Between 1930s and the 1960s, 
Thai politics was, according to Wilson (1966) and Riggs (1966), essentially defined as 
a ‘bureaucratic polity,’ and Thai politics was a political competition between 
bureaucratic elite groups and factions. Other political institutions or groups, Wilson 
(1966: 277-278) contends, were weak, and the idea of parliamentary democracy had 
not yet emerged in Thailand. Moreover, he asserted that the vast majority of Thais were 
not interested in politics; he described them as individualistic, status-conscious, and 
politically passive people (ibid: 45-71). This cultural explanation was along the same 
lines as Embree (1950) and Benedict (1952) who argued that the loosely structured 
social system is a crucial factor for the lack of group and self-discipline among Thais. 
This attitude is believed to have developed into political passivity among the Thai 
populace. Other authors, notably Hindley (1968), also stressed the politically apathetic 
role of the Thai masses during this period.  
This political setting changed as Thailand entered the 1980s. A new consensus 
between elite groups was reached and Thai politics in this period is generally defined as 
semi-democracy (Chai-anan 1989). While the role of the bureaucratic elite remained 
strong, the elected politicians were allowed to share some of the power. The 1980s also 
saw the beginning of what was later known as money politics, which largely involved 
illegally activities, such as vote buying and corruption, by politicians and businessmen 
(see Callahan and McCargo 1996). This rise also marked the emerging power of the 
provincial capitalist politicians after the bureaucratic elites were defeated in the May 
popular uprising in 1992.  
However, the dominant power of the Thai state has never been without local 
challengers. Thailand, according to Missingham (2003: 20), has a long history of 
protest and rebellion organised by peasants. Peasants revolts appear to have occurred in 
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different periods from the seventeenth century to 1959 and in many regions, notably the 
Northeast. During the 1930s and 1940s, MPs from the Northeast and civilian groups 
also played a key role against the military dictatorship (see Somchai 2006: 38-44). And 
from the mid-1960s to late 1970s, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), which was 
the strongest non-bureaucratic force outside Bangkok, mounted serious assaults on the 
Thai state. In 1974, Thailand saw the emergence of the first grassroots movement, the 
Farmers Federation of Thailand (FFT). But its activities soon ended after the violent 
attacks of the rightist forces in 1975 and 1976 (see Morell and Chai-anan 1981; Turton 
1978).  
The non-governmental organisation movement also re-emerged in the 1980s. 
Thai NGIs had been working with the grassroots since the late 1960s, but they ceased 
their operation after the 1976 coup due to the government’s repressive strategies 
towards non-bureaucratic groups. However, Prudhisan and Maneerat (1997: 199-200) 
argue the movement revived because: 1) political conditions were more open in the 
1980s, 2) former student activists in the 1970s became the disillusioned with the armed 
struggle strategy, 3) government-funded poverty reduction schemes became available, 
and 4) career opportunities in the private and government sectors were also lacking. 
With the influx of these new NGIs, large organisational structure was also replaced by 
small issue-based organisations, and their activities were no longer concentrated in 
Bangkok areas. As conflict increased in the late 1980s, the role of NGIs in many areas, 
especially the Northeast, also became more political and confrontational (Somchai 
2006: 61; Callahan 1993: 163).  
Increased local conflicts in 1990s resulted in a rising number of protests. The 
situations for the farmers' activism in the early 1980s had not changed much from the 
last decade. The protests of the farmers might have increased in number, but they were 
less radical, more sporadic, and short-lived—similar to those of the late 1970s (Prapas 
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1998: 27). However, as the problems escalated in the 1990s, the number of protests 
significantly increased and the protests became more organised. In 1990 during the 
Chatichai government, the number of protests on land-water-forest issues was only 58, 
but the number skyrocketed to 279 protests in 1994 and 335 protests in 1995 (ibid: 30).  
Arguably, the turning point of the Thai grassroots politics took place as the 
military tried to implement one of the most ambitious state schemes, known as khor jor 
kor, to relocate 9,700 villages (around six million people) out of 1,253 different 
selected forests throughout the country (Pasuk and Baker 1995: 83). Implementation 
faced fierce resistance from the locals. The village protesters were also joined by 
students and activist groups. In 1992, the protesters hit the national media as they 
organised a rally of 4,500 participants, marching from the Northeast to Bangkok, which 
soon resulted in the suspension of the programme (ibid: 84).  
The anti-khor jor kor movement, according to Pye (2005: 206-227), has several 
long-term political impacts, including the emergence of new grassroots political groups 
and actors. It also “provides a powerful learning experience for villagers” (Missingham 
2003: 159) in engaging collective action. These new leaders would play a central role 
in the different movements and organisations in later periods. Somchai (2006: 72) 
suggests the anti-khor jor kor movement was the first important grassroots activism in 
the region since the collapse of the CPT, and it marked a new stage of radical 
movements in Thailand. Furthermore, the anti-khor jor kor protests also signified a 
rural-urban alliance, which would be the basis of people's politics afterwards.   
In 1992, almost two decades after the collapse of the FFT, another strong, 
nationally-recognised grassroots movement, the Small Scale Farmers’ Assembly of 
Isan (SSFAI), 3
                                                 
3 Isan is referred to the North-eastern region of Thailand.   
 was founded. The movement’s demands were mainly on two main 
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issues: land rights and income (Somchai 2006: 93, 105). The movement also sought to 
build an alliance with other social groups and classes, including NGIs and school 
teachers. But soon, there were internal disagreements and scandals, which finally led to 
a split among the leaders. The movement became significantly weakened afterwards.    
As the SSFAI was in its decline, another strong grassroots movement, the AOP, 
was also formed. The Assembly of the Poor was officially founded on 10 December 
1995 as 250 villagers' representatives 4
As a public launch event, the AOP marched from Hua Lumphong railway 
station to the ASEAN Summit (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to present the 
Declaration to ASEAN delegates (Missingham 2003: 39). This attracted considerable 
media and public attention. The AOP then submitted a petition to the government that 
included a detailed list of its members' grievances (Assembly of the Poor: 1996, quoted 
in Missingham 2003: 39). In late March 1996, the AOP staged its first massive protest 
 and NGO delegates gathered at Thammasat 
University in Bangkok during a conference, entitled ‘Assembly of the Poor: The 
Consequences of Large-scale Development Projects.’ The event was also joined by 
representatives from NGOs from other countries. Another site for the conference was 
located at the Mun River in the Northeast, where two local conflicts over large dams 
were taking place (Missingham 2003: 38). The founding of the AOP was marked by 
Mun River Declaration, which stated that movement was a “platform (wethi) for mutual 
learning and exchange of knowledge about our problems by poor and disadvantaged 
people in society” (ibid: 39). It aimed “to build the power and cooperation of the poor 
at the local, national and international levels to convince the public that states must 
manage resources in ways that ensure equity and fairness for all people, free rights, and 
popular participation and self-determination” (Missingham 2003: 39).   
                                                 
4  These villagers represented: the Small Scale Farmers’ Assembly of Isan, the Northern 
Farmers' Network, the Network of People Affected by Dams, the Isan Farmers' Assembly for 
Protection of Land Rights, and a network of urban slum dwellers. 
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against the Banharn Silpa-archa government's unresponsive handling of their 
grievances. Approximately 12,000 people joined the campaign, and the protest lasted 
five weeks. The collective action gained an extensive media attention and public 
recognition (Missingham 2003: 129). Despite that, the protest was fruitless in terms of 
solving the problems of the villagers; Banharn’s coalition government soon collapsed 
and officials refused to take any further action (ibid: 129-130).  
 For the next move, the AOP was aware that in order to get something tangible 
from the new Chavalit Yongchaiyudh government, their protest had to be massive, 
lengthy, and attractive to the media. And they did just that. The AOP rapidly expanded 
its networks and was able to mobilise over 25,000 participants. The protests stayed in 
front of Government House for ninety-nine days (from 25 January 1997 to 2 May 
1997) and gained even more extensive media coverage and public support. The protest 
was a significant political phenomenon in many ways. Although the 99-day protest no 
longer holds the record for the longest lasting protest ever staged in Bangkok,5
The government recognition and level of compensation the AOP received were 
certainly extraordinary. Baker also writes, “Although far short of the AOP’s original 
agenda, concessions on this scale were totally unprecedented” (2000: 23). The list 
included: giving compensation packages to almost 7,000 families for their loss of land 
and livelihood caused by dam projects; cancelling one dam project and reviewing five 
 it was 
the first time that such a massive and lengthy political demonstration had taken place in 
the capital. Prapas (1998) notes that it was the first time that affected villagers and the 
government delegates were put at the same level at the negotiation table. Historically 
speaking, it has not been too often that the mighty Bangkok government was 
surrounded and barraged by powerless rural villagers (Baker 2000). 
                                                 
5 The PAD announced that their protest against the government led by People’s Power Party 
outlasted the 99-days protest by the AOP. The PAD’s protest lasted 193 days from 25 May 
2008 to 3 December 2008.  
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others; and ending summary eviction from ‘forest’ lands and admitting the principle 
that long-settled villagers should be allowed to stay in ‘forest’ zones. In total, the 
government’s immediate cost was 4,657 million baht (ibid.).  
 However, the success of the AOP was short-lived. After urban-biased Chuan 
Leekpai became the prime minister following the collapse of the Chavalit government 
in late 1997, he reversed the land settlement and dam compensations promised by 
Chavalit. Thereafter, any outstanding government promises were simply ignored by 
state officials (Missingham 2003: 201-202). The AOP was further hit by the 1997 
economic crisis, which turned the public as well as the media against the poor 
protesters. Street protests were feared to cause the country a bad image for foreign 
investors (Baker 2000: 24-26; Rungrawee 2004: 545; Prapas 1998: 136). Realising its 
increasing unpopularity in the capital, the movement then experimented a dao krajai 
(literally, scattered stars) tactic. Instead of concentrate on one massive rally in 
Bangkok, which required more resources, the AOP staged smaller protracted protests in 
several local AOP bases. The strategy turned out to be a failure (Rungrawee 2004: 
546).   
 However, the prospect of the AOP was briefly boosted at the beginning of the 
Thaksin government (2001-2006). At first, Thaksin appeared to be sympathetic with 
their cause of struggle (Pasuk and Baker 2009: 144). The early optimism turned into a 
bitter end as the government refused to agree to the AOP’s major demands, notably the 
permanent opening of the Pak Mun Dam’s sluice gates. The conflict became intensified 
in late 2002. The AOP staged a prolonged protest to pressure the government to change 
its decision. But the protest was proven to be fruitless as the villagers were forced to 
leave Bangkok in early 2003 empty-handed. The AOP organised another massive 
protest in March 2005, but it lasted only two days and once again yielded nothing.    
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 The AOP came back to the capital in February 2006, amid the heating political 
conflict between the government and the anti-Thaksin groups. The villagers took a 
radical approach as they occupied a Ministry of the Agriculture and Cooperative 
building to make demands over their unsolved grievances. Key cabinet members 
rushed to negotiate with the protesters, but a dead end ensued; the negotiations were 
halted after the Thaksin publically announced a surprise political move, the dissolution 
of the parliament. After both actions, the protesters left Bangkok with no success. 
These failures of the AOP during the Thaksin governments resulted in a further decline 
of the movement. Since 1997, the AOP has not been able to mobilise a protest as 
massive as in the past, and the protests have not yielded anything near what the 99-day 
protest did. This clear decline of the AOP is also evident in academic studies, which 
will be discussed in the next section.  
C. The Assembly of the Poor in Literature  
The literature on the AOP can be divided into two periods, the early rising period (1997 
– 1998) and the later decline period (1999 - present). Work produced during the early 
period, mostly captures the excitement of a new grassroots movement with a new 
strategy, new qualities, and a potentially bright future in the Thai political arena. This 
considerably contrasts with studies of the later period, which offer a more cautious 
analysis stressing the AOP’s limitations. The discussions also move towards external 
factors, notably the strength of the Thaksin government. As the AOP became 
weakened, the development of the movement became increasingly influenced by 
outside factors.  
In one of the earliest studies, Suthy (1997) describes the AOP as a new social 
movement—a description which, as Uchane argues (2007: 151), has been widely used 
ever since. Suthy (1997) points out that the AOP can be seen as a new social movement 
because it comprises of different social classes, addresses previously unaddressed 
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issues, adopts direct political actions, and seeks to build a new more equal relationship 
between the people and the state. Similarly, Kanoksak (1999) views the movement as a 
new social movement with non-class interests. He adds that the AOP's political struggle 
is the continuation of the movements in the past but with a new approach. Prapas 
(1998) argues that the AOP should not be recognised merely as an interest group 
because the movement address some long-term public issues, such as environmental 
problems. Some of the achievements, he argues, include the creation of a decentralised 
organisational structure, participatory culture among its members, collective leadership, 
a new resource mobilisation structure, non-violent practices, and an alliance with 
NGOs and other allies. 
In these early studies, one can find stress on the following common features: a 
more democratic and decentralised structure, direct political actions, new non-violent 
strategies, the link between the AOP with the role of strengthening the civil society, the 
recognition of the AOP as a new social movement, the multi-class alliance, and the 
tackle on the previously unaddressed issues, especially environment. These descriptions 
clearly distinguish the AOP from the failed radical movements in the 1970s as well as 
the less successful movements in the 1980s and 1990s. By branding the AOP as a new 
social movement and linking the movement with civil society and environmentalism, 
the authors not only emphasise on the AOP's ‘unique’ qualities but also attempt to 
appeal the middle-class groups. After the 1992 uprising, which many middle-class 
protesters participated, democratisation, civil society, and the middle-classes were 
believed to be closely linked. Since the 1980s, environmental issues can also appeal to 
the middle-classes. The attempt to label the AOP as new social movement or an 
environmental movement certainly links the AOP with the middle-classes, who had an 
increasingly vocal voice in Thai politics in the 1990s and early 2000s.    
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The early works also show an apparently optimistic view. On one hand, the 
optimism is to some extent justifiable since it clearly reflects the strong political 
standing of the AOP during and immediately after the major 1997 protest. On the other 
hand, as Uchane (2007) points out, it reveals the lack of ‘critical culture’ among the 
members of the Thai ‘people’s sector.’ This is ironic, given that many of these people 
consider themselves as vocal radical leftists. However, this can also be argued that 
some of these authors (Suthy and Prapas) have worked closely with the movement, so 
their supportive and uncritical views come as little surprise. Also, in a country where 
political struggle is fiercely contested like Thailand, academic work is another 
contested space. Academics working on movements often feel pressure to work with or 
for the movements.  
Academic works in the later period of decline contrasts greatly with earlier 
writings. While the sympathetic tone remains intact, more critical points and cautious 
view are offered. Sorot (1999) argues that country's centralised political structure has 
forced the villagers adopt extra-parliamentary political approach. Although he 
recognises some positive impacts that the SSFAI and the AOP have created, he 
downplays the achievements of the two in strengthening civil society. Kanokrat (2003) 
reveals some failures faced by the anti-Pak Mun Dam movement (part of the dam 
group in the AOP). 6
                                                 
6 Although the study does not focus directly on the AOP as a whole, it reflects similar problems 
faced by the AOP. Moreover, Anti-Pak Mun Dam group has an important role in the movement 
because of: 1) the size of the affected people, 2) the organisational readiness, 3) the long 
experience and developed ability of the village leaders, and 4) the leading role of its advisers in 
the AOP.  
 In terms of framing processes, she argues that the movement 
leaders failed: 1) to promote the culture of participatory democracy to the public at 
large, 2) to inform the public about the long-term goals and demands of the movement, 
and 3) to create a common understanding about long-term goals even among movement 
participants themselves (ibid: 243-244).  
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The change of economic and political climate after the 1997 protest had 
significant impacts on the level of mobilisation of the AOP. While Baker (2000) 
recognises some significant contributions of the AOP to Thai political history during 
the highly symbolic protest in 1997, he also identifies the reverse effects of the 1997 
economic crisis and the rise of the Chuan government on the AOP. Likewise, 
Rungrawee argues that the media plays a pivotal role in the AOP’s political strategy. 
She points out that after the 1997 economic crisis hit the country, the media 
immediately turned its back on the protesters (2004: 545). Missingham (2003) also 
recognises the limitations of the AOP in the post-1997 period. In conclusion 
Missingham cautions: “Any claim that the Assembly of the Poor is democratizing 
society or transforming structures of inequality in Thailand in any far-reaching way 
would be overly optimistic. [...]  In terms of material outcomes of the AOP’s protests 
and petitions, the movement has had significant but limited success” (2003, 220).  
Moreover, Naruemon (2006) views the limited participatory nature of Thai 
democracy, the 1997 constitution, and the rise of Thaksin as major obstacles to the 
mobilisation of the AOP in the late 1990s and early 2000s. She recognises the 
limitations in the AOP’s ‘dual strategy,’ which involves demonstration and negotiation, 
and how it could be significantly disrupted by the change of socio-political 
environment. Prapas and Uchane (2006) argue that the AOP, which uses the extra-
parliamentary politics as their main strategy, has to depend on the media access for 
their political campaign. They observe that due to many factors, the movement had not 
been able to gain adequate media attention recently. Moreover, they also notice that the 
content of reports on the movement during the Thaksin government appeared to focus 
on the dramatisation of the conflicts between the protesters and the government rather 
than the AOP's demands and the background of villagers' problems. Partially because 
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of this, it came with no surprise that the public showed little sympathy to the villagers 
during the Thaksin government.  
Additionally, Uchane (2007: 164) challenges the claims made in early writings 
as he argues the AOP should more appropriately be viewed as an interest group with 
some unique features. He raises some serious questions about some underlying 
principles and features of the AOP. Uchane (2007: 163), for example, questions the 
legitimacy of the image promoted by the AOP and its supporters as an environmental 
movement or a new social movement. He also argues factors, such as the focus on 
short-term objectives, massive and prolonged protest strategy, the changing situation 
(inside and outside the movement), and the complex organisational structure and 
relationships between groups, have significantly weakened the movement.  
More critical views and more emphasis on external factors are clearly evident in 
academic studies of the later period. This reflects the declining political position of the 
AOP as well as the rising internal chasm. The later studies agree that there has been an 
increasing pressure for the movement to rethink its strategy. The role of NGIs in the 
movement, which was had previously been seen as strengthening force, has been put in 
dispute. To emphasise the important of the internal factors, Kingkarn (2008: 40-41) 
correctly argues that internal elements are crucial factors because only movements with 
internal strength would have capacity to withstand the external pressure and continue to 
be a challenging force in an unfriendly political environment. As the movement itself 
became weakened, external aspects have been increasingly influential in the later 
works.  
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D. Social Theories and the Political Opportunity Structure 
Before discussing the theoretical model used in this thesis, it is essential to address 
some approaches in social movement study. The classical model, which was employed 
in early studies, focuses on the relationship between structural strain and people’s 
discontent of the social or political system. Classical theorists believe that social 
movements arise when people are highly disrupted by the system. To them, the 
movements function as a kind of psychological therapy for these movement members. 
This model clearly views collective actions as irrational behaviour of psychologically 
disoriented members of the society (McAdam 1982: 6; Meyer 2004: 126). However, 
later studies suggested otherwise. The approach is criticised as not offering logical 
explanation for the emergence of the insurgence of the marginalised groups for rational 
political goals.  
Rooted in European traditions, new social movement theory (NSM) rejects the 
traditional Marxist traditions that solely focus on actors and actions deriving from 
capitalist economic production and class relationships. Instead, the approach, according 
to Buechler (1995: 442), focuses on ‘other sources of identity,’ such as gender and 
ethnicity, as the definers of their collective actions, and NSM theories are also based on 
“a diverse array of collective actions that have presumably displaced the old social 
movement theory of proletarian revolution associated with classical Marxism” (ibid.). 
In terms of methods, Cohen (1985) views the movements as reflecting an abandonment 
of the old dreams of revolution, and the replacement of revolutionary goals with a quest 
for structural reforms. On the other hand, Habermas (1981) believes that the NSMs can 
function as protection of civil society space against state encroachment.  
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a. Internal Factors: Mobilising Structure and Framing Processes 
A movement also needs to a suitable mobilising structure to achieve its goals. One 
approach, known as resource mobilisation theory (RMT), seeks to explain how 
organisation can be structured under constraints of limited resources. RMT suggests 
that without some support from some members of the elite groups, an emergence of 
functioning movements is unlikely (McAdam 1982: 21). Whereas traditional theories 
assume that a movement’s participants tend to be irrationally motivated by discontent, 
RMT explains that a social movement is collectively formed and institutionalised by 
rational actors (Meyer 2004: 127). Any actions taken are carefully calculated in terms 
of costs and rewards. The resource management skills of leaders are highlighted as 
crucial factors for mobilising a successful movement. However, RMT is criticised for 
its failure to explain the emergence of movements instigated by resource-lacking 
groups (see McAdam 1982). Despite these criticisms, this approach is still useful in 
evaluating how organisational resources are managed, how grievances are defined, and 
how strategies are formulated and employed by the movement leaders. In the context of 
a society such as Thailand that has a rigid system of social hierarchy, the role of 
leadership and its requisite skills in mobilising the masses should not be 
underestimated. 
Another social movement approach, known as ‘framing processes,’ focuses on 
how social movements can gain political leverage by bringing certain issues or 
presenting ideas, beliefs, or values to the public. These strategic actions are aimed at 
gaining more support, creating sense of unity, as well as legitimising their collective 
actions. Moreover, Tarrow (1998: 21-22) argues that framing defines ‘us’ and ‘them’—
meaning that framing creates certain collective identities among the movement 
participants, which essentially separate them from movement outsiders. However, 
framing theories are often criticised for their failures to understand cultural constraints 
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surrounding the movements (Benford and Snow 2000: 622). And to mobilise a 
successful movement, the activists have to be able to select appropriate issues or 
concepts that help them to achieve their goals. Movement organisers are therefore 
required to possess some skills to control the framing processes.   
b. External Factors: Political Opportunity Structure 
Developed in the 1980s, the political process model focuses on the influences of the 
wider political system in facilitating or impeding the growth of social movements. The 
movements and their supporters are viewed as only one of the factors within the 
political process. According to McAdam (1982), the political process model outlines 
three essential factors: the first two involve elements within an organisation and the last 
one focuses on the importance of political opportunities conditioned by political 
environment. First, organisational resources are required if a movement is to succeed. 
Similar to RMT, the availability of resources and the skills to manage them are required 
in order to sustain or expand the movements. It is also necessary for activists to be 
skilful in formulating political strategies and tactics. Second, a psychological factor 
called ‘cognitive liberation’—meaning the belief that collective action can bring about 
change to society—is crucial for mobilising popular support.  
The third factor is the availability of political opportunities. Wars, political 
realignments, prolonged unemployment and other socio-political conditions can have a 
great impact on the public support for social movements (McAdam 1982: 41). In his 
work, the changes in policy and political environment overtime, such as the collapse of 
cotton economy in the south, the migration of African Americans to the north, made it 
possible for movements mobilise for public support. Meyer points out the importance 
of political environment factor in the political process theory as follows: 
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The primary point of the political process approach was that activists do 
not choose goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, the political 
context, conceptualized fairly broadly, sets the grievances around which 
activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others. 
[...] The wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activists’ choices—their 
agency—can only be understood and evaluated by looking at the political 
context and the rules of the games in which those choices are made—that 
is, structure (2004: 127-128).  
In addition, the strength of this model also has to do with the fact that it allows the 
researchers to understand non-elite-based movements (McAdam 1982: 36-40), which 
are likely to be found in developing countries. It can also be used to understand not 
only the emergence and development of a movement but also the decline of a 
movement in a given political environment over time. 
Many social movement theorists focus solely on external factors, known as the 
political opportunity structure. According to Van Der Heijden, the POS is generally 
referred to “specific features of a political system (e.g., a country) that can explain the 
different action repertoires, organizational forms and impacts of social movements, and 
social movement organizations in that specific country” (2006: 28). These specific 
features “jointly determine the strategies of the members of the political system in 
general, and of political authorities in particular, with regard to the mobilisation of 
social movements” (Kriesi et al. 1995: xv). The POS is shaped by the occurrences of 
political events or broad socio-political processes that have effects on the structure of 
political establishment (McAdam 1982: 41). Such events or processes serve as 
mechanisms to maintain or disrupt the existing political status quo. According to Meyer 
(2004: 128) the term the ‘structure of political opportunities’ was first explicitly 
introduced by Eisinger (1973) to explain the presence and absence of riots over race 
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and poverty in American cities in the early 1960s. Eisinger (ibid.) seeks to study the 
complex relationship between political environment and political behaviour by 
exploring various environmental conditions and the likelihood of urban riots.  
Several other writings have been devoted to clarify and utilise the concept. 
Kitschelt (1986: 63) argues that there are four factors that determine the openness of 
the political system; 1) the number of political parties, factions, and groups functioning 
in electoral politics, 2) the capacity of legislatures in independently developing and 
controlling policies, 3) the access to the decision-making process, and 4) the 
availability of demand-collecting mechanism. Kriesi et al. (1992; 1995) suggests that 
the components of the POS include the followings; 1) the nature of existing cleavage, 
2) the formal institutional structure, 3) the informal strategies used by the elite groups 
against their challengers, and 4) the structure of the electoral alliance. This narrower 
specification of the POS used by Kitschelt (1986) and Kriesi et al. (1992; 1995) is 
contrasted with earlier works by McAdam (1982) and Tilly (1978), which offer a broad 
range of factors. Such simple specification is, Kitschelt (1986) argues, expected to offer 
better explanation of the strategies utilised by the challenging groups in each country. 
But by doing that, researchers risk simplifying and flattening “simplifying and 
flattening a broad range of factors critical to the development of a social movement 
over time” (Meyer 2004: 131).  
Other studies on the grassroots movements are devoted to examine the factors 
within the political environment that enable the excluded groups to emerge in 
developing countries. The movements in these developing nations usually face 
difficulty trying to survive in the state-controlled political structure. Osa and 
Corduneanu-Huci (2003), for example, attempt to identify the POS that enables non-
elite groups to challenge authoritarian governments. Borrowing Tarrow (1998), the first 
four factors employed in the study include: 1) elite divisions, 2) less severe state 
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repression, 3) media access, and 4) influencing allies (Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003: 
612). Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (ibid.) add a fifth factor to their study, namely the 
availability of social networks. This model is designed to understand the emergence of 
social movements in authoritarian states, and therefore, its applicability to the more 
open political system of Thailand must be cautioned. Lundy (1999), on the other hand, 
does not offer a concrete conceptualisation of the POS of the mobilisation of 
environmental groups in Jamaica, but she does mention the issue of limited 
applicability of the First World theory to Third World countries in terms of 
participants’ profile, their motives and goals, and most importantly the political 
circumstances surrounding the movements. 
Political Opportunity Structure and the Assembly of the Poor  
Although the available paradigms in social movement studies are not entirely helpful in 
explaining Thai POS, many elements of these theories are more or less relevant to the 
case. In order to apply the idea of POS in this work, the re-conceptualisation of the idea 
is therefore necessary for this research project. The re-conceptualised POS, however, 
has to be cautious as Gamson and Meyer point out that: “The concept of political 
opportunity structure is [...] in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect 
of the social movement environment” (1996: 275). Also, the concept of POS may 
explain a great deal but the approach may not be applicable to other cases (see 
Goodwin and Japer 2003, quoted in Meyer 2004: 126). 
 In this thesis, two main sets of POS components are utilised. The first set 
involves stable POS elements, which are deeply embedded in the political system. 
Social movement theorists view these components as essentially fixed and given 
elements, which are beyond the control of the movement activists (Gamson and Meyer 
1996: 277; Kriesi et al. 1995: 26). Changes only occur to these permanent components 
through either slow transition or revolution (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 277). The 
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analysis on elements is certainly useful in comprehending the structural barriers that 
grassroots movements in a given political structure are up against over the long period 
of time. In Thailand, these elements have adversely impacted the development and 
mobilisation of grassroots movements for decades.    
 As for the stable components, I propose the use of dominant culture, 
institutional structure, and prevailing strategies because these three have played an 
essential role in partially determining the development of the Thai grassroots 
movements. First, studies show that cultural structure can have significant impacts on 
social movements. A cultural shift in western societies during the post-war period, for 
example, partially gave rise to ‘new politics’ issues and Green movements (Inglehart 
1977; 1990). Likewise, Saichol (2005; 2008) argues that the idea of Thainess, which is 
an important part of the Thai culture, creates limited space for the poor to obtain 
justice, freedom and equality.  
 Second, in terms of institutional structure, Kriesi et al. (1995) propose an 
influential model that can assess how the stable aspects of the POS affect social 
movements. Generally, the prospects of the movements are influenced by the strength 
of the state. The stronger the state is, the less like the movements would succeed. The 
state strength, according to Kriesi et al. (ibid.), is determined by the degree of 
decentralisation and separation of power. They argue that the greater degree of 
decentralisation, the more the access points, and less the capacity of the state to act. 
Similarly, the more the degree of separation of power (between different branches and 
within each branch), the more constrained the state is capable to act. Moreover, they 
also contend that three political arenas, namely parliamentary, administrative, and 
direct democracy, also have to be taken into consideration to further measure the 
strength of the state. These factors are helpful in determining the strength of the Thai 
state and how the villager protesters have been restricted from gaining access to the 
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system. As the AOP seeks not to topple the government, its success mostly relies on its 
capacity to influence the government to resolve the grievances of its members as well 
as change the laws that damage the livelihood of the villagers. The access to the 
political system is therefore one of the crucial factors that measure the movement's 
success.  
 Third, studies suggest the link between the prevailing strategies and the 
development of social movements (Tarrow 1998; Kriesi et al. 1995; Gamson and 
Meyer 1996). For example, repressive strategies can be used to deter non-elite 
challengers from taking any collective action (Tarrow 1998: 80). According to Kriesi et 
al. (1995: 34-36), the prevailing strategies are structurally embedded and they are 
closely connected with the country's history and tradition. However, the application of 
this concept to the AOP case has to be made cautiously. Unlike many other grassroots 
movements, the AOP's primary goals are not to bring down the government or radically 
to change the political structure, so the use of state repression against villagers has been 
relatively limited.  
 The second set of components involve volatile elements, which includes elite 
divisions and media access. Unlike the stable components, these elements constantly 
change and they can be influenced by the movement activists (Gamson and Meyer 
1996: 289). In most studies, elite divisions are cited as the most important factor that 
influences grassroots mobilisation. Generally, splits among the elite, according to 
Tarrow (1998: 79), provide incentives to the non-elite groups to challenge the system. 
The divisions also encourage groups within the elite to take the opportunity to assist the 
grassroots protesters to challenge the opposing elite group for their political gains 
(Schock 2005: 33-34; Jenkins and Perrow 1977). On the other hand, the presence of 
elite support or being allied with the elite may also encourage the challengers take risks 
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since they may be provided with some sort of protection or assistance (Tarrow 1998, 
79).  
 However, in the AOP case, having influential allies do not produce significant 
impacts on the movement. Although elite allies can provide the movements with media 
some coverage or funding opportunities, their role is rather restricted. As Thailand is a 
developing democracy, it is essential that elite groups both inside and outside the 
parliament are taken into consideration. While elected elites officially control the 
political powers, bureaucratic elites effectively function as a stabilising force. Military 
interventions and coups throughout the history ensure that the Thai government has to 
find a way to control the armed forces (McCargo and Ukrist 2005: Chapter IV). The 
degree of division or unity among these elites has significant impacts on the general 
political structure as well as the political opportunities for the AOP.    
 Equally important, social movements have to depend on media access in order 
to carry out successful political campaigns. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993: 116) argue 
the movements are dependent on the media for three main purposes: 1) conveying their 
messages, 2) validating their status and actions, and 3) broadening the audience. In 
democracies, the media access can help the movement gain more members 
(Vliegenthart et al. 2005; Smith 1999, quoted in Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2012: 392). 
In non-democratic regimes, the media also plays a key role in facilitating the grassroots 
mobilisation (Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003). Similarly, media coverage contributed 
considerably to the achievements of the AOP during its 99-day protest in 1997 (Prapas 
1998: 131-135; Baker 2000: 20). Rungrawee (2004) argues that the protesters 
deliberately and actively carry out their collective actions in order to gain the media 
attention. Prapas and Uchane (2006) contend that the AOP have to depend on the media 
because its main strategy involves extra-parliamentary activities and non-institutional 
channels. They add that due to many factors, the movement has not gained the media 
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access it once had. This has adversely affected its campaign in the recent years. 
Unfortunately, after the political polarisation began in late 2005, no new study has been 
conducted focusing on the link between AOP's mobilisation and media access.  
  However, while the thesis emphasises on external factors, namely the POS, it 
also attempts to assess the internal components of the AOP. As shown in the previous 
section, although authors have written extensively on this subject, most of these 
writings have more or less overlooked the influence of NGIs on the movement and 
have failed critically analysed the movement's goals, strategies, and structure. The 
resource mobilisation approach, which has already been discussed, will be used to deal 
with this subject.  
E. Methods 
In order to understand the Assembly of the Poor, this thesis uses both documents and 
empirical data. For documents, primary and secondary sources are utilised to portray an 
accurate picture of the movement and its political surroundings. The thesis reviews 
extensive academic writings on the AOP, people's movements, and Thai politics. These 
documents provide the analyses on the internal elements of the AOP, general 
knowledge of the people's movement, and the political environment in different 
periods. The selection of documents for study is, of course, a political act in itself. The 
selection of materials is both systematic and reflexive, so that my biases as researcher 
are appropriately and adequately evident. As the thesis aims to look at the movement 
from a critical perspective, it emphasises the arguments from later writings on the AOP, 
which tend to offer a much more cautious and critical view. Some official documents, 
such as the movement's statements, are also examined to add details to study. In terms 
of language, the thesis uses both English and Thai documents in order to broaden the 
views on the movement.  
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 In the media access section, newspapers and weekly magazines are also used 
extensively to understand the link between the media and the AOP's political 
opportunities. The section analyses the news reports from the Matichon news clipping 
online database, between January 2000 and December 2010. The database provides 
news reports from over 30 sources (see FAQ, Matichon News Clipping Online 
Database), including all major newspapers, in both Thai and English. This method 
shows the media space that the movement has gained over the years. When the AOP's 
news reports are compared with the political events in the same period, this to a certain 
extent reveals the connection between AOP's activities and the national politics. The 
use of news report counts in an analysis is also used in Forsyth (2001), as he accesses 
the relationship of social and economic class and environmental social movements in 
Thailand.   
 As for empirical data, the thesis fieldwork was conducted in various provinces 
in Thailand, mostly in Bangkok where the AOP's regular meetings were usually held. 
The fieldwork covered the period between February 2010 and January 2011. During the 
fieldwork, mostly qualitative methods were used, including semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews, non-participant observation, and group discussions. A great 
deal of information came from the discussions during and after the AOP's meetings, 
which I regularly attended during the fieldwork in Thailand. I also attended other 
related events, including a demonstration and a meeting with a government 
representative and the state officials. I was also allowed to attend an exclusive meeting 
that was open only to the AOP leaders. Some valuable information came from these 
events.   
 The list of people I interviewed and discussed in groups included the AOP 
advisers, leaders and rank-and-file members, academics, a reporter, and a member from 
the Thaksin government (see Appendix A). The selection of the interviewees, who 
28 
 
worked or had worked with the AOP, was made according to their positions in the 
AOP, the depth of their understanding, and their views towards the movement. Age and 
experience of the interviewees were considered as part of the criteria. For those outside 
the movement, their selection was based on their professions and their role in the 
movement's development. Political views of the interviewees were taken into 
consideration because yellow-shirt supporters tend to be less critical of the movement 
than red-shirt sympathisers, who tend to be more radical. These criteria ensured that the 
information and insights from the interviews were in-depth and balanced. 
Unfortunately, there was some limitation for the field research as well. Since there were 
only a handful of women working as AOP's advisers, their voices might be 
underrepresented in terms of number in the interview. However, extra attention was 
given to these female voices to make sure that their views are adequately covered in 
this study. 
 In terms of format, the interviews were either semi-structured and unstructured 
depending on the circumstances, the issues, and the interviewees. Some unstructured 
interviews were conducted in certain situations, such as general discussions with rank-
and-file movement members outside the meetings. In most cases, semi-structured 
interviews were used to gather information from the selected interviewees. Some 
important open-ended questions were prepared in advance, but they were occasionally 
adapted to suit the interviewees. Note taking and recording were used during the 
prepared interviews. However, in cases, where recording was not possible, only note 
taking (during or after the interview) were employed. In some sensitive issues, such as 
internal conflicts, measures were taken to ensure the interviewees full anonymity. 
Interviews were conducted both in central Thai and North-eastern Thai dialects, both of 
which I speak fluently. Sometimes, the use of the North-eastern Thai dialect helped me 
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to gain trust from the interviewees, who were from the Northeast and could not speak 
the central Thai fluently (McCargo and Krisadawan 2004).  
Regarding transliteration, all Thai words are transcribed into English by using 
the Leeds Romanisation system (see Savitri 2002: xi-xii). But for personal names, 
English spellings follow informants’ and subjects’ own preferences, as shown in their 
business cards or personal Facebook pages.      
F. The Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis is divided into two parts, which deal with the AOP's internal and external 
components. Chapter II and Chapter III discuss the internal elements, such as the 
influential role of NGIs and the AOP's internal organisational structure. Regarding 
external elements, Chapter IV examines the stable aspects of the POS, while Chapter V 
investigates the volatile components. The detailed organisation of the thesis is shown as 
follows.  
 Chapter II discusses the influential role of the NGIs in Thai politics and the 
people's movements in the recent years. Since the NGIs have an important position in 
the movement, their thoughts and strategies have considerable impacts on the 
movement. The chapter argues that many of these activists, who have adopted the 
community culture approach, show a conservative tendency and non-political strategy. 
While these traits may have helped the villagers resolved some local issues, the 
strategies also have adverse impacts on grassroots activism and the people's movements 
in the long term.  
 Chapter III aims to reconstruct an understanding of the AOP in a more critical 
view. The chapter discusses some problems regarding goals and strategies of the 
movement. The pursuit of short-term goals by the majority of AOP component groups 
may have helped the movement expand in the early years, but as the struggle dragged 
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on, many AOP members simply left the movement. The chapter argues that those who 
joined the movement primarily for short-term interests tended to show low 
commitment, and were more likely to leave the movement, once their goals were 
realised or they found a better option to achieve their goals. Moreover, the loose 
structure and the lack of institutionalisation have significantly weakened the movement 
in the recent years. The weakened mobilising structure has in effect limited its success 
in pressuring the government outside the parliament, since the mass protest strategy 
heavily relies on numerical strength.  
  Chapter IV shows that the three stable aspects of the POS, namely the cultural 
structure, the institutional structure, and prevailing strategies, have mostly limited the 
development and mobilisation of the people's movements in Thailand. These structural 
components helped to explain why in the last few decades grassroots movements have 
not been able to reach their full potentials. First, the core of the cultural structure, the 
Thainess discourse, has made it difficult for the villager protesters to campaign for 
justice, freedom, and equality (Saichol 2005: 1). Second, the chapter also shows that 
the Thai state should be considered as a strong state mostly under the control of the 
elite groups. This has effectively limited the non-elite groups from gaining the access to 
the system. Third, the use of violent means as the prevailing strategies of the elites has 
negative  effects on grassroots activism.   
 Chapter V discusses the volatile aspects of the POS, which have allowed 
grassroots movements to occasionally emerge and develop over the years. These 
components include the elite divisions and media access. The first element, the elite 
divisions, had an important effect on the AOP during the Thaksin government. After 
having consolidated the powers, Thaksin was able to considerably control the elite 
groups inside and outside the parliament. This enabled the government to pursue its 
populist policies as well as weaken the people's movements, especially the AOP. 
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Although the government began to lose the elite control in late 2005, the AOP was 
unable to materialise from this elite cleavage. Apart from the weakened mobilising 
organisation, the AOP lost its capacity to gain the media access during this polarised 
politics. Most media attention turned to the national conflicts and coloured movements. 
This lack of media access significantly hindered the AOP's development in this period. 
An analysis on the news reports shows that the media would give the media space to 
the AOP only when its activities were somehow linked with colour-coded conflicts.  
 Chapter VI provides the summation of the thesis and reaffirms the key 
argument, which states that since the early 2000s, the development and the mobilisation 
of the AOP has been increasingly influenced by the external factors. This decline of the 
AOP is caused by the movement's weakened mobilising structure as well as the 
changing political opportunity structure. As a result of the this weakened position, the 
movement has become increasingly engaged in more controversial strategies, including 
lobby politics. The chapter also reveals that the limited mobilisation of the AOP is not 
an isolated incident, but rather an experience which has been shared by other Thai 
people's movements. Moreover, it argues that the prospects of the AOP could be quite 
limited, due to its internal weaknesses and the on-going political polarisation. This 
chapter also examines the theoretical contribution of the thesis. By examining the 
external elements, this thesis offers a different perspective in understanding the AOP. 
Additionally, this study contributes to the study of social movements and political 
opportunity structure, which has been based mainly on the emergence and development 
of social movements in either developed countries or non-democratic ones. 
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Chapter II: Making Sense of the Political Activism of Thai 
Non-Governmental Individuals 
A. Introduction 
Many things have politically in Thailand changed since the coup in 2006, including the 
constitution, nature of political conflict, the increase of street violence—the list goes on 
and on. But among these changes, perhaps the least publically discussed development 
is how ideas or concepts related to Thai politics should be defined. Basic political 
terms, which are already contested, such as democracy and sovereignty, 7
                                                 
7 Dressel (2010), for example, discusses the contestation of the two notions of legitimacy—the 
enduring trinity (nation, the religion, and king) and the alternatives (constitutionalism, popular 
sovereignty, performance). Although he does not see this as a competition of two main political 
groups to redefine the term democracy, in a way, this actually is. This is because both camps 
claim to represent two types of democracy—the Thai-style democracy (see Hewison 2009; 
Surin 2007) and the modern democracy. The main differences of these two types of democracy 
include the sources of powers, the distribution of powers among political groups, and the 
people’s rights and role in the system.  
 have also 
become even more highly debated than never before. A decade ago, fierce public 
debates over these issues would be unthinkable. The control over the definition gives 
the control over power distribution and political categorisation. Similarly, the term, 
‘people’s sector’ has also become openly contentious. Back in the 1990s, the term 
would mostly be used to refer to NGIs and villager leaders, which is an indicator of the 
closeness between the NGIs and the people. It also indicates the legitimacy of the NGIs 
to speak on behalf the people. However, after the post-2006 political crisis began and 
some NGIs performed widely questioned roles, such as supporting the coup or violent 
crackdown of the red-shirts, the term has become another space for political 
contestation. For example, Suriyan Tongnoo-ied, the Acting Secretary General of the 
Campaign for Popular Democracy, who had previously worked with the AOP and other 
people's movements, publically showed his support for the use of military suppression 
on the red-shirt protesters in April 2010 (Prachatai, 10 April 2010; Atchara 2010; 12-
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13). This caused some conflicts among his fellow NGIs (Fieldnotes, 25 September 
2010) and the activist circle (Thai E-News, 8 October 2010). 
 An interview with an outspoken NGI, Baramee Chairat, who has worked with 
people's movements such as the SSFAI and the AOP, reflects this view:  
NGIs probably played the most important role in the people’s sector in 
the past. NGIs and the people’s sector tended to be close together and 
were inseparatable. I think the NGIs were the first to use the term 
people’s sector when they did a presentation for or negotiation with the 
government. But now, I think NGIs and the people’s sector began to 
share increasingly fewer things in common. NGIs have their own 
political stance, thoughts, direction which I think […] are not 
compatible with those of the people’s sector. […] NGIs may publically 
announce that they are part of the people’s sector, but the terms NGO 
and people’s sector can no longer be used anonymously like before. […] 
I think the role of the NGOs has changed from checking on the 
government to working more with the government. And this direction is 
different from that of the villagers, the people’s sector—especially 
judging from the recent political situation. It is clear to me that the 
directions of the NGIs and the villagers are [now] different ones 
(Prachatai, 30 August 2010). 
This interview contains several interesting points. First, Baramee is widely known in 
NGO circles, so his comments reveal some serious ideological conflicts among the 
NGIs themselves. Second, the interview was part of a video series conducted by a 
group of a more radical element of the people’s sector, the Thai Social Movement 
Watch, which allies itself with the progressive wing of the red-shirt movement. This is 
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a clear attempt to redefine the term people’s sector from the red-shirts' point of view. 
Third, the interview raises an interesting point when it suggests that the Thai NGIs and 
the villagers/people no longer go to the same direction. Thai NGIs have always been 
known to be working closely with the people, and that is where their legitimacy derives 
(Shigetomi 2004a). So this begs some serious questions about the role of the ‘NGO 
movement’8
 This chapter is therefore an attempt to analyse the political thoughts and 
strategies of the Thai NGIs, and how these elements have impacts on the overall 
political structure and the emergence and development of people’s movements. 
Although the NGIs make up only a small number of individuals, they occupy positions 
of considerable power and influence over the formal and informal decision-making 
processes of these movements. According to Missingham (2003), their influence 
derives from their position in the structure, communication skills, and considerable 
grassroots activism experience.
 in the people’s politics and the democratisation process in Thailand in the 
past three decades.  
9
                                                 
8 The term ‘NGO movement’ is widely used in many academic studies of Thai NGOs (see 
Quinn 1997b; Pasuk and Baker 1997; Missingham 2003; Somchai 2006; Kasian 2004). In some 
works, this usage reflects a more positive view on the NGOs, which was prevalent in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. For others, it appears to emphasise some common characteristics of the NGIs, 
such as backgrounds, forms of activism, and interest in social justice (Simpkins 2003: 162). 
However, in a more critical view suggests otherwise. Simpkins, for example, writes that:  
a closer look at the NGO sector reveals that it is not an organized, coherent 
movement concentrating its efforts on specific policy issues, but rather a 
shifting agglomeration of disparate, even separatist, groups with different 
agendas, diverse visions of democracy, and extremely thin membership, 
dominated by luminaries of the activist era (ibid.). 
Another critical view on the Thai NGOs, led by Giles, accepts the existence of NGO movement 
but rather criticises their anti-radical Left and pro-conservative elite tendency (see Giles 2010).    
9 Although the study by Missingham (2003, especially chapter 5) only covers the AOP, this 
pattern of relationship between the NGIs and the villagers is commonly found in other people’s 
movements in Thailand.    
 Outside the movements, their sources of influences 
stem from their intellectual capability and their representativeness of the grassroots 
voices (Shigetomi 2004a). The strengths and weaknesses of these NGIs will shed some 
light on the internal capability of the AOP (next chapter) as well.  
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Although there are various kinds of NGOs in Thailand, this thesis only focuses 
on what Quinn (1997b) calls people-centred NGOs, (which Prudhisan and Maneerat 
1997 call NGDOs, or non-governmental development organisations), also widely 
known as development NGOs, which advocate development-related issues, such as 
popular participation, alternative development, and empowerment. Despite their ‘non-
political’ stance and a number, these NGIs often find themselves deeply involved in 
political activism and street politics—certainly far more often than their NGO 
counterparts who work on welfare issues.  
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section is a review of 
the historical background of the development NGOs. The second section is devoted to 
understand how the NGIs are characterised. The discussion includes their political 
thoughts, and strategies. Unlike most earlier works on the NGIs, criticisms are also 
emphasised in this chapter’s discussion.  
B. Background 
Before discussing the characterisation of the Thai NGIs, it is imperative to understand 
some of the historical background of the activists. The discussion emphasises not only 
the development of the NGOs in different periods but also the political context. The 
history of Thai NGOs can be classified into four main periods, according to the changes 
of the political environments and the roles of the NGIs in the political processes. These 
periods include: 1) the period of emergence (1960s – mid-1970s), 2) the re-emerging 
period (1980s), 3) the people’s sector period (1990s – early-2000s), and 4) the period of 
decline (mid-2000s – present).  
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a. The Period of Emergence (1960s – mid-1970s) 
The emergence of development NGOs came during the ‘development period.’ It can be 
traced back to the formation of Thailand Rural Reconstruction Movement (TRRM). 
Founded in 1967 by a progressive technocrat, Puey Ungpakorn, the TRRM was aimed 
to tackle social development issues at the grassroots level (Shigetomi 2004b: 46; 
Sheldon 2001: 167). The TRRM was also based on philosophy of improving the lives 
of the rural villagers by working closely with them (Missingham 2003: 27). This 
philosophy is reflected in the NGO’s long-held slogan, ‘the answer lies in the villages.’ 
Despite its critical view on the state-led development, the NGO was still allowed to 
function without confronting the military government (Shigetomi 2004b: 47). Along 
with other NGOs, the TRRM were also associated directly and indirectly with student 
and pro-democracy movements as well as NGOs in the later periods (Sheldon 2001: 
167). 
 In the 1970s, Thailand faced a period of turbulence. The first turning point came 
as the ‘Three Tyrants’ 10
                                                 
10  Three tyrants refer to General Thanom Kittikachorn, General Prapas Charusathien, and 
Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, who led the military regime in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
and played a leading role suppressing the student uprising in 1973.  
 regime was overthrown by the people in October 1973. 
Suddenly, a combination of factors, such as a weak state, perceived support from the 
King (Handley 2006: 211), and the public perceived sense of changes (Prapas 1998, 24) 
and a boost of political confidence among the masses (Kanoksak 1987; Giles 2006b: 
572), led to a brief period of democratic euphoria. Hundreds of urban students went to 
the villages and educated the people about their rights and duties in a democratic 
system (Pasuk and Baker 1995: 303), while thousands of rural villagers took the streets 
and demanded justice (Kanoksak 1987). NGOs also found a new political space. Many 
NGOs were founded in this period. Some of these newly-emerged NGOs had 
connection with religious groups. The first human rights watchdog, the Union of Civil 
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Liberties, was founded during this time. Part of the work of NGOs in this period was 
democracy promotion. Unlike the NGOs in the past, the NGOs were more critical of 
the state-led development and were seeking alternative approaches to development 
(Shigetomi 2004b: 46). The open space and threat imposed by the right-wing groups 
appeared to radicalise some of these NGIs.  
However, on the morning of 6 October 1976 thugs and right-wing groups 
organised a massacre at Thammasat University, and later in that day a coup was staged 
to oust the civilian government. Over a hundred students were killed and 1,300 more 
were arrested during the incident (Pasuk and Baker 1995: 311). As a result, hundreds 
more were forced flee to the jungle and join the armed struggle. From that point, the 
democratic period ended abruptly, the political space for NGOs’ activities suddenly 
shrank, and it became almost impossible for them to continue working in the villagers 
(Shigetomi 2004b: 47).   
b. Re-emerging and Radical Period (1980s – Early 1990s) 
The NGOs re-emerged in the early 1980s, which was caused by the changes in many 
socio-political conditions (see Prudhisan and Maneerat (1997: 199-200). Prudhisan and 
Maneerat (1997) describe the early 1980s as the period of proliferation, reorientation, 
and networking. They explain that: “This growth period for NGDOs was marked by a 
proliferation of small localised NGDOs, often established by development workers who 
had resigned from larger NGDOs due to differences over ideology or methodologies” 
(ibid: 200). The NGOs’ change of approach came in the mid-1980s as they adopted a 
more people-centred development and focused more on local histories and cultures 
(ibid.). This approach, known as community culture, was soon adopted and widely used 
among Thai NGOs (Shigetomi 2004b: 48). There were also attempts to create 
networking between the government and the NGOs and between the NGOs themselves. 
The attempts were made by the government and the National Economic and Social 
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Development Board (NESDB). 11  The NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural 
Development, (NGO-CORD) 12
The political role of NGIs notably increased in the 1990s. The turning point for 
grassroots politics was marked as the government tried to implement the controversial 
khor jor kor project in the early 1990s. This resulted in fierce resistance from locals, 
and the project was finally suspended (Pasuk and Baker 1995: 83; Pye 2005). This 
marked the new official role of the NGIs as ‘supporters’ for the anti-khor jor kor 
movement as well as the subsequent movements. But it was not until the May crisis in 
1992 that the NGIs assumed another political role. Apart from Chamlong Srimuang and 
the Student Federation of Thailand (SFT), it was the NGOs, especially the Campaign 
 was also founded in 1985 to increase cooperation 
among NGOs themselves (Shigetomi 2004b: 49; Prudhisan and Maneerat 1997: 201). 
The initially cooperative atmosphere turned confrontational as conflicts over 
resources escalated in the late 1980s. The export-oriented economy expanded, and so 
local resources were transformed into economic capitals. This strategy caused 
economic and environmental problems in some rural areas, and it soon led to the 
confrontation between local groups and the outsiders (Prudhisan and Maneerat 1997: 
201). The late 1980s saw a sharp increased number in environmental conflicts. These 
included rock salt mining in the Northeast, prawn farming in the South, and the most 
high-profile case, the Nam Choan Dam project (see Rigg 1991). As the conflicts 
became intensified, the role of local and smaller NGOs, especially those in the 
Northeast began to more political and confrontational.  
                                                 
11 The government led by Prem Tinsulanond set poverty reduction as its primary goal, and so it 
supported the NESDB, which already had some connection with NGOs through Puey. The 
progressive technocrat was once the chair of the board and was close to the NGOs from his role 
with the TRRM. These attempts resulted in two seminars in 1981 and 1982 with NGOs. 
Although some government agencies initiated regular consultation with NGOs at the local 
level, most of cooperation between the government and NGOs remained limited; it mostly 
involved holding joint seminars and exchanging ideas (Shigetomi 2004b: 48-49).  
12 This was later changed to NGO-COD. 
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for Popular Democracy (CPD), who played an important part in the movement. 
Partially, the NGIs were able to organise and mobilise the movement which eventually 
overthrew the Suchinda (Shigetomi 2004a). Callahan, for example, argued that it was 
the NGI's non-violent action that provided the spark in 1992 May event, which later 
was transformed into broad-based mass demonstrations (1998: 111). They later became 
considerably involved in the political reform, including drafting the new constitution, 
and so they came to be seen as a ‘driving force for democratisation’ (Naruemon 1998: 
31). 
c. People’s Sector Period (Mid-1990s – Early 2000s)  
The May 1992 crisis and its aftermath had many long-term impacts on Thai politics. 
After the crisis, the bureaucratic and the elected elites were significantly weakened. The 
bureaucrats lost their role as ‘national defenders’ after their actions led to a number of 
deaths during the crisis (Shigetomi 2004a), while the politicians were also seen as an 
obstacle to the reform in this period (see Connors 2002; Shigetomi 2004b: 53). The 
drawback of the state sector gave rise to the anti-state actors, the ‘people’s sector.’ 
According to Nelson (2007: 5-6), the terms people’s sector (phak prachachon) and 
people’s politics (karnmuang phak prachachon)13
In that period, the NGIs’ political role was significantly heightened as they 
became the face of the people’s sector and were seen as ‘agent of change.’ Equally 
important, the May crisis to some extent changed the public perception of street 
 have been used in discursive politics 
by non-state political actors, who were organised in the forms of NGOs, people’s 
organisations, social movements, grassroots groups, and protests. Nelson observes that: 
“The term has the positive, even normative, connotation of citizen empowerment 
against all those in political and economic power” (ibid.)  
                                                 
13 According to Prapas Pintobtaeng, karnmuang phak prachachon was first coined by Chai-
anan Samudavanija to signify the people’s struggle against the semi-democratic system and 
money politics in the 1980s (A Report on ASEAN People’s Forum 2009: 41). 
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politics—from simply ‘un-Thai’ to somewhat more acceptable. This change of 
perception in turn helped to legitimise extra-parliamentary activities, which were 
usually used by NGOs. Terms, such as popular participation and direct democracy, 
which were often used by these groups to assert their role in the decision-making 
process gained political legitimacy as never before. Coups and elections were no longer 
the only ways to secure political power. Grassroots activism gained unprecedented 
legitimacy. For much of the 1990s, mass protests by farmers from the Northeast 
became an annual event in the Thai capital. 
Moreover, the NGIs' political role was radically extended after they became 
engaged in the 1990s reform. Their goal was to make the democratic system in 
Thailand “more legitimate, efficient, and participatory (Naruemon 1998: 46). The most 
important part of the reforms was the constitution, which the NGOs were able to 
broadly participate in the drafting process (Shigetomi 2004a: 299-303; Connors 2002: 
47-52). For the first time, ‘NGO agendas,’ such participation and community rights, 
were added to the country’s constitution. Equally important, the May crisis and the 
1990s political reform effectively unified the people’s sector, and this unity in turn 
strengthened these groups’ position in the political arena immensely.  
In December 1995, the NGIs took another important step when the AOP was 
founded. The formation of the AOP increased the political position of the NGIs in at 
least three important ways. First, working with the AOP gave them something they did 
not possess—mass support. The political power of the NGIs normally came from their 
knowledge, but without strong pressure from the public or the street, their proposals 
were easily ignored. The alternative agriculture group, for example, was a small group, 
which was led by a handful of NGIs with only a few dozens of families. By joining the 
AOP, the group could lend mass support from the villagers from other groups and 
increased its bargaining power (Fieldnotes, 11 October 2010).   
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Second, it was the first time that people’s movement reached out to national 
audience as they repeatedly staged massive and prolonged protests in Bangkok in the 
mid-1990s. This also put the NGIs in the national spotlight, so from that point onward, 
their opinions did matter. Third, the decentralised structure of the AOP helped the NGIs 
to shake off the moe thi sam (literally, third-hand) image, which was usually portrayed 
by their opponents and generally perceived by the public. The NGIs are often seen as 
the people who attempt to stir the harmonious relationship between the government 
(the ruling) and the villagers (the ruled) (see Attachak 2006). It helped them to 
strengthen their ‘supporting’ role, thereby legitimising their involvement as well as the 
actions of the movement as a whole. The movements and the NGOs, according to 
Quigley, were seen as playing “a role in spreading democratic values, fostering 
participation, and nurturing the skills and confidence necessary for Thais to act as 
citizens in a consolidating democracy” (1996: 226). Unfortunately, their success did not 
last long. The achievements from the 99-day protest were drastically reduced after the 
after 1997 economic crisis and the rise of Chuan government (see Rungrawee 2004: 
544-546; Baker 2000: 25). Popular participation and direct democracy became 
secondary to political stability and economic recovery.    
The role of NGIs revived briefly in the early 2000s during the early years of the 
TRT. During the policy-making process, Phumtham Wechayachai, a former-student-
activist-turned-NGO-leader-turned-politician, set up several meetings in different 
locations between TRT leaders and local groups, which later resulted in key pro-poor 
policies.14
                                                 
14 Phumtham Wechayachai, Interview, 19 January 2011.    
 The influence of the NGIs came from informal channels as well. Phumtham 
and ‘October generation’ activists-turned-politicians, who played an important role in 
the TRT, also acted as communication channels for their former comrades in the NGOs 
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to the party leaders. The seemingly cooperative atmosphere continued after Thaksin 
became the prime minister.  
But not long afterwards, this was proven to be a tactical move to suppress the 
NGOs and their supporters (Pasuk and Baker 2009: 144). In 2002, twenty leading Thai 
NGOs and forty-four of their foreign supporters were put under investigation by the 
Anti-Money Laundering Office (ibid: 145). Thaksin repeatedly depicted the NGIs as 
corrupt recipients of foreign donors. For example, Thaksin said, “Some of them want to 
make their presence felt. They record their rallies on video and send the tapes overseas 
to get financial support” (The Nation, 31 July 2002, quoted in Pasuk and Baker 2009: 
147). Under Thaksin, the NGOs were labelled as third-hand by the government and 
they were no longer needed in the Thai political life (Pasuk and Baker 2008: 69; 2009: 
144-149). During this period, the political influence of NGOs was significantly 
weakened.  
d. Period of Decline (Mid-2000s – Present) 
In the second half of the 2000s, the NGIs’ political role was further reduced by the 
‘coloured’ conflict. The conflict began in late 2005 when the media mogul Sonthi 
Limthongkul began protesting and accused Thaksin of abuse of power, conflict of 
interests, and violation of royal privileges (see Suparak 2006; Kasian 2006). While the 
anti-bureaucratic wing of the people’s sector was convinced that supporting the 
popularly elected government is a necessary step to normalise the traditional unelected 
elite, the majority of the NGIs saw Thaksin’s actions as unacceptable. The NGIs 
joining forces with conservative groups to form an anti-Thaksin movement, also known 
as the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), was partially a response to latter view. 
But the clear chasm in the people’s sector surfaced as the PAD called for a royal 
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intervention in late February. While the majority of the NGIs were still with the PAD, 
some simply left the stage.15
However, what many see as the last straw occurred in 2010. After the 
crackdown on the red-shirt protesters in April and May, which resulted in more than 
ninety deaths and over two thousand injuries, the military-installed Abhisit government 
appointed three reconciliation committees.
  
The people’s sector was divided further when the military overthrew the 
Thaksin government on 19 September 2006. Some NGIs, mostly the younger 
generations, came out and publically opposed the coup, while many senior NGIs 
appeared to be either silent or publically supportive of the coup. The situation did not 
improve as many NGIs continued to support the post-coup nationalist PADs and 
conservative elite groups. One of the contentious issues in this period was whether or 
not they should vote for the military-supported 2007 constitution. The anti-coup 
groups, led by Jon Ungpakorn, publicly announced their vote-no stance to the draft, but 
the other pro-PAD NGIs, led by Boonyeun Khongpetchsak, declared that NGIs were 
free to make up their own minds regarding this issue (Atchara 2010: 7). In 2008, many 
NGIs, notably those close to the Campaign for Popular Democracy, continued to show 
support for the PAD. 
16
                                                 
15 Suriyasai Katasila, Interview, 28 July 2010.  
16  These committees are the 19-member National Reform Committee, presided by Anand 
Panyarachun, the 27-member Assembly for National Reform, headed by Prawase Wasi, and the 
9-member Truth and Reconciliation Commission, chaired by Kanit na Nakorn. 
 These committees were strongly criticised 
for its pro-government inclination. The majority of the committee members showed 
clear support for the PAD. It was clear that these committees were set up for a political 
purpose—to reduce the political pressure arising from the use of excessive violence. 
Many of NGIs, such as Saree Ongsomwang and Rewadee Prasertcharoensuk, and 
people with NGO connection, including Dr. Poldet Pinprateep and Prida Tiasuwan, 
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were also included in the committees. Those, who were not appointed, also tried to take 
advantage of this opportunity (see Atchara 2010). This led to some serious conflicts 
among the NGIs.  
Since the beginning of the Thaksin government, the NGIs have not been able to 
retain the same degree of political power as they did in the 1990s. This weakened 
position has been caused by both internal and external factors. Internally, the NGIs 
have not been able to unify the people’s sector and build a strong mass movement as 
they did in the 1990s. And as mentioned above, the activists have been heavily divided 
over coloured conflict. Externally, the coloured conflict left little room for non-
coloured movements to mobilise. Since the 2006, the public perception on extra-
parliamentary politics also changed considerably. Street politics, which was previously 
seen as one of the political channels for the non-partisan, marginalised voices to gain 
social justice, has now become viewed as a political space for state challengers with 
party ties to overthrow the government. The NGIs’ role in the democratisation process 
has now been reversed; many of them, who have directly and indirectly supported the 
conservative PAD, are now seen by the more radical wing as an anti-democracy force. 
Instead of being an agent of change, the NGIs now appeared to be an obstacle to 
change.  
C. Characterisation of Thai Non-Governmental Individuals  
There are many works that try to characterise the NGIs in different aspects (see 
Simpkins 2003; Giles 2006a; 2006b; Thongchai 2008a; Atchara 2010; Kengkij 2010). 
These recent works offer a much more critical view on the NGIs than those produced in 
the 1990s. Yet, most works on NGIs do not sufficiently address the diverse nature of 
the NGO circle. This section is yet another attempt to characterise the NGIs in terms of 
political thoughts and strategies. In this section, I offer another approach to understand 
them by proposing criteria that can be used to categorise the two main groups of NGIs 
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in terms of political thoughts. The second part of the section is also devoted to 
understand the NGI’s strategies in terms of forms and channels. The section also 
discusses how these thoughts and strategies have impacts on their actions, the political 
structure, as well as the development of the people’s movements. 
a. Thought 
In terms of political thought, Thai NGIs may be roughly divided into two main schools 
of thought: the political economy and community culture (Somchai 2006). 17
 In order to understand the differences between these two groups, I propose that 
three main criteria may be used to classify these two. The criteria include: 1) the view 
on capitalism, 2) the level of analysis, and 3) the mode of participation. The first 
 While 
there are critical differences between these two (see below), it is important to 
understand that both of them share similar ideas regarding development and popular 
participation. They both oppose state-led development while support grassroots popular 
participation. They agree that state-led development has adverse impacts on local 
communities and popular input from the bottom can be a remedy for problems in the 
villages. Their interpretations of the participation may however differ. The political 
economists see this as a necessary step to create a more equal society as well as 
strengthening democratic institutions in the country, while the community culturalists 
view this as protection for local villages from the capitalist influence.  
                                                 
17 The idea is developed from Somchai (2006), which divides the activists into two groups, 
political economy and community culture. However, elsewhere these two groups may go by 
different names. The political economy may also be called structuralism, radicalism, or 
Marxism (see Simpkins 2003; Giles 2010), while community culture (a direct translation from 
the Thai term, wattanatham chumchon) may also named as communitarianism (see Pfennig 
2005; Kengkij and Hewison 2009). Moreover, a comparable analysis of these two ideological 
groups in the activist circle is also found in A Day Weekly (7-13 January 2005). In the 
magazine, there is a debate between two academics (Giles Ungpakorn and Prapas Pintobtaeng), 
representing two groups of activists, the Marxists and the NGIs (see “Karn lakmad rawang 
khon chaikhob kab Marxists” 2005: 24-27). While the debate is about two groups of people, the 
insiders and outsiders of the NGO circle, there are some similar elements with the discussion in 
this chapter, such as their view on capitalism and party politics.   
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doctrine, that of political economy, has a leftist tendency, and its roots can be traced 
back to the radicalism in the 1970s. While these political economists are influenced by 
Marxist ideology and clearly against the capitalist imperialism, they do not reject the 
influence of the market economy entirely. For those who believe in Marx’s historical 
materialism, this is a necessary step to move Thailand from being a semi-feudal state 
run by conservative elite to the next mode of production, capitalism.18
These political economists believe in changes at the structural level. As 
Marxists, they believe that meaningful changes only occur in the system, so to achieve 
that, some sort of mass mobilisation is required. Their mode of participation includes 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities. Outside the parliament, they propose a 
mass-based political organisation to increase bargaining power vis-à-vis the state 
(Somchai 2006: 65-66). As conflict escalates, they are prepared to take a more radical 
step, such as prolonged mass protest or seizing state properties. Moreover, the political 
economists do not hold disgust for party politics. They believe that meaningful changes 
can be achieved only through having some control over state authority. So they are not 
 But for some, it 
is just impractical to work against the global economy as capitalism has already 
penetrated into the villagers’ everyday living (Somchai 2006: 65-66). Recent studies on 
the red-shirt movement and their socio-economic background support the view (see 
Naruemon and McCargo 2011; Apichat et al. 2010; Keyes 2011). 
                                                 
18 This idea, which portrayed Thailand as semi-feudal or semi-colonial state, came from the 
Maoist doctrine and it was a dominant idea among the CPT members. It was mostly used to 
describe Thailand in the 1970s and 1980s (Giles 2001: 156). However, some Marxists still hold 
this view today. They particularly see the domination of conservative elites in Thai politics as 
an indicator of semi-feudalism. It was part of the reason why many leftists gave support to the 
TRT—the party which they believed to represent the ‘thun mai’ (literally, new capital or new 
money) (Suriyasai Katasila, Interview, 28 July 2010). The new capital, they argue, would 
transform Thailand into a full capitalist state by overthrowing the ‘thun kao’ (literally, old 
capital or old money), and as the historical materialism argument goes, the class struggle would 
eventually lead to an end of all the exploitation in Thailand. However, this view that Thailand 
is a semi-feudal is conclusively rejected by those who left the CPT in the 1980s (Pasuk and 
Baker 1997: 384). Many of these non-believers later worked as NGIs.  
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shy to show support for ‘suitable’ parties. Some went further and formed mass parties 
themselves. But so far, there has been no success story.  
However, leftist ideology never actually gained formal recognition and wide 
popularity in Thailand, even during its peak in the 1970s. Similarly, today most leftists 
in Thailand are either some ‘uncles’ in their sixties or seventies, who spent years in the 
jungle with the CPT, or some new generation activists. Some of these activists also 
work in NGOs.19
 The second doctrine, community culture, which is a dominant ideology among 
the NGIs (Shigetomi 2004b: 48), emerged in the 1980s after the failure of the CPT's 
armed struggle against the Thai state. Utilising historical analysis, Chatthip Natsupha, a 
prominent Thai scholar, proposed the idea that there is a Thai essence in community 
culture which, he believes, is an ‘antidote’ to the aggression of capitalism (Thongchai 
2008a: 579). While this idea is welcomed by some activists as they see it as tool to 
struggle against capitalism, it has also been criticised for its conservative and 
nationalist tendencies (Thongchai 2008a: 579; Kengkij 2009b). Unlike the political 
economists, the community culturalists hold a more pessimistic view towards 
capitalism. I would argue that these culturalists are not personally against capitalism. 
Many of them enjoy a luxurious life and work closely with wealthy capitalists 
 Although many of these NGIs from time to time seek advice from the 
uncles, their influence in the NGO circle is still fairly limited. It is because the most 
influential group in the NGO circle, according to Atchara (2010: 9), is that of mid-
ranking and senior NGIs (40s and above), who played an important part in reviving the 
NGO work in the 1990s, such as Wanida Tantiwittayapitak, Watcharee 
Phaoluengthong, and Sanan Chusakul. The majority of these NGIs appear to be 
community culturalists. It is therefore safe to say that the leftists are the minority, and 
their leftist ideology is only a subordinate view among the NGO circle.     
                                                 
19 Suriyasai Katasila, Interview, 28 July 2010. 
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themselves. But, in their view, capitalism has negative impacts on the villagers. The 
community culturists see capitalism as the primary cause of poverty and social ills in 
the rural communities. They see villagers as highly vulnerable to exigencies of the free 
market economy. 
Also, instead of emphasising structural changes like the political economists, 
community culturalists prefer the answer-lies-in-the-village approach, which basically 
highlight local-based solutions to the problems in the rural life. Their proposed 
solutions are based on the Thai ‘essence,’ which includes cultural qualities, such as 
sense of cohesion, solidarity, harmony, and nam jai (literally, care for others or 
hospitality), self-sufficiency (Thongchai 2008a), local wisdom, traditional practice, 
Buddhist values, local history, and identity (Somchai 2006: 62-64). This emphasis on 
the local issues has an important impact on people’s movements; it ensures that the 
movements only use issue-oriented form of activism. Ironically, this view is also 
supported by some western ideas, such as new social movement, postmodernism, and 
environmentalism. Thai NGIs often cite these concepts to legitimise their actions (see 
Uchane 2007). 
The community culturalists hold contempt for party politics. They see Thai 
politicians as immoral agents of capitalism and political parties as sham organisations 
under control the capitalists for their own self-interests. Elections, for them, are simply 
a dirty business of buying votes, thereby viewing as an illegitimate source of power. 
Moreover, unlike the political economists, the community culturalists do not seek to 
control the state authority, but rather they prefer that more autonomy be vested in local 
communities. They believe that the control of the resources by local population not 
only satisfies the local demands better but also empowers the villagers. As a result, 
instead of party politics, the culturalists prefer to conduct political campaigns outside 
parliament and defend their local autonomy.   
49 
 
One important lesson from the recent political crisis about the community 
culturalists is that while they do not trust the bureaucratic elite, they find it acceptable 
to build an alliance with bureaucrats to counter the politicians.20
 However, it is not to say that these two groups can be clearly defined. First, the 
proposed three criteria are only a rough categorisation of the NGIs for the purpose of 
this thesis. But for some reason, if other factors, such as their view on traditional elites, 
are added to the criteria,
 But apparently for 
them, all politicians are not equally ‘evil.’ During the anti-Thaksin campaign, many 
NGIs openly gave their support to the Democrat Party (DP), largely because they 
opposed the powerful TRT. They also saw it necessary to join hands with the one group 
of politicians to fend off another (Fieldnotes, 19 August 2010). The expansion of the 
TRT was seen as a threat to their grassroots activism. In this respect, the community 
culturalists could be quite pragmatic.  
21
 The dominance of community culture in the NGO circle has provoked many 
criticisms. First, it is blamed for weakening people’s movements. The NGIs, who play 
the leading role in organising the movements, tend to limit their goals at the local level. 
 the groupings may look considerably different. Second, 
many Thai social activists cite ideas from both perspectives, sometimes 
interchangeable, which may not be surprising given that most of the Thai NGIs share 
similar backgrounds, and they have been more or less influenced by the 1970s 
radicalism. Besides, they are both to a certain degree critical of the Thai state and the 
elite-controlled political structure.  
                                                 
20 In their defense, they argue that Thaksin became a dictator and was too powerful for normal 
check and balance mechanisms in the democratic system to function properly. And allying with 
the bureaucrats, for them, was a necessary step to move the country forward and create a better 
democracy in the future. However, as time passes by, their argument has become more and 
more unconvincing because five years after the coup, while Thaksin is no longer in that ‘too 
powerful’ position, and yet the NGO leaders’ support for the bureaucrats and the use of 
undemocratic methods remain unchanged.  
21 These factors are in fact quite relevant for the examination of the role of NGIs in the current 
political development. But it is however not as useful for studying the people’s movement.  
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They make sure that the movements do not aim to subvert or supplant state authority, 
or to make excessively radical demands. The advantage of this tactical preference is 
that they can avoid the ‘paid mob’ image, which they are usually labelled by the public 
and their opponents. Such an image would damage their legitimacy as genuine victims 
of misdirected-state development projects. Given their limited goals, governments are 
also reluctant to counter protestors with openly harsh measures.  
 However, these limited goals also have some setbacks. They effectively limit 
the capability of these movements to mobilise as one powerful movement for structural 
change. At times, these smaller local movements maybe unified under one larger 
movement, but the goals of the umbrella movement would be only to ‘assist’ the local 
movements to achieve their goals in the communities. But given the diverse nature 
within the movement, it is almost impossible to effectively mobilise and develop this 
national movement for meaningful and structural changes. As noted, the goals are 
mostly short-term, and once the grievances are solved, most members would simply 
stop their activities. And because of this, many radical activists became disillusioned 
and simply left the movements for more radical groups, such as colour-coded pro- and 
anti-Thaksin movements.22
 Second, NGIs can become a conservative force. The Thai NGIs are often 
understood as ‘progressive’ and ‘pro-democracy’ groups mainly because they tend to 
find themselves on the street leading or assisting anti-government protesters whose 
livelihood is destroyed by the state projects.
 The list includes some people from the Friend of the People 
group and the Campaign for Popular Democracy. 
23
                                                 
22 Suriyasai Katasila, Interview, 28 July 2010. 
 The logic is simple; the Thai state is 
23 Before the 2000s crisis began, there was a perception that the expansion of the political space 
was an integral part of the democratisation process in Thailand. As a result, it is believed that 
street politics was an important development for the democratic structure, and those engaged in 
extra-parliamentary were perceived as part of the progressive groups. Likewise, Supalak 
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made up by the elite, the exploiters, and so their opponents would easily qualify as 
progressive and pro-democracy groups.  
 Yet, as Thongchai (2008a) points out, this progressive position may be 
dramatically changed when they feel threatened by capitalism. The adoption of local 
‘Thai’ values or even the symbols of Thainess by NGIs in order to resist the perils of 
capitalism directly or indirectly, has the potential to make them an ally of conservative 
elites. Ironically, in order to struggle against capitalism and its agents, which include 
businessmen and the politicians, the NGIs have adopted conservative discourses, such 
as nationalism and moralism, which were used by the conservative elite against them in 
them in the past. The irony did not end there. This fear of capitalism partially 
transformed them into an anti-democracy force, and they ended up helping bureaucratic 
elite to bring down the democratically elected government in 2006 and afterwards.   
 On the other hand, Sirote Klampaiboon, an academic who has closely worked 
with the NGIs, argued that many senior NGIs, such as Pipop Thongchai, Dej 
Phumkacha, and Rosana Tositrakul, have not changed their ideological position 
regarding conservatism. Rather, it is the public that has changed its perception since the 
2006 coup. After the military intervention, critics began to view these NGIs in a 
different light. Sirote added that these activists have always opposed capitalism. They 
saw the market economy as the source of many serious socio-economic problems. But 
before the 2006 coup, the public saw their ideas as a form of progressive thinking. 
However, after the coup, many changed their perception and viewed  these ideas were 
essentially linked to conservative concepts such as sufficiency economy and Thainess. 
                                                                                                                                              
(2006), a senior journalist and a former student activist, writes an interesting account about his 
perception of the street politics and the degree of democratisation as follows:  
I had this wrong impression about political demonstrations for a very long 
time. I assumed that the more the people demonstrated on the street, the more 
the country became democratic. But the anti-Thaksin demonstrations by the 
PAD revealed the fact that it did nothing to improve the country democracy. 
On the contrary, it might have taken us away from being democratic. 
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But he also explained that the NGI's fear of capitalism could be overwhelming, and 
hence could push the activists to adopt an anti-democratic stance, and so to espouse 
pro-military and pro-monarchy positions and sentiments.24
Some blame the NGIs’ lack of sufficient theoretical knowledge and framework 
for this setback. Atchara (2010: 21) argues that they do not have much knowledge 
about contemporary political ideology, and they do not really understand important 
ideas, such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, and democracy. Their understanding 
on important issues, such as history and political structure, is also limited. This lack of 
theoretical insights is caused by the reliance on personal experiences as main source of 
information. According to Krisada (2006, quoted in Atchara 2010: 21), instead of 
learning from reading books, the Thai NGIs rely on learning from the experiences of 
more senior NGO leaders from the same network or group. The experiences are usually 
passed on though discussions, forums, and meetings.  
  
 This also indicates that the NGIs can also be highly practical and flexible when 
it comes to political manoeuvre. To explain this twist, Giles (2006b) explains that 
partially this has to do with the ‘disillusion’ of these former student activists with the 
communist movement, which resulted in their abandonment from adhering to theory 
and principle. This is not a simple rejection of Marxist ideas, but a rejection of any 
grand theory or principle. This works well with the NGIs because community culture 
offers small local-based theories with fluid nature. This is also supported by the 
widespread of post-modern idea of rejecting ‘grand narrative,’ which was popular 
among the Thai intellectuals (ibid.). Moreover, this practical attitude is caused by the 
nature of their work at the local level, which requires them to be adaptive and flexible. 
Similarly, Preecha also notices that most NGIs do not “base their performances on 
specific approaches” (1999: 21). 
                                                 
24 Sirote Klampaiboon, Interview, 12 January 2011. 
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While this approach is very useful in understanding local issues (see Quinn 
1997a), this reliance on personal experiences also has some setbacks. First, it creates 
the uncritical culture among the NGIs. Krisda observes that although meetings and 
discussions are held regularly for NGO works, most of them only focus on strategic 
planning or public campaigning. But these events are mainly aimed to support each 
other’s ideas rather than fairly criticise them (Krisda 2006, quoted in Atchara 2010: 
21). Second, this indicates seniority and patronage culture within the activist circle. 
Some may find these ironic, given that they are the ones who usually raise critical 
voices against the others and show contempt for the patronage culture in the 
bureaucratic system. 
 Third, some cast doubt on the NGO approach in solving problems in the 
villages. Rigg criticises the NGO development strategies as ideologically driven and 
impractical. He argues that their strategies are mainly constructed from polarities, and 
they simply seek to defend the villages from the market economy (Rigg 1994, quoted in 
Quinn 1997b: 10). Quinn (1997a: 110-112) argues that in some circumstances, the 
NGO approach can also be fruitless. In some cases, the failure is caused by the local 
people being accustomed to the handout approach. In other cases, the complex nature 
of the locations is responsible to this fruitlessness. Quinn also observes that the 
weakness of the NGO approach lies in its time-consuming and geographically limited 
nature. Moreover, she argues that this approach can only be fully applied to 
communities where the people are willing to be self-sufficient and be kept away from 
the global economy (ibid: 112). Without that consent, the NGOs will not find 
cooperation, let alone success. From the leftist point of view, the NGO approach is not 
as effective in addressing the needs of the people in the villages as that of a strong 
populist government. Kengkij and Hewison write:  
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While TRT’s ‘populist’ policies were unlikely to address inequality and 
power, the government did seek to address various problems that had 
bedeviled rural communities for decades in terms of health care, debt 
and production. Communitarian ideas, while having some localized 
successes, were remarkably unresponsive to the poor’s broader needs 
and demands. Those involved with social movements recognized this 
and understood that the communitarian vision was perceived by the rural 
masses as too idealistic and less grounded than the TRT’s pro-poor 
policies (2009: 462).  
The proponents of this view support the formation of a mass party with some socialist 
policies rather relying on the existing parties, which mostly utilise the mixture of 
populist schemes and money politics.25
b. Strategies  
     
Self-limiting Radicalism 
Since the re-emergence of the NGOs in the 1980s, the NGIs have mainly employed 
self-limiting radicalism. Cohen defines it as “a self-understanding that abandons 
revolutionary dreams in favor of the idea of structural reform, along with a defense of 
civil society that does not seek to abolish the autonomous functioning of political and 
economic systems” (1985: 664). Dryzek et al explain that “[...] movement generally 
does not wish to capture, overthrow, or even share state power [...] even as its members 
may look to radical paradigms beyond industrial society” (2003: 11). For the new 
                                                 
25 For example, Somchai (2008: 106) studies the elections in 2001 and 2005 in the Northeast 
region, and he argues that the TRT’s success did not derive from one single factor, but rather 
due to the combination of two strategies, old-style money politics and policy-based campaigns. 
The TRT’s successors, the PPP and the PT, have also employed similar strategies. This 
approach has now been adopted by other major parties, including the DP which voiced strong 
opposition to the TRT’s populist schemes in the past.    
55 
 
social movements in the West, the adoption of this approach is merely to protect civil 
society space against state encroachment (Habermas 1981).  
 In developing countries, many view this approach as a ‘non-political strategy’ 
because these grassroots challengers only seek to make limited changes and distance 
themselves from party politics (Giles 2010). For the movements in these countries, 
including Malaysia and Thailand, the reasons for adopting self-limiting radicalism 
include problems concerning funding opportunities (Pornamrin 2008: 24), the adoption 
of post-Cold War politics, and the repressive practice of the semi-authoritarian state 
(Giles 2010: 81). Moreover, as previously discussed, for Thai NGIs, community culture 
doctrine, the distrust of party politics, the public perception of street politics also play 
an important part in making them adopt this non-political strategy. 
On the other hand, this limit of political goals effectively enables the NGIs and 
people’s movement to utilise considerably radical tactics with much less harsh 
consequences. The people’s movements have employed numerous radical tactics, such 
as prolonged encampment and occupying government buildings, only to pressure the 
government to solve their local or single-issue problems. Hundreds of AOP members, 
for example, stormed Government House on a few occasions in 2000 and seized the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives building in 2006. While some of these 
villagers were charged with breaking the law, compared with the fate of those taking 
part in the red-shirt movement the consequences they suffered were much less severe.   
NGOs and People’s Movements 
The NGIs employ two forms of mobilisation, through NGOs and people's movements. 
The NGIs’ first form of mobilisation is made through NGOs. While there are around 
20,000 NGOs in Thailand, only fewer than one thousand of them are the development-
oriented NGOs (Gawin 2004: 64). But the figure of active NGOs was much smaller. In 
2000, there were probably around 140 active NGOs (Pasuk 2000: 8). It should be 
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noted, however, that accurate figures for active NGOs in Thailand has never been clear 
since not all of them are officially registered. A directory made by Thai Development 
Support Committee in 1997, listed only 465 NGOs (Riska 1999). The estimated figure 
is far greater than the figure in the official record. In 1993, for example, it was 
estimated that there were approximately between 10,000 and 20,000 NGOs (Amara 
1993: 11).  
 The percentage of unregistered NGOs is even greater for grassroots, 
development-related NGOs. The main reason for this failure to register of these NGOs 
has to do with the government-imposed requirements of endowment or membership 
(ibid: 10). Registered NGOs must also declare in a written statement of objectives that 
they are non-political (ibid: 7). Many development-oriented NGOs are short-lived 
(Riska 1999), as they do not have permanent structure or lasting resources. A number 
of them are ad hoc organisations, which are simply founded to support certain goals or 
projects in a given time. Some NGIs work for one organisation, but officially they 
belong to and get paid by another (Missingham 2003: 117). This flexible practice is 
partially due to the limited funding opportunities (see Gawin 2004; Simmons 2003: 85-
86) as well as the patronage culture with NGO circles.  
Given this flexibility, it is not always easy to tell which actions NGIs undertake 
on behalf of their organisations and which ones they undertake as individuals. In such 
an environment, senior NGIs in particular have more freedom to assert their political 
goals as individuals more than the younger counterparts. Their sources of power 
include personal networks, knowledge, working and communicative skills, and well-
respected status in the activist circle. According to Pornamrin (2008: 23), the reputation 
of these NGO leaders is among the top factors that attract funding to their 
organisations. It is also widely known among the NGO circle how connection with 
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board members of funding institutions can be transformed into funding opportunities.26 
Many board members of these institutions, including the Thai Health Promotion 
Foundation and the Community Organizations Development Institute, are either senior 
NGIs themselves or those with NGO connections. This patronage system and funding 
issues also cause serious conflicts among the activists. Despite these advantages, it is 
usually more fruitful for these leaders to take action on behalf of or with organisations. 
This is because the Thai public does not perceive NGIs as a having clear function in the 
socio-political structure. People working for NGOs often complain of having to explain 
to the people what their job entails (Gawin 2004: 62-63).27
 This direct role of NGIs and NGOs in the political process was evident during 
1990s political reform period. NGOs, such as Women and Constitution Network and 
the Union for Civil Liberty, played an important part in the drafting process of the 1997 
constitution and its organic laws. Other NGOs also participated other areas, such as 
public hearings and election monitoring (Shigetomi 2004a: 299-303). This role of the 
NGIs has also continued in the 2000s, especially during the anti-Thaksin protests in 
 Apart from the available 
resources, being part of an organisation gives them one more advantage—a more 
credible status in the public eye.  
                                                 
26  After the withdrawal of foreign donors from Thailand to less economically developed 
countries in the late 1980s, the Thai NGOs have heavily depended on quasi-state institutions, 
such as Thai Health Promotion Foundation, Thai Research Fund, and Community 
Organisations Development Institute, for financial support. The activities of these organisations 
are controlled by boards of directors, which are currently dominated by medical doctors, 
academics, NGO leaders, and their like-minded acquaintances. Many of them are conservative 
reformists and community culturalists.  
27 The Thai public sees philanthropic NGOs as legitimate organisations, and they simply call 
them munnithi (literally, foundation). But a different story goes for development NGOs. Most 
people simply use the English term, NGO to call those working for the NGOs, even though the 
term has been translated to Thai as ongkorn patthana ekkachon. The main reason may be 
obvious; NGO is a lot shorter than ongkorn patthana ekkachon, so it is a matter of convenience. 
But it also reflects how foreign the concept of NGOs is to most Thais. Gawin interestingly 
writes: “A person working with a nongovernmental organisation may find him/herself being 
asked by a reporter or member of the public, ‘Are you from an NGO or a foundation?’ Two 
different answers immediately solicit different attitudes and reactions” (2004: 63). This sums 
up quite well how the NGOs and NGIs are viewed in the Thai society. 
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2006. While many people’s movements refused to join the anti-government camp, the 
majority of NGIs did (Supalak 2006). Many of took part as organisations while others 
joined the protests as individuals.  
The work of the NGIs can also be done through people’s movements. The 
relationship between grassroots movements and the NGIs have been formed since the 
late 1980s. Their relationship may correctly be described as ‘symbiosis’ since both gain 
something from each other—something they lack (Chantana 2004a: 220). The 
movements can utilise the knowledge and network the NGIs possess while the NGIs 
can also use the movements’ masses. The mass support gives the NGIs more 
bargaining powers for their agendas. The NGIs generally position themselves in 
‘supporting role’ in this relationship. This relationship was developed during the anti-
khor jor kor project period in the late 1980s and became more institutionalised in the 
1990s in the SSFAI and the AOP. In this arrangement, the NGIs’ primary role is to 
provide assistance to the main actors, the villagers who are affected the state 
development projects.     
For the NGI’s supporters, they are believed to be as playing a positive role in 
the democratisation process, given their supporting role in politics of the marginalised 
groups. Preecha contends that “NGOs have become involved in the protest movement 
as ‘resources’ rather than as full ‘actors’ by providing linkages and networks” (1999: 
1). For him, the NGOs merely functions as social movement organisations. He 
concludes that “it was the poor, not the NGOs, who actually staged the protest” (ibid: 
26). The NGOs’ intervention only occurs when the conflict escalates. Similarly, Quinn 
(1997b) also sees NGOs as interventionists. The intervention, Quinn explains, “will not 
provide ‘magic bullets’ or ready-made formulae to be replicated by other NGOs. 
Rather, it will reveal the complicated reality of social relations and conflicts among the 
different actors who compete to utilise and control productive resources” (ibid: 2) in 
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local communities. The NGO intervention is believed to empower the grassroots 
people, thereby strengthening the democratic structure. It should be noted that the 
political struggle in the 1990s mostly revolved around development issues, and so it is 
understandable why the NGIs were seen as representing a progressive voice in the past.  
However, their critics opposed this view arguing that by adopting the patronage 
relationship with the villagers, the NGIs have effectively reversed the democratic 
development in grassroots politics. Giles, for example, writes that there is “always a 
patronising element to their practical work” (2010: 76). He contends that the NGIs are 
the self-appointed leaders who believe they should nanny 28
 
 villagers and workers 
(ibid.). Rigg and Tjelland also raise some serious questions about the relationship 
between NGIs and the villagers. They argue that it is the NGIs that have the real power, 
not the villagers, as they would like the public to believe. This unequal relationship is 
made possible mainly due to pervasiveness of the patronage culture in Thai society 
(Rigg 1994; Tjelland 1995, quoted in Missingham 2003: 98-99). Rigg also writes that 
“most NGO activists accept that villagers are by nature passive [...and...] there is a 
tendency for [NGO] facilitators to become leaders, to take decisions without consulting 
the people, and to create a hierarchy of relationships” (Rigg 1994, quoted in 
Missingham 2003: 98). In sum, Rigg and Tjelland “argue that NGOs do little more than 
incorporate villagers into unequal patron-client relations with little real opportunities 
for grassroots democracy or empowerment” (Rigg 1994; Tjelland 1995, quoted in 
Missingham 2003: 8).  
 
                                                 
28 He specifically uses the term ‘nanny,’ which is sarcastically translated from the Thai term, 
phi liang. The term phi liang is generally used to describe the NGIs who work to support local 
people’s movements, such as producing documents, providing information, and maintaining 
and coordinating local groups (Missingham 2003: 44-45; Prapas 1998: 99-102). 
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Formal and Informal Channels 
In terms of channels, there are two main ways for the NGIs to gain political influence: 
the formal and informal ones. The NGIs work though formal channels, which include 
appointed committees and legislature. First, the committees can be appointed by the 
government for issue-solving purposes, by National Economic and Social Development 
Board for planning strategies, or by independent bodies, such as National Human 
Rights Commission, for fact-finding reasons. Most of these committees involve 
resource management and development issues. However, it must be noted that 
appointing committees can also be used cynically by governments as a delaying tactic. 
A number of appointments are made, especially by the government, simply to appease 
the heated conflict. These committees are usually appointed without legally binding 
terms, so the government can ignore their recommendations if they want to.  
The NGOs also initiate or support law proposals for the parliamentary 
consideration. Since the 1997 constitution onwards, this channel has been more open to 
the extra-parliamentary groups. Part of the reason has to do with the fact that many 
former activists and their allies have been able to enter the Senate, either via election 
(according to 1997 and 2007 constitution) and selection (according to 2007 
constitution). High-profile senators with NGO connections include Niran 
Pitakwatchara, Rosana Tositrakul, and Prasan Maruekapitak. Since then, these 
parliamentarians have also functioned as another channel for NGO issues. However, 
critics raise questions regarding this practice in reality. Despite the seemingly open 
mechanisms set by the 1997 and 2007 constitutions, the direct popular input has been 
very limited. The obstacles to this process include the high costs, inconvenient 
procedures in gathering signatures, and the bureaucratic red-tape.  
However, the most important obstacle of all is that the law proposals from non-
elite groups often receive little or non-cooperation from the government and the 
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parliament. The lesson from the past decade is that without some sort of support from 
political parties, bills proposed by NGOs would be delayed, turned down permanently, 
or amended by the parliament with little or no regard of the original draft (Prachatai, 
25 April 2013).  
This raises some questions concerning the NGIs’ capability to create structural 
changes without a party structure. First, the single-issue movements with loose 
structure may be helpful in addressing some needs in the villages, but it certainly not as 
effective as party in delivering policies at the national level. The TRT’s success in 
addressing the local needs in its populist schemes is often cited as the NGOs’ failure 
(Kengkij and Hewison 2009: 462). Second, in a Marxist view, by rejecting a formal 
political party and not taking control of the state power, the NGIs basically allow the 
capitalist state to be strengthened and maintain the exploitive structure (Giles 2006b).29 
Third, without a party structure, the NGIs have considerably relied on lobbying politics, 
which offers little or no accountability to their constituency. Without permanent access 
to the formal structure, NGIs are sometimes forced to take any offered opportunities—
even if it means they would be viewed as opportunists. The recent so-called 
reconciliation committees are good example of this drawback.30
Moreover, the NGIs also work through informal channels, which are intended to 
put pressure on the government. Their activities usually involve public campaigning, 
  
                                                 
29 This view is often countered that there is no convincing explanation how such a left-wing 
party would emerge, not to mention function, in the current Thai political structure. The 
prospect of a left-wing party in Thailand would sound even less convincing if one considers the 
fact that no left-wing party has achieved anything substantially, if not ceased to function at all, 
since the late 1970s. Another feasibility question is raised by Kasian as he observes that the 
people’s sector is made up only by small groups of people with great diversity in terms of 
backgrounds, interests, and demography, so it would be difficult to build a party based on these 
groups. Even if they could build a party, he doubts if the party would be successful in elections 
(2003: 44).  
30 Atchara (2010) explains that while some NGIs understand the political motive behind the 
establishment of these committees, they are convinced that their involvement should be seen as 
non-political and it is for the greater good. Some, however, simply take side and have little 
sympathy for the dead and injured during the 2010 crackdown.  
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giving press conferences, organising seminars, and giving public talks. Unlike the 
formal channel, the public is their target audience, and so, they have to depend on the 
media to send their message across. It is therefore vital for NGIs to create networks 
with reporters. It is generally much more difficult for young NGIs to contact the media 
than the more senior NGIs, unless some sort of ‘special’ connection is established. 
Apart from their accumulated skills and knowledge, these networks with the media put 
the senior NGIs in a very influential position (Fieldnotes, 25 September 2010). 
Publications are also used to communicate with the public. Recently, new information 
technologies, such as DVDs, e-mails, websites, and viral videos, have also been 
employed as part of the campaign strategies.  
To accomplish this goal, the NGIs considerably depend on the use of discursive 
politics. The discursive tactics used by the NGIs generally serve two main purposes. 
First, it is used to explain the problems with the state development projects and how 
they negatively impact the local population. This tactic is also supposed to put the 
pressure on the government and state officials by portraying them as the oppressors or 
exploiters while depicting villagers as victims to the public eye.  
Second, the NGIs resort to another discursive tactic in order to defend their 
credibility as story tellers as well as to portray the image of the villagers as victims. 
They use both ‘western’ theories, including critical theory, post-modernism, and 
environmentalism, and ‘indigenous’ Buddhist principles for these purposes. These 
discursive strategies are used to show that the villagers' mobilisation is non-political, 
and their actions are therefore legitimate. However, the public usually views the 
villagers as politically passive people, so many are suspicious of their grassroots 
activism. Elite opponents easily exploit this opportunity by labelling the villager 
protesters as paid mobs organised by their political opponents. On the other hand, the 
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NGIs are seen as third-hand who comes between the traditional harmonious 
relationship between the elite patrons and the villager clients (Attachak 2006).  
But as previously discussed, this strategy relies heavily on the NGIs’ ability to 
communicate with the public through the media. Despite the increasingly important 
role of the new media, the support from the traditional media remains most crucial. But 
to gain the media attention is not an easy task. It depends on many internal and external 
factors. This strategy is therefore not always effective, especially for smaller issues or 
movements. Since the 2005-06 political crisis began, the NGIs have not been able to 
gain the media attention they once could. Most media space is given over to colour-
coded-conflict-related news (see Chapter V).           
D. Conclusion  
This chapter reviews the historical background of the NGIs since the 1960s to the late 
2000s. It is classified into four main periods: the emergence period, the re-emerging 
period, the people’s sector period, and the period of decline. It should be pointed out 
that the NGIs, who were seen as progress elements in the 1980s and 1990s, have now 
become grouped with conservative groups. Thongchai (2008a) argues that the main 
culprit for this drawback is their fear of capitalism, which makes the NGIs resort to 
conservative discourse of community culture since the 1980s. It should however be 
noted that Thaksin is the other main factor for this twist. Others may see Thaksin as an 
agent of capitalism, but for many NGIs, he is the face of thunniyom samarn (literally, 
evil capitalism). And because of this fear, the NGIs turned to what they saw as the 
lesser evil, the conservative elites.31
 In terms of political thought, the Thai NGIs may be roughly divided into two 
main schools of thought: the political economy and community culture. Both of them 
  
                                                 
31 Suriyasai Katasila, Interview, 28 July 2010. 
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share similar ideas, such as alternative development and bottom-up participation. But 
these two groups mainly disagree in the following criteria, the view on capitalism, the 
level of analysis, and the mode of participation. However, the majority of the NGIs fall 
into the second group, the community culturalists, and they are criticised for weakening 
the people’s movement, having conservative tendency, and ineffectively dealing with 
the needs of the people in the villages.  
 Generally, the NGIs and the people’s movements employ self-limiting 
radicalism, which can basically defined as focusing of limited political ambitions. This 
approach allows the NGIs to radicalise their tactics to pressure the government. In 
terms of mobilisation form, the NGIs focus on employing two main strategies—
mobilising as part of NGOs or people’s movement. These two forms can be used either 
separately or simultaneously depending on the issue, the level of pressure, and the 
audience. Moreover, the chapter also discusses the two main channels used by the 
NGIs, the formal and informal. The formal channels include appointed committees and 
law proposals, while the informal ones involve campaigning and discursive politics. 
However, the disadvantages of NGO strategies include the limited capability to bring 
about structural change, the tendency to adopt lobbying tactic, and excessive 
dependency on the media.  
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Chapter III: Making Sense of the Assembly of the Poor 
A. Introduction 
While the political environment underpinning the development of the AOP is the focus 
of this thesis, without building some understanding of the AOP’s internal operations, a 
complete picture of the movement cannot be portrayed. Most studies of the AOP view 
internal factors, such as the collective leadership and the loosely-structured 
organisation, as integral to the AOP's success. Baker (2000: 16) believes that  
deploying collective leadership could prevent problems, such as cooptation of key 
individuals and the use of violence against leaders. Suthy (1997: 95-96) argued that 
bringing together small groups under one national umbrella movement was a ‘political 
synergy,’ which could exponentially amplify the bargaining power of the member 
groups. Elsewhere in the developing world, internal factors have played an important 
role in the development of social movements. Makino and Shigetomi observe that in 
developing countries, “organizational conditions have a great influence on how social 
movement organizations develop, and shape the forms and directions of the 
movements” (2009: 228). 
Theoretically, the resource mobilisation approach proposes that internal 
elements, such as resources and organisation, play an important role in allowing a 
movement to emerge as well as to develop, as opposed to the classic theory which 
focuses on role of structural strains of rapid social change (see McCarthy and Zald 
1977; Jenkins 1983; and McAdam 1982). Drawing conclusions from many authors, 
Jenkins argues that “grievances are relatively constant, deriving from structural 
conflicts of interest built into social institutions, and that movements form because of 
long-term changes in group resources, organization, and opportunities for collective 
action” (1983: 530).  
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The mobilising structure can be in both formal and informal forms. While latter 
had not been given much academic attention until the last decade, the former comprised 
the key focus of social movement studies since the 1970s. The social movement 
organisations (hereafter: SMO), according to Kriesi, “constitute crucial building blocks 
of the mobilizing structures of a social movement” (1996: 152). These internal 
elements, therefore, play an essential role in the movement's mobilisation and 
development.  
The internal elements are even more relevant for the movements in developing 
countries, such as Thailand, where political opportunities are generally limited and 
resources are scarce (see Makino and Shigetomi 2009). The purposes of this chapter 
are, therefore, to investigate the on-going debates concerning the AOP’s internal 
components, and how these factors have contributed to the movement’s recent decline. 
This chapter argues that the pursuit of short-term goals by the villagers as well as the 
idea of self-limiting radicalism of the NGIs have resulted in an adoption of loose 
structure and limited degree of institutionalisation. Such a structure may have helped 
the AOP to achieve numerical strength during its early waves of protest, but with a 
lower level of commitment, the movement soon became significantly weakened. The 
chapter has one main section, examining the characterisation of the AOP.       
B. Characterisation of the Assembly of the Poor 
This section is an attempt to critically analyse how the AOP's internal elements—
including the goals, actors, formal organisational bodies, structure institutionalisation 
process, and strategies—have impacted on the movement. It also discusses the 
weakness and strengths of these elements.   
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a. Goals 
The goals of AOP can be divided into 2 levels: 1) the immediate level and 2) the 
structural level. According to Prapas (1998: 88-89) the first goal of AOP was to address 
the immediate problems of its members, which were partially or entirely the results of 
misguided state development projects, unjust laws, and government policies. These 
goals usually involved financial compensation and the cancelation of problematic state 
projects. At the structural level, the AOP also aimed to put a stop to state policies that 
have been pursued without grassroots participation and caused problems in rural 
communities.  
 More ambitiously, the movement sought to change the relationships between 
the state and the people. People, according to the AOP, “must be those who control the 
direction of development [and] must truly benefit from development. Poor people must 
be part of the decision-making process in [any] development projects that affect the 
people’s lives” (Leaflet No. 1, ruampalang prasanjai su chai khonchon [Consolidation, 
Unified Heart to the Victory of the Poor], March 1997, quoted in Prapas 1998: 87) By 
taking part in the movement, attending meetings and negotiations, networking, and 
interacting with other social groups, Missingham argues, AOP members had “expanded 
the social domains available for political association and contesting the power of the 
state” (2003: 199).  
On a more subtle level, the AOP, according to Naruemon (2006), also 
challenged narrowly defined conceptions of democracy in Thai politics. By connecting 
democracy and participation with the development process, the AOP contested the idea 
of representation in the narrow terms generally used in Thailand. She points out the 
struggles of the AOP indicate that democracy was not only about election results, but 
also about debate, dialogue, and the decision-making process, especially on issues 
concerning the livelihood of the poor. The AOP also sought to empower the ordinary 
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people by including the marginalised groups in the political system through direct 
actions (ibid: 207). Unlike some other organisations, in which rank-and-file members 
were not required to ok raeng (literally, work), the AOP demands its members to 
regularly participate in its activities, such as meeting and protests, and pay for any costs 
deriving from the activities. This practice aimed not only to solve their resource 
problems, but was also expected to empower its members. 
However, what really mobilised the AOP was not long-term goals, which were 
more or less shared among the members, but rather short-term ones. Being aware of 
this weakness of the people’s movements, politicians often exploit it by the use of 
cooptation, which frequently worked in their favour. This is also one reason why Thai 
people's movements are highly fragmented. The Thai villagers are quite pragmatic and 
well aware of their options (Somchai 2008: 119). Since their primary interests are 
based on their short-term goals, their main commitment would be to groups that would 
be more likely to yield the results with the smallest investment. This was evident as the 
AOP’s struggle dragged on: many local groups became exhausted and left the 
movement for what they saw as better options. For example, in early 2010, some land 
rights groups, which were typically among the most desperate groups in the alliance, 
left the AOP and joined the Land Reform Network partially for this reason.32
 The emphasis on these immediate goals also has some drawbacks in terms of 
commitment. To explain this, Naruemon Thabchumpon, an academic who worked with 
the AOP for a long time, noted that many advisers showed some concerns about the 
level of commitment of the AOP members. According to her, they drew an interesting 
comparison between the AOP and a ‘clothes line.’ She explained that if we put clothes 
in the sun, when they dried they would be immediately removed from the line. 
Similarly, the villager members would also leave the movement instantly, once their 
  
                                                 
32 Watcharee Phaoluengthong, Interview, 23 August 2010. 
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problems were solved. 33
 To solve this commitment issue, during the 1997 protest, there was an 
agreement among member groups that they would not leave the protest camp unless all 
problem cases were resolved. This was proven effective at the time, but as the villagers 
got more desperate, the agreement soon became void. An AOP adviser from alternative 
agriculture group, Ubol Yoowa, pointed out that not every group can wait for a long 
period of time for resolution.
 This indicates how little long-term commitment many 
villagers had for the movement.  
34
In other words, the AOP was more successful in solving short-term problems of its 
members than finding long-term solutions for them. It should be noted that while the 
 The land rights groups in particular were the most 
economically insecure ones. These were some of the main reasons why the number of 
the AOP member has decreased over the years. But this does not happen to those 
activists who work closely with the movement. These people tend to be less pragmatic 
and more committed to the movement than rank-and-file members (Fieldnotes, 10 
October 2010). 
In terms of achieving goals, it has been a mixed result. Uchane assesses the 
success of the AOP as follows: 
If the achievement of the AOP is measured by the success in solving its 
members' problems, then it can be said that the AOP has achieved a 
little. But if it is measured by its success in easing the members' 
immediate problems (e.g. the villager not being forced out from their 
land or the state projects being frozen), then the AOP should be seen as 
having achieved some success (2007: 174).  
                                                 
33 Naruemon Thabchumpon, Interview, 19 January 2011. 
34 Ubol Yoowa, Interview, 16 August 2010. 
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AOP proposed changes at the structural and policy levels that would benefit the people 
at the grassroots (see Naruemon 2006; Prapas 1998; Missingham 2003), its main 
emphasis remained mostly on goals at the local level. These long-term proposals are 
drafted and pushed mostly by the NGIs with limited support from the villagers. Similar 
with Uchane (2007: 174), Baramee observes that the AOP has been to some extent 
successful in pushing for local grievances, but when it comes to policy proposing, its 
success has been fairly limited.35
 However, these claims should be treated as a strategic move by the  AOP’s 
middle-class supporters rather than a balanced analysis. These claims were purposely 
made to differentiate the AOP from failed class-based movements in the past, as well as 
to appeal to the emerging role of the middle classes in the political process in the 
1990s. Some AOP supporters projected their own wishful thinking onto the movement. 
 The AOP’s proposed policies would not be passed by 
the parliament without significant support from other groups from the people’s sector, 
especially the NGIs (see Ekpon 2007: 220-221).  
 The goals of the movement are also linked with how the movement should be 
viewed. The already suggested, the early writings on the AOP seem to suggest that the 
AOP should either be viewed as a new social movement or an environmental 
movement (Uchane 2007: 162-166). The new social movement argument went more or 
less as follows: the AOP is formed by an alliance of multi-classes with new strategies, 
including non-violent and extra-parliamentary means, to work on new issues, such as 
widening participation and improving the environment (Suthy 1997). AOP members 
could be viewed as environmentalists because they rejected state-oriented development, 
which they argued had caused environmental degradation and disasters. The villagers 
also demanded that their environmentally friendly livelihoods be respected 
(Missingham 2003).  
                                                 
35 Baramee Chairat, Interview, 17 December 2010. 
71 
 
 Also, these claims made by middle-class supporters became problematic for the 
AOP's campaign because they did not necessarily reflect the reality of the movement. 
For example, while many of AOP’s public campaigns are based on long-term green 
environmental reasons, their key demands, at least for the majority, often involve short-
term economic interests. Economic demands, such as requests for financial 
compensation for those adversely affected by state projects, are hardly new issues and 
not exactly environmentally-related matters.  
 This portrait of the movement as a new social movement or an environmental 
movement has created a massive gap between the movement’s public discourse and the 
real demands of the majority of the members. Besides, one of the problems that 
stemmed from this image was that it swayed the public from more substantive debates 
involving human rights issues. The government's construction of state projects without 
local consent often involved clear human rights violation for the local population, and it 
was only fair that the affected villagers should be fairly compensated for their losses.   
b. People 
The AOP consists of three main groups of actors: 1) the local villagers, labourers, and 
slum-dwellers, 2) academics and students, and 3) NGIs. The first group, local villagers, 
labourers and slum-dwellers, are the largest component, and they comprised the 
grassroots constituency. In other words, they were the ‘poor’ (khonjon) in the 
Assembly of the Poor. While most AOP members could be categorised as rural 
dwellers working full-time or part-time in agricultural sector, but some, especially 
those from Work-Related and Environmental Illness Group were actually from the 
urban areas and worked in the industrial sector. The grassroots element played various 
roles in the movement. Most of the people in this group were only rank-and-file 
members and had a relatively passive role, including attending local meetings and 
supporting other movement activities. But some villagers, mostly the experienced ones, 
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play a more active role, including attending the PKY assembly meetings, representing 
their problems to state officials or the government, or working as NGO workers in the 
locale. This active role of these key villagers is a unique feature of the AOP, which 
does not necessarily appear in other people’s movements in Thailand.  
The second group includes academics and students. The primary role of the 
academics is being advisers, but sometimes they also engage in other supporting 
activities such as producing documents, giving interviews, giving public lectures on 
development issues, and sitting in government-appointed committees. Academics such 
as Bantorn Ondam and Prapas Pintobtaeng, who had close ties to the movement since 
the beginning, have sat on many appointed committees on AOP-related issues. The 
students’ role in the movement is mostly limited to assisting the movement during the 
protests and meetings. Some work with the movement’s youth programme. The 
villagers give special respect to the academics not only because of their advice and 
expertise, but because their credentials and their political connections can also boost the 
movement’s public legitimacy as well as bring in resources from funding institutions. It 
is safe to say that to the movement, their status as academics is as important as their 
knowledge, if not more so.  
The third group is made up by NGIs. Senior NGIs mostly work as advisers, 
while the younger ones are either join the secretariat team or become phi liang 
(literally, carer or nanny). As advisers, they are expected to give advice and support to 
the movement. Their works include recommending legal and policy changes, providing 
channels to other organisations and state agencies, and attending appointed committees. 
The secretariat team and phi liang play more active role in providing information and 
support, producing documents, maintaining and coordinating local groups, and 
communicating with the public as well as other organisations (Missingham 2003: 44-
45; Prapas 1998: 99-102). The major different between the secretariats and phi liang is 
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that the secretariats mostly work with pho krua yai while phi liang mostly work with 
local groups. But, it is worth noting that some NGIs play multiple roles in the 
movement, from phi liang to adviser.36
 
  
On the other hand, Chantana (2004a; 2004b) argues that AOP members consist 
of the two main groups with different approaches and goals. She argues that the AOP 
can be viewed as a “symbiosis between the interest-based groups (in this case, 
development victims) and the cause groups (policy advocacy NGOs in particular), in 
order to gain greater legitimacy for non-parliamentary politics” (Chantana 2004b: 220). 
This view clearly indicates differences in terms of goals and strengths of these two 
groups of actors. Advisers, for example, tend to concern themselves with long-term 
goals and getting public support while villagers are inclined to focus more on their 
short-term economic interests (see Figure 3.1). Although the cooperation of these 
groups expands the networks, which in turn increases their bargaining power, their 
collaboration and mobilisation is rather limited. Occasionally, this causes tensions 
within the movement. 
Figure 3.1: Symbiosis of the Two Political Groups   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Baramee Chairat, for example, is a phi liang for Sirindhorn Dam group and some other land-
related cases, but many people also recognise him as an adviser. At times, he has also worked 
as part of the secretariat team. This is also true with Hannarong Yaowalers and Watcharee 
Phaoluengthong. 
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The Non-Governmental Individuals and Their ‘Supporting’ Role  
Although formally NGIs are supposed to be in a supporting position, in practice 
it is a little more complex. While the first group, the poor, makes up the majority of the 
movement according to the above structure and is supposed to be the group making 
decisions, in reality this is not always the case. Authors argue that at times NGIs do not 
only play ‘supporting’ roles (see Missingham 2003: Chapter VII; Naruemon 2006: 
Chapter II; Uchane 2007: 169-170, 175-177). Uchane (2007) correctly argues that the 
role of NGIs in the AOP has been understated. The activists can assert their ‘influence’ 
either during or outside PKY assembly meetings (Missingham 2003: 187-190). Under 
the formal structure, their assertions would be treated merely as ‘advice’ but 
sometimes, the advice can have great influence. Somchai (2006: 163) notices that the 
proposals made in PKY assembly meetings by advisers rarely face disagreement from 
the village members.  
One AOP adviser once told me it is very rare for villagers to openly and 
strongly oppose the advisers. During my fieldwork, I observed that it was not 
uncommon for NGIs to intervene during the PKY assembly meetings when there were 
disputes or confusions. The NGIs did not always act as neutral party. Sometimes, they 
could be very assertive and made sure the villagers took their ‘advice’. According to a 
villager leader, Anont Sripen, most NGIs, not only AOP advisers, acted in this manner. 
The villagers had to accept this role of the NGIs because they had to depend on the 
activists concerning many issues.37
Several factors contribute to this influential role of the NGIs. Partially because 
the villagers have to rely on their ability to acquire financial support, provide 
information,
   
38  negotiate with the government officials, 39
                                                 
37 Anont Sripen, Interview, 25 September 2010.  
38 Prapon Singkaew, Interview, 27 December 2010.     
 produce media and 
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publication, and build lobbying networks. Although the villagers have gained 
experiences over the years of struggle, this reliance on the NGIs remains evident. One 
of the villager leaders complained that the lack of advisers (mainly the NGIs) has made 
it much more difficult for them to gain access to state officials (Fieldnotes, 11 January 
2012).  
Mutual trust, which has been built from working closely together over the years, 
was also another important factor (see Shigetomi 2004a). During my fieldwork, many 
NGIs expressed the importance of this trust as the key to working with the villagers. 
Other contributing factors include the NGO workers’ more advanced literacy, 
communicative, and general office-related skills (Missingham 2003: 145). While there 
are some village leaders who are capable to communicate effectively, typical villagers 
struggle to articulate their thoughts as well as present their cases clearly. This does not 
include a number of villagers who still struggle to speak standard Thai. Most of the 
NGIs who work with the AOP are good in communication and public speaking.  
Critics see this leading role of the NGIs as a result of a typical ‘Thai-style’ 
organisational structure or undemocratic tradition in the movement (Giles 2010: 151).  
Social movements in Thailand, including the AOP, according to Giles, “are dominated 
by unelected Pi-liang (NGO “nannies” or advisers) and Pu-yai (NGO “elders”). There 
is a real problem with [...] a lack of internal democracy. Young people are expected to 
respect and listen to their elders in the movement and positions are never up for 
election” (italicised in original text, ibid.). Although the academics are put in a 
‘respected’ position, they are not considered as insiders by senior NGIs. The NGIs 
often defend this patronage relationship, since they see it as part of local culture, which 
                                                                                                                                              
39 It is not only negotiating skills that the villagers do not have. One of the problems faced by 
the villagers while negotiating with the government officials is the linguistic barrier. Most 
villagers speak local dialect, and as a result, many struggle to speak to the officials directly. The 
NGIs, who speak central Thai fluently, often simply work as translators. 
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needs to be respected. This argument is clearly in line with the community culture 
doctrine which emphasises on respecting what they see as local traditions or 
characteristics of ‘Thainess’. 
However, proponents of the influential role of the NGO workers argue that it is 
necessary that the activists have their say in the movement’s development process. 
From a Marxist point of view, the villagers have potential, but without going through a 
proper development process, their ability may never be realised. It is therefore 
necessary for the activists to step in and ‘jad tung’ (literally, organise) the mass. The 
villagers are expected to learn about the political process in a democratic system, 
understanding their basic rights, and developing legal knowledge, and the necessary 
communicative and managerial skills. These knowledge and skills are required in 
getting immediate problems solved for the members.  
But more importantly, the members are expected to understand the importance 
of the long-term objectives of the movement. The members are expected to get some 
sort of ideological and thought training to improve their commitment to long-term 
causes and to unify various local groups for common goals. In principle, the final say 
belongs to villagers because the PKY assembly, which comprises the representatives 
from local groups, constitutes the highest power in the movement. So ideally, the 
activists are expected to influence the mass by ‘organising’ it, but in the end, it is the 
village members who decide what to do,40
Despite this critical mission to promote long-term political change, critics 
question NGIs' success. Based on the assessment of the anti-Pak Mun Dam group, 
Kanokrat (2003: 243-244) points out that the NGIs failed to create a common 
 and their decisions have to be respected by 
all parties.  
                                                 
40 Nitirat Sapsomboon, Interview, 14 January 2011. 
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understanding about the long-term goals to the members. Uchane (2007: 177) observes 
that the ability to organise the mass by NGO workers is compromised by the nature of 
their work. NGOs’ primary mission is to work on their funded projects with short-term 
contracts. Their focus as a result has to be on the projects, which may or may not share 
the same goals as the movement. Short-term contracts also mean financial instability 
and constantly changing conditions, which certainly have adverse effects on the long-
term movement. Time and efforts are consequently devoted more to fulfil the project 
requirements rather than the needs of the movement. The constraints also derive from 
the focus on basic tasks like producing data, which is not necessarily useful for 
achieving movement goals, rather than the organisational mission. Due to the 
bureaucratic requirements set by the funding institutions, which are now mostly state or 
quasi-state agencies, tasks such as producing paperwork and document could be very 
time-consuming.  
 An NGI who has worked over a decade in anti-Pak Mun Dam movement, 
Somparn Kuendee also agrees that working on projects can be counterproductive for 
the movement as it requires a great deal of time and effort. She noted: 
I think these projects have been troublesome. Local NGIs spend almost 
all of their time working on project proposals, reports, and accounts 
only. What about working on developing the villagers’ thinking? In 
order to mobilise the people, they need proper way of thinking. Even 
with economic constraints, family problems, or limited time, but with 
the right thinking, they can be mobilised. They can manage. [...] 
Organising the people has not been sufficiently done by NGIs. It is just 
not enough.41
                                                 
41 Somparn Kuendee, Interview, 26 December 2010. 
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Some villagers also complain that these projects were not relevant or not supportive of 
the movement’s course of struggle. In order to survive, the NGIs have to amend the 
purposes of their projects to qualify the terms and conditions set by the funding 
institutions. Not only did they not support the movement, sometimes it also takes away 
time and human resource from the organising task (Fieldnotes, 11 January 2011). 
Somparn also added some of them left the movement devote themselves entirely on 
their projects. Part of the departure has to do with time constraints, but in many cases, 
this is due to conflict over the projects.42 To be fair to the NGIs, some villager leaders 
also left the movement for the same reason.43
 There are other serious problems that derive from this unequal relationship. 
First, this highly personalised leadership is prevalent among the Thai NGO activists. 
The AOP’s loose structure means the influence of these people remains substantial. 
This structure allows the leaders to intentionally or unintentionally build pom khai 
(literally, a fortress or territory) to defend their informal authority.
  
44 These fortresses 
have to a certain extent impeded the unification process of the AOP. This is especially 
true with big local groups with sufficient size and resources to mobilise on their own.45
                                                 
42 ibid. 
43 During the Thaksin government, many populist policies, such as village funds, required that 
the villagers organised themselves in groups. Many villager leaders joined these local groups. 
As the project required a considerable amount of documents and routine work, many were too 
busy for the AOP activities (Naruemon Thabchumpon, Interview, 19 January 2011; Put 
Buntem, Interview, 11 October 2010).  
44 Nitirat Sapsomboon, Interview, 14 January 2011. 
45  It should be noted that financially Thai NGIs rely on working on projects funded by 
government or quasi-government agencies. Projects involving bigger number of people tend to 
give them some advantage in getting financial support than the smaller ones. Many Thai NGIs 
are very territorial, and for them, working in ‘bigger cases' somehow means commanding more 
respect from other NGIs. 
 
The dam network groups, for example, are more autonomous and seeking cooperation 
from them is much more difficult than other groups (Fieldnotes, 11 October 2010).  
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Second, critics claim that the advisers often think on behalf of the villagers. 
This influential role of the NGIs has effectively blocked the villagers’ input in the 
decision-making process. This has a significant impact on the empowerment process of 
the village members. One of the villager leaders explained that those who participated 
in the AOP activities were more likely to show more commitment to the movement 
(Fieldnotes, 10 October 2010). Third, this imbalance also begs some serious questions 
regarding the legitimacy of the movement in the democratisation process. For example, 
Giles writes: “The Assembly of the Poor is thus led by unelected NGO activists rather 
than by poor farmers themselves” (Italicised in original text, 2006b: 585). Big part of 
the AOP’s legitimacy derives from its decentralised structure, which allows substantial 
grassroots input. Without villagers’ contribution, the legitimacy of movement would be 
severely undermined.  
c. Formal Organisational Bodies 
Within the AOP’s structure, there are four main bodies: 1) the pho khrua yai assembly, 
2) the body of advisers, 3) the secretariat team, and 4) the working group (see Figure 
3.2).46
                                                 
46 Originally, there had been only three bodies, PKY assembly, a body of advisers, and a 
secretariat team. The fourth one, working group was added into the structure in a meeting in 
September 2009.  
 At the top of the structure is what the AOP call pho khrua yai (literally, head 
chefs) assembly, which constitutes the collective leadership of the AOP (see Figure 
3.3). Formally, the assembly represents “the highest form of authority in the movement, 
determining campaign goals and strategies, protest actions, and so on” (Missingham 
2003: 54). The term pho khrua yai (hereafter: PKY), according to Naruemon (2006: 
89), reflects the relationship between democracy and the economic issues. The idea of 
PKY assembly also, according to Baker (2000: 16), indicates a commitment to 
localism. The decentralised form of collective leadership is particularly hoped to 
prevent problems, such as the buying, co-opting, or even killing of individual leaders 
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(Somchai 2006: 157; Baker 2000: 16). Members of the PKY assembly are delegates 
from local groups, and the size of the assembly varies from one meeting to another, 
ranking from more than two hundreds during its heyday (Missingham 2003: 53-54) to 
fewer than a hundred in the present day.  
The supportive bodies include advisers and the secretariat team. The advisers or 
thi pruksa are mostly made up of senior NGIs, but a few of them are academics. During 
its height, dozens of them would attend the assembly meeting, but during my fieldwork 
in 2010 only a few would show up. Their formal role is to give advisory support and 
needed information, but sometimes their support goes beyond what is formally stated. 
The secretariat team or kong lekhanukarn is made up by mid-rank or younger NGIs, 
and their role is to carry out the tasks decided by the PKY assembly and to support the 
fourth body, the working group. Their role also include providing information and 
support for the AOP, maintaining and coordinating the network of villagers’ 
organisations in the AOP, and communicating with the public as well as other 
organisations.  
The fourth body, the working group, was introduced in September 2009, to take 
some of the responsibilities, which had previously been performed by NGIs, such 
coordination with other organisations and state offices. Other duties of the working 
groups include making decisions concerning day-to-day management, drafting annual 
strategic plan, releasing public statements, and representing the AOP. Currently, the 
group consists of five members representing five networks.47
                                                 
47 According to the head of the working group, Sawat, there are no representatives from slum 
and alternative agriculture networks because they have not been working closely with the AOP 
in the last few years. Many even thought that they were no longer part of the AOP. As a result, 
the PKY decided to have only five active networks represented in the working group (Sawat 
Uppahat, Interview, 15 August 2010).   
 One of them is chosen to 
be phuprasan-ngan (coordinator), which is the head of the group. The creation of the 
working group was a move to address the problem of the reduced number of NGIs 
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working with the AOP in recent years. But this, some may argue, also indicates the 
development of the ability and leadership of the villagers which has grown over the 
years.48
 
† The working group was introduced September 2009, while other bodies have remained largely the same since the 
AOP’s formation.  
   
Figure 3.2: Formal Organisation Structure  
                                                 
48 Watcharee Phaoluengthong, Interview, 23 August 2010. 
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Figure 3.3: Structure of the Assembly of Pho Krua Yai
 
d. Loose Structure  
In terms of political legitimacy, the AOP’s greatest strength derives from its loose 
structure, which can be seen in the PKY setting as well as the autonomy of the member 
networks and member groups. Most authors view this as a positive democratic 
development at the grassroots (Prapas 1998; Baker 2000; Missingham 2003; Naruemon 
2006). Although this view is by no means invalid, the pragmatic motive for this 
structural setting should not be ignored. I would argue that the loose structure should be 
seen as pragmatic design as much as an idealistic move. To better understand this 
structure, first it is useful to lay some background of the movement and how this view 
was adopted.  
 The AOP was not meant to be tightly structured right from the beginning. 
According to Baramee Chairat (2008: 51-52), the idea of the AOP originated from the 
group discussions, called sewana khonjon (literally, discussions of the poor). The 
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discussions were organised in 1994 by Baramee and a few other young NGIs, who 
were at that time working with the SSFAI. 49  These discussions were intended to 
provide opportunities for students, labourers, and farmers to share their thoughts and 
experiences. This idea was welcome by their fellow activists, including Wanida 
Tantiwittayapitak and Watcharee Phaoluengthong. Later the idea of transforming and 
expanding it into a national-level movement was introduced, and it was widely 
supported by the circle of the activists. A series of formal and informal meetings took 
place during that period between these NGIs and village leaders to discuss the terms 
and ideas about the new movement (ibid.). The AOP was then officially formed in 
December 1995. But interestingly, some essential functions, including the secretariat 
team, were not created at the beginning. According to Nitirat, one of the founding 
members of the secretariat, the team was later set up essentially because document task 
became burdensome, and it could not be done separately.50
But not everyone was satisfied with the loose structure. This dissatisfaction can 
be seen when the AOP was renamed. At the beginning, the AOP was officially known 
as Forum of the Poor in English, which signified its main function at the time as space 
for sharing ideas and support among its members. However, in 1996 the name was 
changed to Assembly of the Poor. According to Suthy (1998), the new English name 
more accurately reflected the Thai name, samatcha khonjon.
 This indicates that the role 
of the central organisation was minimised right at the start.  
51
                                                 
49 The meeting was funded by Wongsanit Ashram, an organisation which was founded in 1985 
as part of a community for simple living, engaging in social action, and spiritual practice. The 
organisation is led by well-known figures such as Sulak Sivaraksa and Pracha Hutanuwatr. (see 
Wongsanit Ashram). 
50 Nitirat Sapsomboon, Interview, 14 January 2011. 
51 The Thai name has never been changed since its formation.   
 But at a more subtle 
level, this was also a reflection of the how the AOP should be organised and mobilised. 
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According to Nitirat,52 the new name, for many leaders, including Bamrung Khayotha, 
was believed to signify a more unified, centralised, goal-oriented, and permanent 
AOP. 53
Despite that, the movement's loose structure persisted, and most people 
appeared to have embraced the loose structure idea. There are some practical reasons 
why this structure has been widely adopted and well maintained. First, it is a clear 
rejection of the controversial SSFAI model. Before the forming of the AOP, the SSFAI 
was the main driving force in the grassroots politics in the early 1990s. The movement 
adopted a centralised organisational structure and some unusual tactics for a people’s 
movement. Some of the SSFAI leaders went as far as establishing ties with political 
parties (see Somchai 2006; Prudhisan 1998: 269). However, the centralised structure 
and these adopted tactics later led to conflicts among its leaders and corruption 
scandals. These issues resulted in pervasive dissatisfaction among the people’s sector 
towards to the ‘SSFAI model.’ Not only did this cause the mass defection of its leaders 
and member,
 From that point onward, the AOP was no longer hoped to be merely a 
discussion space, but it was also expected to be where the collective actions were made 
by the people with common goals.  
54 it also set an example that it was never a good idea for a people's 
movement to become involved in party politics.55
                                                 
52 Nitirat Sapsomboon, Interview, 14 January 2011. 
53 Nitirat explained that the degree of centralisation of the structure also reflects the strength of 
the movement. When the movement is strong, the AOP appears to be an assembly, which 
means the member groups working closely together. This is because by doing so, the members 
would benefit more from the movement. But as the AOP becomes weakened, the forum 
arrangement, which allows member groups to mobilise more independently, would prevail. He 
is convinced that currently the AOP has become more like a forum—a highly loose structure. 
54 Some authors, including Missingham (2003: 37-38) and Baker (2000: 15), believe that the 
SSFAI split in the early 1990s had a role to play in the founding of the AOP. Somchai (2006: 
144) plays down such a claim and suggests that the role of the SSFAI is only to prepare for the 
founding of the AOP, while Naruemon (2006) denies the link between the split and the AOP’s 
formation.  
 As a result of this, one of the goals of 
55 It should be pointed out that after the May massacre in 1992, the military dictatorship lost its 
role in the political scene, so the politicians became the only elite force left in the formal 
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the AOP founders was not to repeat the same ‘mistake’ again, and several ideas, such 
as collective leadership and the non-political involvement approach, were implemented 
in an attempt to overcome the internal schisms among the leaders as well as improve 
the AOP’s public image.  
 Second, the AOP’s loose structure was well supported by the prevailing ideas 
which were current in the mid-1990s when the movement was founded, such as 
community culture and civil society. These ideas, which emphasise extra-parliamentary 
activism and a non party-political approach, reflect the adoption of self-limiting 
radicalism among the political actors in that period. As already mentioned in the last 
chapter, such ideas did not call for radical structural change, but rather focused on 
reforming the system and protecting the interests of their constituent groups. This trend 
was also found in academic works in that period. A number of academic works on Thai 
politics published during the early 1990s period were devoted to understanding non-
state actors (Kengkij 2009a: 7). These trends reflected the supposedly declining 
political power of the traditional elite, the military and elected politicians, after the May 
1992 events. Instead of taking over the state forming through a revolutionary 
movement or winning elections, proponents of self-limiting radicalism believed in 
protecting their political space in their local communities.     
 Third, the horizontal structure facilitated the diverse nature of the AOP (Uchane 
2007: 170), and allowed the movement expand its numeral strength. Currently, the 
AOP is formally made up of seven groups according to the issues emphasised by 
different elements. These member groups have diverse backgrounds, which include 
different financial statuses (ranking from heavily indebted landless farmers and middle-
class land-owning farmers), degrees of education (ranking from no formal education to 
                                                                                                                                              
political structure. As a result of this, the media and the public became more critical to the 
elected officials.  
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college degrees), locations (mostly from rural but some also from urban areas) and the 
numbers of people involved in each case (ranking from one family to several 
thousands). The diversity of their demands is also significant; they include cabinet 
resolutions, law or policy change, and financial compensation. The size of the 
compensation could rank from less than a million baht (£20,000, mostly land cases 
involving a few families) to billions of baht (more than £20,000,000, mostly dam cases 
involving thousands of families).56
Fourth, the loose structure has supported work of the existing groups. By the 
mid-1980s, there were several anti-state project groups throughout the country, 
especially in the Northeast. The most prominent of these groups were anti-dam project 
movements. Compared to other grassroots groups, anti-dam groups were the strongest 
and most powerful: each group represented thousands of people, and their groups were 
generally well organised.
 Some demands are also urgently needed (mostly 
forest cases involving forest encroachment claims) while others, such as policy change, 
will take years to resolve. Not only member profiles and demands, the diversity also 
includes different expectations towards and dissimilar commitments to the movement. 
Despite the decline in number of the grievances, the diverse nature of the movement 
remains a significant characteristic of the AOP. Without this arrangement, it would not 
have been possible for these member groups to be united as one movement.  
57
                                                 
56 Approximately, one pound is equal to fifty baht. 
57 In general, larger groups have greater resources and adequate support from NGIs. Generally, 
the NGIs also prefer working with larger groups over smaller ones because of the importance of 
the case and better funding opportunities (Fieldnotes, 10 October 2010). 
 For these groups, the founding of the AOP was by no means 
an attempt to replace the existing many local groups with one national organisation. 
The new movement was rather expected to assist these member groups, which were 
struggling at that time, to achieve their goals. To explain this, Wanida writes:  
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[We] must understand that we did not join the AOP, but the AOP was 
founded by the people from Pak Mun Dam and Sirinthorn Dam and 
other networks to learn from each other and to work together. Then it 
has become a movement which is not rigidly organised but rather 
loosely structured, and each unit is autonomous and self-sufficient. [...] 
The mission of the AOP is pushing forward the proposals of the member 
groups while not asking the groups to follow the AOP’s vague 
ideologies like other organisations (2008: 339-340).    
In sum, the AOP’s original goal was to help local groups achieve their demands, not to 
make its own demands and make local groups follow. As the AOP was not intended to 
replace the local groups, the AOP’s organisational structure was consequently designed 
to facilitate the mobilisation of member groups.  
  However, there are some problems with the loosely structured organisation as 
well. First, the unclear structure put the movement’s unity into question. According to 
Uchane (2007: 169-170), the AOP’s structure can be viewed in three different 
configurations, as follows: 1) the AOP as a forum (loose structure and no obligation for 
its members), 2) the AOP as an assembly (some structure and some obligations for its 
members), 58
                                                 
58  In the Thai original text, he uses the term wethi for both the first and the second 
configurations, but to differentiate these two, I use forum for first configuration and assembly 
for the second.  
 and 3) the AOP as an organisation (centralised structure and clear 
obligations for its members). This unclear structure can be problematic because 
different understandings lead different expectations of the movement, and this 
sometimes leads to internal conflicts. Some groups depend entirely on the AOP to solve 
their problems and want the movement to be actively engaged in politics, while others 
only view the movement as part of their political strategy.  
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 Moreover, some may be in for short-term immediate interests while others may 
be in for longer-term structural solutions. These differences also lead to the variation in 
commitment to the movement and PKY assembly decision, the disagreement in 
resource and power distribution structure, and the dissimilarity in goal, priority, and 
strategy. From time to time, these dissimilar views have clashed inside the PKY 
assembly meetings, especially when some sort of mobilisation was needed. Outside the 
meetings, these conflicts mostly manifested themselves in the form of gossip and 
private talk, but sometimes, these frustrations escalated and led to open disputes.  
Also, some unity problems emerge because not every AOP member is identified 
with the AOP as much as they are with their local groups. According to Uchane (2007: 
175), members of local groups are tied more closely with their ‘hua kao’ (literally, old 
heads – meaning old/local groups) than ‘hua mai’ (literally, new head – meaning the 
AOP). This problem is less profound in small groups because they have to rely on the 
AOP for mobilisation, so they are more inclined to be identified and unified with the 
AOP. But for bigger groups with greater resources, namely dam groups, the role of 
AOP in their mobilisation becomes less essential. Members of these groups tend to be 
identified with and unified under the local groups rather than with the AOP (ibid.).  
Also, according to Nitirat,59
                                                 
59 Nitirat Sapsomboon, Interview, 14 January 2011. 
 not all the member groups have equally benefited 
from being part of the AOP. Nitirat suggested that the dam groups have gained more 
from the AOP than the others. This happened because the dam groups, which have the 
numeral strength and the influential NGIs, could assert more influence on the AOP’s 
decisions to mobilise according to their wishes. This has sometimes alienated other 
member groups, especially the smaller ones, which feel marginalised by the unequal 
power distribution. This unequal power has significantly weakened the sense of 
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equality and belonging among the AOP members, thereby reducing the movement’s 
sense of unity.60
 Second, the loose structure prevents the members from going beyond local 
interests. Since the loose structure allows local groups to mobilise on their own, one of 
the consequences of this flexible structure is that the member groups still focus on their 
own problems rather than on common interests (Bangkok Post, 9 January 1997, quoted 
in Somchai 2006: 163). AOP members are also often criticised for their inability to ‘go 
beyond’ their immediate interests (Uchane 2007: 170), and thus the movement became 
highly fragmented. Such a structure may encourage the local masses to participate in 
local issues, but it limited popular participation at the national level. Many idealistic 
activists became disillusioned with the AOP's limited potential for structural changes 
and later left the movement.
  
61
Third, the resource mobilising capability of the movement is fairly limited 
under the loose structure. Similar to other movements in the developing world (see 
Makino and Shigetomi 2009), the AOP is a resourceless movement. The majority of the 
AOP members are rural-dwelling villagers who reside at the bottom of the socio-
economic strata (Baker 2000). From the beginning, the AOP has relied on financial 
support channelled by allied NGOs, small donations from its members,
  
62
                                                 
60 For example, I was told by an unnamed AOP member that there was an incident during a 
PKY assembly meeting, where the meeting participants had voted against staging a protest 
against the Thaksin government. Usually, this would be final, but one of the leaders from a dam 
group, who wanted the protest to take place, lobbied the villagers and insisted on taking another 
round of voting. This incident caused discontent among some AOP members. 
61 Watcharee Phaoluengthong, Interview, 23 August 2010. 
62 It has become a custom for members to donate some of their compensation money to the 
AOP once they receive it. However, there is no suggested amount of donation that should be 
made.     
 and funding 
from outside supporters and sympathisers. During demonstrations, the participants are 
expected to finance for their own activities. However, the costs of protests and other 
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mobilisation activities do not come cheap, and they remain a great burden for the 
members, especially the high-profile ones. After the 1997 protest, for example, many 
protesters were deeply indebted after spending months on the street in Bangkok.63
The loose structure has offered little help to the AOP’s resource mobilisation. 
Given the loose structure, resources are mobilised primarily to support the local groups 
and their grievances. As previously noted, the villagers are expected to support 
themselves. This is believed to have helped the movement to shake off the paid-mob 
image, thereby giving them political legitimacy. But by doing so, the members’ 
primary concern is supporting their own activities, and as a result, little effort is made 
to support each other,
  
Time is also a constraint for the protesters, as many live from daily labouring in 
the rural areas, particularly when they have to participate in prolonged protests in 
Bangkok. The poor protesters solve these problems by either taking day-time jobs in 
demonstration areas while protesting or sending elderly members of the families to 
protest on behalf of their families. One can easily notice that a number of those 
participating protests in the recent years have been senior AOP members and 
sometimes their grandchildren. But these solutions have limited the political 
participation of the people aged between 30 and 59 (the supposedly politically active 
ages for grassroots politics). This has partially weakened the movement ever since. 
64
                                                 
63 Sawat Uppahat, Interview, 15 August 2010.  
64  For example, when the PKY assembly decides to stage a protest, the groups—which 
primarily benefit from the mobilisation—would fully commit its manpower and resources to 
the decisions. But the level of commitment would be far less for other groups which do not 
directly gain from the decision. What these groups usually do is to give the mobilising groups 
their kamlang jai (literally, moral support), which might include showing public support, a few 
leaders joining the demonstration, or logistic support. 
 let alone to support the movement as a whole. In other words, 
most resources are mobilised to support the short-term goals, while little is left for the 
long-term ones. Also, with such a structure, larger groups have an advantage over 
smaller groups by having the connections and wherewithal to acquire more resources 
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for their political ends. Under such a structure, the members can largely disregard the 
central organisation, and so it has been left mostly in the hands of NGIs.  
e. Institutionalisation  
The AOP leaders’ decision to go with a loose structure over a centralised one 
may also indicate the view of the AOP leaders on the idea of institutionalisation. Many 
AOP leaders are not big fans of a strong institutionalised movement with fixed political 
ideologies and enduring structure. This view is clearly in line with the community 
culture ideology, which focuses on local empowerment. One of the AOP NGO leaders, 
Hannarong Yaowalers also suggested that in his view, the AOP, like other people’s 
movements in Thailand, was prone to change and would eventually cease to exist.65
To measure this degree of institutionalisation, Van Der Heijden proposes that 
three components, namely the organisational growth, internal institutionalisation, and 
external institutionalisation, be taken into consideration (1997: 31-35). First, in terms of 
organisational growth, the AOP has struggled to maintain supporter numbers. The AOP 
was very successful in the early years as many local groups joined the movement, 
which eventually resulted in the historic 1997 protest. Over twenty thousand protesters 
camped in front of Government House for over three months; that figure was 
unprecedented for a lengthy protest. However, the numbers the AOP could muster 
significantly reduced during the Thaksin government (2001 – 2006), and this trend 
 For 
the NGIs, the main purpose of the people’s movements is to assist their NGO work. 
The idea of institutionalisation for the movement has clearly been secondary to the 
local interests, and one can see why the AOP has not been successfully institutionalised 
over the years of existence.  
                                                 
65 Hannarong Yaowalers, Interview, 4 August 2010.   
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continued even after the 2006 coup. The number of cases went down from 205 in 2005 
to 38 in 2010.  
There are several reasons for this decrease in number. Many left because they 
already achieved their goals, while others believed they had never gained anything 
from the struggle and felt disillusioned with the AOP. A land rights group from Bantad 
mountain range left the AOP in 2007 partially because of this reason.66
Despite this massive decline, there has been no serious effort to replace those 
who left. There is no official or sufficient data on the number of AOP members, but it 
is estimated that in 2010 the members were reduced to a few thousand from about 
twenty to thirty thousand ten years earlier.
 Also, some 
groups left because they became strengthened, and they felt they could take care of 
their own problems. Others deserted the movement because of internal conflicts 
(Prapas and Uchane 2006: 18-19).  
67
Second, internal institutionalisation, which is measured by the degree of 
centralisation and professionalisation (Van Der Heijden 1997: 32), is evidently limited.  
Centralisation refers the availability of a command structure, such as local branches or 
 Van Der Heijden notes that the growth of a 
movement organisation is “both a condition for, and a further consequence of internal 
and external institutionalisation” (1997: 31). The decrease in number of membership 
has as a result important impacts on the AOP’s internal and external institutionalisation.  
                                                 
66 Watcharee Phaoluengthong, Interview, 23 August 2010. 
67 The figure varies due to the movement’s poor information management system and nature of 
the loose structure which has little control on membership. Also, there are some conflicts of 
understanding regarding the membership status of certain groups. For example, I was told that 
the alternative agriculture group and some slum community groups had announced their 
departure from the AOP, but some of their leaders insisted that their groups remained part of 
the movement. Also, it is not uncommon for a local group to be part of more than one people’s 
movement, given that its priority is the short-term interests. In a PKY assembly meeting, one of 
the NGO leaders also made a sarcastic remark that no one really left the AOP because there 
was no official notice. He said, “They don't really leave. They just never showed up” 
(Fieldnotes, 25 September 2010). 
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chapters, which can be used to increase the effectiveness of the movement 
mobilisation. The continuation of the loose structure indicates the resistance to any 
attempt to centralise the movement. Formally, there is no clear chain of command 
within the AOP structure. The main function of central bodies, which consist of the 
secretariat team, the advisers, and the working group, is to support and to coordinate 
with member groups. The final say belongs to the villagers and the local groups who 
comprise the movement’s highest authority, the PKY assembly. It can however be 
argued that the central bodies (mostly made up by the NGIs) have more influence than 
they officially admit, and because of this, the movement structure is actually quite 
centralised and under the control of the central bodies. But this may not be entirely true 
because many of the NGIs also work as phi liang or advisers for local groups, so their 
decisions are not entirely made in benefit of the central organisations. Formally and 
informally, the control of the movement is, therefore, still in the hands of the local 
groups.  
Also, the central bodies have not been suitably professionalised. The degree of 
professionalisation can be determined by the number of paid staff (Van Der Heijden 
1997: 32). In the past, the AOP was run by NGIs who were paid by other organisations 
or their own projects (which might or might not involve the AOP) (see Missingham 
2003: Chapter V). They basically worked for the AOP as volunteers. Not until 2010, 
the AOP receive funding from the Community Organizations Development Institute for 
a short-term project, which was used to pay for two full-time staffers, financial supports 
for working group members, and campaigning activities. This was the first time that the 
AOP had explored this funding channel.  
Some people disagree with this move as they argue that working for the AOP 
should not be a career. In their view, the work should not be driven by a salary but 
rather by moral responsibility (Fieldnotes, 21 November 2010). But what these 
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moralists fail to address is that the salaried positions also give those who work for the 
AOP a full-time job as well as a full responsibility to the movement and its members. 
Uchane (2007: 176-177) argues having full-time staff can change the relationship 
between the villagers and NGIs, which has been biased in favour of the NGIs since the 
beginning. Although hiring paid staff has not yet yielded the results that many had 
hoped due to the lack of experience of the new staff members, it has noticeably created 
a new relationship between the secretariat team and the villagers. The villagers now 
have much more control over the movement affairs than they had had before.     
Professionalisation can also be seen in the handling of secretarial work. In the 
past, movement’s secretariat work had been compromised by the nature of volunteer 
work and the lack of proper facilities. The AOP had, for example, failed to build a 
decent information management system of its own. In the past, most information was 
stored either in the computer hard drives or the offices of volunteer NGIs. And more 
often than not, when they left, the valuable information would leave with them as well. 
Without sufficient information, the AOP has at times struggled to communicate 
effectively with the government officials and the public.  
Moreover, after fifteen years of existence, the AOP has also failed to build a 
permanent office or official address. They have used the addresses of NGO offices 
which supported the movement.68
                                                 
68 Khematas Palprem, Interview, 4 September 2010. 
 Not only this has caused some postal inconvenience, 
but it has also caused some difficulty in effectively managing the information and 
documents. This is rather ironic given that many of its member groups have offices of 
their own. This lack of permanent infrastructure reflects how the AOP leaders view the 
movement and its institutionalisation.  
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 Third, external institutionalisation of the AOP, which is generally measured by 
the change of strategy from using unconventional to conventional channels in order to 
gain access to the official policy process, is somewhat limited. While the AOP has 
recently adopted a more conventional approach, such as lobbying and formal meetings, 
the shift has been made mainly because of its weakened mass support. And not 
surprisingly, the villagers rarely get access to the decision-making process. Mostly, 
these meetings were set up either to postpone addressing the movement’s demands or 
to ease political tensions. For example, when Abhisit Vejjajiva became Thailand's 27th 
prime minister with the support of the military in late 2008, he was strongly opposed by 
many pro-democracy and pro-Thaksin groups. To ease the political pressure, one of the 
first things that he did was setting up a series of meetings with the AOP and a few other 
people's movements (see Chapter V). The gesture was clearly intended to resemble 
what Thaksin did in early 2001 when he joined the AOP for lunch in his first day in the 
office. But because there was no strong political pressure outside the parliament, no 
meaningful outcomes were achieved from these meetings. In other words, the adoption 
of the conventional approach had little to do with gaining access to the system, but it 
should be seen as an adaptation of a weakened movement to new political conditions 
over which they had little control. 
 In sum, the AOP has not achieved much success when it comes to 
institutionalisation. Since the early 2000s, the movement's organisational growth has 
been severely stalled. The internal institutionalisation has been hindered by the 
communitarian ideology and the loose structure. The AOP may have changed its 
strategy to a more conventional one, but this change was only a response to the 
weakened political strength, not because of any real institutionalisation. In recent years, 
it has become very difficult for the movement to pursue an unconventional approach 
and mobilise a strong large-scale protest.   
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f. Strategies 
The selection of strategies is a rational behaviour. It generally responds to several 
factors, including the goals of the movement, the organisational structure, and notably 
the changing political environment. In a study on anti-nuclear movements, Kitschelt 
(1986: 66) proposes two major hypotheses to understand how the POS affects the 
movement's strategies. He argues that when the political system is open and weak, 
assimilative strategies can be used since multiple points of access are available. But 
when the system is closed, disruptive strategies will be used to gain access. On the 
other hand, in a country like Thailand where political participation is largely limited 
and human rights are rarely respected, social systems are generally closed. And yet 
sometimes the systems are also weak, so that occasionally the state opponents are 
allowed to challenge power-holders.  
 Over the years, the AOP has employed various forms of strategies, but, the 
overall strategy of the AOP may, according to Naruemon (2006: 212), be described as a 
dual strategy approach, a combination of agitation and negotiation. As noted earlier, the 
system is not necessarily closed, but it is mostly inaccessible for the marginalised 
groups. As a result, without pressure from outside the parliament, the demands from the 
villagers may never be put on the negotiation table. So when the people and resources 
are well equipped, it is necessary to employ both sets of strategies simultaneously.     
Agitation 
Agitation strategies generally involve demonstrative and confrontational events, such 
as public demonstrations, road blockades, encampments, and building occupations. The 
approach has several strengths. First, it can be used to gain attention from the 
government of the day. This works best when the government is in a weak position. 
The AOP employed these strategies with great effect during the mid-1990s, since the 
governments of the day were unstable multi-party coalitions that needed to make 
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pragmatic compromises in order to remain in office. But this changed radically after 
2001, when the institutional arrangements introduced with the 1997 constitution 
produced more stable governments (Naruemon 2006: Connors 2002) and strengthened 
electoral politics (Naruemon 2006: 29-30). The 1997 Asian financial crisis also caused 
a public clamour for strong governments (see Rungrawee 2004: 544-546; Baker 2000: 
25).  
 Second, the strategies can also boost the movement’s public visibility. Chantana 
(2004a) argues that the AOP have been successful in making themselves visible to the 
public. This in effect increases the political relevance and legitimacy of the movement. 
This is a useful means to educate and communicate with the public about their 
grievances and demands. This can be used to create public sympathy and support, 
which in turn be transformed into the pressure on the government (Prapas and Uchane 
2006: 2). However, this public visibility also has unintended consequences. By 
employing disruptive strategies in order to gain the public attention through the media, 
the AOP risks reinforcing their stereotype as ‘troublemakers’ in the eyes of the public 
(Rungrawee 2004: 561). Their public actions may also be seen as too demanding and 
aggressive by Bangkokians. This negative view works against the interests of the poor 
because the Thai political elite tend to listen to the opinions of the urban dwellers, 
rather than that of those from the marginalised villages (Chantana 2004b: 229).  
 Third, the agitation tactics also help to build the sense of identity and unity, and 
confidence. Many collective activities during the protests, such as the use of symbolic 
artefacts, discursive tactics, and political training, are specifically designed to increase 
these feelings (Missingham 2003: 140-161). One of the NGIs recounted the story of 
villagers who gained confidence after successfully blocking a road: 
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After that many NGO workers believed that this way made the villagers 
“smart,” made them feel confident, capable, and determined. They see 
their own potential. They feel they are equal to the governor, equal to 
Cabinet ministers, because this power of collective protest is very clear 
[...] If you give training, some sort of education, I don't know if you will 
get the same results. Maybe you would. But I think, up to now, this 
method of protest has been the best, it's useful. Pho Siang [one of the 
villagers] can talk with Cabinet ministers, it's become ordinary (Quoted 
in Missingham 2003: 159). 
One of the working group members also observed that participating in collective 
actions has a direct impact on the members' sense of identity and unity, and confidence. 
He noted that those who get closely involved in the activities tended to stay with the 
movement for a long term and show signs of leadership (Fieldnotes, 11 October 2010).  
 However, the strategies can also be considerably costly as they require popular 
strength and resources. The strategies work best when the movement can mobilise a 
large number of participants as well as sufficient resources to accommodate them. 
Generally, to gain bargaining power with the state, their protests have to be massive 
and lengthy. To put sufficient pressure on the government, the AOP believe numbers 
really mattered. In order to get attention and any action from the government, the 
number of the protesters, they concluded, had to be at least twenty thousand. To put 
this into perspective, the late Wanida, one of the AOP's iconic leaders, explains that: 
If we came only a few, we would only meet the security guards. If we 
came about ten or twenty, we might be able to meet with the secretary of 
the service centre. If we came in hundreds, might be able to meet a 
secretary of a minister. If we came in thousands, a deputy minister 
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would come to meet us. If we came in tens of thousand, a minister 
would come to negotiate with us. But to be able to meet with the prime 
minister, we need about twenty thousand (Quoted in Prapas 1998: 152, 
translation mine.).  
Also, the protest had to be lengthy. AOP learned the lessons from the past that without 
continuing pressure, the government's promises would be soon forgotten. Prolonged 
protest was their answer to this problem. They believe a prolonged protest would allow 
them pressure the government during the long negotiation process and put both the 
government and the protesters at the same level. The AOP determined that the protest 
would not be called off until final decisions were reached on every issue. The 
agreements are also expected to be ratified as a cabinet resolution, which would instruct 
local officials to implement the policies (Prapas 1998: 151, 157-158). An effective 
protest, they believe, has to last about three months (ibid: 153).  
 But in recent years, both the 20,000 protestors figure and the three month period 
of collective action have become impossible to achieve, since many supporters have 
deserted the movement. Also, the weakened political position has made it much more 
difficult to convince the members commit their time and resources to a prolonged 
protest. As noted in the previous section, this explains the reason why the AOP has 
adopted a more conventional approach and explored more formal channels, such as 
meetings and petitions, which require less manpower and resources. An AOP adviser 
said that although the movement has taken a different path, the villagers remained 
committed to street politics. Strategically speaking, he explained, the threat to take their 
demands to the streets could still at least give them some advantage on the negotiation 
table (Fieldnotes, 21 November 2010). 
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 In addition to collective actions, discursive politics also plays an important part 
of the AOP's agitation strategies. As explained elsewhere, non-political discourse has 
been used to legitimise their actions. This strategy worked considerably well in the 
1990s, when the idea of civil society was widely accepted in academic and NGO circles 
(Shigetomi 2004b: 55). Elected politicians and the bureaucrats were often linked with 
terms that contain some negative connotations for the Thais, such as capitalist (naitun), 
cunning (jaole), self-interest (phonprayod suantua), the bureaucratic system (rabob 
ratchakarn), the central government (suan klang) and exploitation (khudrid). Non-state 
actors, on the other hand, were portrayed as self-sacrificing (siasala), virtuous (khon 
di), and non-violent (santi) people. This portrayal in good-versus-evil manner was 
deliberately made to help the movement gain public support. But things changed 
dramatically at the end of the 1990s after the economic crisis and the promulgation of 
the new constitution. Extra-parliamentary politics came to be viewed in a negative light 
while electoral politics became more accepted. The popularity of the Thaksin 
Shinawatra government made it even more difficult for the AOP to achieve results by 
staging protests.   
 Anti-Bangkok-led development and direct democracy discourses have also been 
effectively used by the movement. The AOP, according to Missingham, also contests 
the concept of development arguing that economic development in the last few decades 
brought benefits only to a few while adversely affecting the lives of many poor people. 
The AOP also uses the language of environmentalism, a politically powerful discourse, 
to attack development and to appeal to the media and the middle class (2003: 55). Also, 
the AOP constructed a unifying political identity of the movement participants as 
‘victims of development,’ whose livelihood has been ‘destroyed’ by development (ibid: 
55-57).  
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 The AOP also claimed their rights have been violated by the state and 
development. Missingham (2003: 58) points out that the use of terms such as 
‘participation’ and ‘democracy’ offered another ‘politically charged discourse,’ which 
had significant impact on international and Thai audience. The AOP deployed the 
concept of prachathippatai thi kin dai (literally, eatable democracy), which implied that 
electoral democracy has failed to solve the people's problems. The AOP's most quoted 
slogan, prachachon tong kamnod anakot ton eng (literally, the people must decide their 
own future) also reflects how representative democracy has excluded the people from 
the decision-making process. These discourses work on two levels; empowering 
marginalised voices as well as attacking the political elite.  
 But these discursive strategies are not without drawbacks. Ironically, it is the 
activists' own discourse that causes them unease. Although short-term interests are vital 
for the members, the public discourse engaged in by the movement often prioritises 
‘non-material’ aspects. This sounds understandable given that a non-materialistic 
campaign would gain more public support from the middle-class and the media. 
However, this often makes it difficult for the villagers to explain why there are often 
‘material’ demands attached to their non-material campaigns. This leaves the 
movement vulnerable to countermovement campaigns by their opponents, who seek to 
discredit them by questioning the motives behind their actions.  
Negotiation 
Once the government agrees to take demands to the negotiation table, the struggle 
switches to formal channels. Usually, the villager representatives, the NGIs, and 
academics are allowed to attend the meetings on behalf of the AOP, while the 
government sends a cabinet member and state officials. On rare occasions, the 
problems can be resolved at this stage, but mostly the villagers can expect their cases to 
be assigned specifically to working groups (joint committees) for evidence-proving, 
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fact-finding, or solution-seeking purposes. In many cases, these procedures are not 
actually helpful because they involve outdated laws, of dubious relevance to the issues 
at hand. And yet because of the highly centralised and unresponsive bureaucratic 
system and political party structure, the problems continue and the marginalised groups 
suffer the consequences. In these cases, the only ways out are to pressure the 
government somehow to find a way to resolve the issues through bureaucratic 
mechanism, or better yet, to push for legal changes. But both ways require massive 
pressure outside parliament. Without strong mass and media support, these changes are 
simply unthinkable. 
 However, there are some positive aspects to this strategy. The negotiation 
processes can be used effectively to empower the villagers. In a highly stratified society 
like Thailand, the rural dwellers are given little respect from the state officials. To 
change this, the AOP purposely pushes for what they call wethi jeraja baeb samoena 
(literally, same-level negotiation), which allows the villagers and the officials to be 
equally on the same table (Prapas 1998: 232). Usually, the villagers get help from the 
NGIs and academics with supporting information and analysis, but they are responsible 
for presenting their own cases and other related facts.69
 This strategy has yielded some success, as it has helped many villagers to 
become villager leaders who have the confidence to be very outspoken in public 
settings. On one occasion, I was allowed to attend the official meeting between the 
villagers and the government representatives and officials. I observed that some of the 
villagers could speak fluently and present factually-grounded cases confidently in front 
of over a hundred people—many of them senior state officials. At one point, as the 
arguments became heated, one villager demanded that the nai amphoe (chief district 
officer), who was also at the meeting, be removed from his post (Fieldnotes, 15 
  
                                                 
69 See Missingham (2003: 162-168) for ethnographic details of one of negotiation meetings.  
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October 2010). In the past, the villagers depended on the NGIs heavily when it came to 
negotiations, but after more than a decade of struggle, many of them have become 
much more competent in dealing with the officials and legal procedures.  
 These skills and confidence do not come from the meetings alone; before each 
meeting, the villagers and their advisers usually spend one day preparing for the 
upcoming discussions. They actually practice role playing the meeting in advance. This 
also helps them learn about official procedures (Fieldnotes, 14 October 2010). 
However, this accomplishment should be celebrated with caution, because only a small 
number of local leaders of them can develop these skills.  
 Regarding the joint committees set up to look into problems raised by the AOP, 
although their appointments come with no legally binding terms, they also have some 
utility. As previously noted, many of these committees are merely delaying tactics, 
intended to appease the heated conflict; the government of the day often intends simply 
to ignore their recommendations. One of the villager leaders said to me once, “if you 
ask the villagers how many committees they have had [since the protest began], they 
would say they could fill a ten-wheeled truck with the committee resolutions by now” 
(Fieldnotes, 21 November 2010). That also explains how often the tactic is used to deal 
with the villagers.  
 However, for the AOP, these appointments are not totally useless because their 
findings can still be used to legitimise their claims, especially if the appointments come 
with impartiality and creditability. The information and recommendations from Pak 
Mun Dam research, which was conducted by academic teams from Ubon Rathchathani 
University,70
                                                 
70 In April 2001, the Thaksin government gave the budget of 10 million baht (around 20,000 
USD) to academic teams from the Ubon Rathchathani University to study the impact of the 
dam on the Mun river’s environment and the local fishing economy. While the research offered 
several policy options, it recommended that the sluice gates be kept open all year round for the 
 for example, made a significant impact on the AOP's campaign against 
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the Thaksin government in the early 2000s. Additionally, their budgets can also used to 
indirectly support local campaigns.   
 Lobbying has been left out from academic discussions on the AOP, despite its 
importance. This is probably because some of these academic works themselves are 
part of the political campaign, and lobbying does not sound very grassroots and 
participatory. But lobbying has in fact been a crucial ingredient for grassroots politics. 
Even during its heyday, the use of lobbying, according to Hannarong, played a big part 
of the AOP's achievements. He explained that this success was made possible because 
there were more than twenty phi liangs and these people provided the movement with a 
great deal of lobbying support. And since most of the lobbying activities went on 
behind the scenes, not many people were aware of their importance. He also explained 
that contacts and negotiations are usually made prior to formal meetings or public 
events71
 A villager leader-turned-NGI, Kessakorn Silarak also confirmed the importance 
of lobbying. He noted that during the Thaksin government, deals were made between 
Wanida and her Octoberist comrades in the government, notably Phumtham 
Wechayachai and Prommin Lertsuriyadej.
  
72
                                                                                                                                              
next five years. Thaksin finally ignored the recommendations and opted for 4-month opening of 
the gate as proposed by Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) (see Naruemon 
2006: 171-179).  
71 Hannarong Yaowalers, Interview, 4 August 2010. 
72 Kessakorn Silarak, Interview, 19 August 2010.  
 But as it turned out, the AOP staged 
several protests against the popular Thaksin government, which indicates that closed-
door negotiations did not always reach an agreement. Similarly, during the military 
government (2006 – 2007), with help from Prasarn Maruekapitak, many villager 
leaders from anti-Pak Mun group were given chances to meet with General Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin (Leader of the Council for Democratic Reform) and Prime Minister 
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Surayud Chulanont to discuss the Pak Mun Dam issues. But these efforts proved 
fruitless, and the issues once again remained unsolved.73
D. Conclusion 
    
 There are several problems regarding the use of lobbying. It clearly contradicts 
the philosophy that the AOP has advocated, which is participatory politics. Not only 
that, it thereby rejects the idea of equality among the members as well as concept of 
collective leadership. Since the strategy only allows a few people to get involved, not 
many people will be empowered through the process. Moreover, this approach is 
certainly not a sustainable or long-term solution because it promotes dependency on 
certain individuals. The role of the grassroots majority, as a result, will be severely 
undermined.   
 The AOP has both short- and long-term goals, but the movement has been 
mobilised mostly for short-term ends. These goals involve economic issues, such as 
compensation and land rights of the majority poor. This emphasis on short-term goals 
has caused the movement some serious problems, including commitment issues and 
fragmentation. Advocacy for long-term solutions may have been promoted by the 
movement’s advisers, but such solutions have mostly failed to materialise.  
 The AOP consists of three main groups of actors: 1) local villagers, labourers, 
and slum-dwellers, 2) academics and students, and 3) NGIs. Although the first group 
makes up the majority of the movement and officially, they have the highest authority 
(through the PKY assembly and the working group) in the movement, middle-class 
groups have also enjoyed a considerable amount of influence. These middle-class 
groups are generally expected to play supporting role as advisers and members of the 
secretariat team. The NGI particularly have much more influence over final decisions 
                                                 
73 Somkiat Phonphai, Interview, 25 December 2010. 
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than the general perception, due to their higher status, greater skills and close bonds 
with the villagers.  
The AOP is well known for its loose structure, which had previously believed to 
be a positive political innovation. Its practical strengths include the capacity to facilitate 
the diverse nature of the movement and the work of existing groups. However, the 
loose structure also has some faults, which include unity issues and limitations over 
resource mobilisation. With that structure, the movement's institutionalisation has also 
been fairly restricted. According to, Van Der Heijden (1997: 31-35) the process of 
institutionalisation can be measured by three components: 1) organisational growth, 2) 
internal institutionalisation, and 3) external institutionalisation. The AOP's 
organisational growth has been in decline since the Thaksin government. The internal 
institutionalisation of the movement, which is measured by the degree of centralisation 
and professionalisation, is also noticeably limited. Despite the change in approach to a 
more conventional style of campaigning, external institutionalisation is also constrained 
due to the AOP’s weakened political strength in the recent years.     
 The AOP's strategies mainly involve two sets of strategies, agitation and 
negotiation. The movement have learned from the past experience that without the use 
both strategies, their demands can simply be ignored. The strategies worked effectively 
in the past when the movement still had their mass strength. Latterly with limited 
strength, they have mostly pursued negotiation tactics with limited success.  
 The analysis of the AOP's internal elements shows that mass strength has had a 
significant impact on the movement’s mobilisation and development. The limited 
institutionalisation of the movement partially comes from the pursuit of short-term 
goals of the villagers as well as the idea of self-limiting radicalism of the NGIs. The 
loose structure might have helped the AOP to gain numerical strength in the past, but 
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because of the low level of commitment, the strong movement soon became a 
weakened one. Such a structure makes it very difficult for the AOP to maintain the 
mass strength in the long run. In responding to the recent decline, the movement has 
adopted a more conventional strategy, and yet, without continuing pressure outside the 
parliament, it is unlikely that the movement would achieve any meaningful victory in 
the near future.  
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Chapter IV: Stable Opportunity Political Structure: 
Cultural Structure, Institutional Structure, and Prevailing 
Strategies 
A. Introduction 
With the exception of the late 1990s, the development of AOP has been considerably 
constrained. Not only the AOP, but many other grassroots movements in Thailand have 
shared similar experiences. The Farmers Federation of Thailand emerged in the mid-
1970s and quickly disappeared from the political scene (see Turton 1978; Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981; Haberkorn 2011). The Small Scale Farmers’ Assembly of Isan, which 
was a major force in the grassroots politics in the early 1990s, also lost its influence in 
subsequent years. These movements had their moments of victories as well as defeats, 
but the latter seem to be more prevalent. Their achievements are rather limited. These 
constraints can actually be traced back several decades when the modern form of Thai 
politics began, and they have been largely unchanged over the years.  
 Social movement theorists argue that not all components in the POS constantly 
change. They theorise that some components are deeply embedded in the political 
system. From the point of view of the challengers, the components are essentially fixed 
and given, and they are beyond their control (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 277; Kriesi et 
al. 1995: 26). Changes rarely occur; if they do, they would be gradual or through 
revolutionary changes in the entire regime (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 277).  
 Many studies utilise the approach to compare the success of the similar 
movements in different countries (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 278). Some of the notable 
works include Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi et al. (1992; 1995), and Van Der Heijden (1997). 
Kitschelt's (1986) analyses the impact of the political structure on anti-nuclear power 
movements in France, Sweden, the US. and West Germany. The study focuses on  the 
openness of the political system to movements' demands and the capacity to convert 
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these demands into state policies. Kriesi et al. (1992; 1995), on the other hand, compare 
the political structures (defined as the openness of access to the state and its capacity to 
act) of four western countries, namely France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, and how they impact the mobilisation pattern of new social movements. 
Similarly, Van Der Heijden (1997) contents that the availability of a suitable POS is 
strongly correlated with a high degree of institutionalisation of environmental 
movements in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. For example, 
environmental movements in France, which struggle in a closed POS, have the lowest 
degree of institutionalisation when compared with other European counterparts in the 
study.  
 Yet the study of these components can also be helpful in understanding the 
structural barriers that grassroots movements in a given political structure have to face 
over the long period of time. In this respect, a focus on these elements can be quite 
useful for the study on movements in developing countries, where an undemocratic 
culture is dominant, the institutional structure is relatively closed, and the use of 
violence against those who challenge state authority is prevalent.  
 As a result, this chapter is set to explore the stable aspects of the POS, and how 
they have impacts on the people's movements in Thailand in the last few decades. The 
chapter argues that in generally the stable elements of the POS have rather obstructed 
the emergence and mobilisation of the people's movements. Also, the chapter focuses 
on three main components of the POS: 1) the cultural structure, 2) the institutional 
structure, and 3) the prevailing strategies. In each section, the discussions include an 
examination of each component, a historical analysis, and the impacts on the grassroots 
movements.  
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B. Cultural Structure 
Since the 1980s, authors have attempted to explore the cultural components in politics. 
Some focus on cultural identity as in the new social movement theory while the others 
seek to understand issues with cultural significance that can be used for political 
mobilisation (Williams 2004: 91-94). Structuralist theorists, on the other hand, have 
also developed theories that emphasise cultural environments and their impacts on 
social movements (ibid: 95). Inglehart (1977), for example, argues that there was 
cultural shift in western societies, which was caused by the emergence of the post-war 
generation. This shift gave rise to movements with 'new politics' agendas in the late 
1960s. This cultural shift argument is reaffirmed in Inglehart (1990) as he maintains 
that this trend continued. Observers also see these changes in values as one of the 
factors that allowed the Green movements in the West to win parliamentary seats in the 
1980s. The cultural structure also affects the choice of strategy. In a study of anti-
nuclear movements, according to Nelkin and Pollack (1981: 74, quoted in Gamson and 
Meyer 1996: 279), German activists opted to speak about morality and civic justice, 
while these moral, historical, and legalistic arguments were less emphasised by the 
French campaigners. These differences of tactics derived from different cultural 
traditions in the activist community in terms of freedom of speech in the two countries.  
 With the unstable nature of the institutional structure in the developing 
countries, this cultural structure plays even more important role in the development and 
mobilisation of the grassroots groups. In Thailand, such cultural components are 
closely linked with the Thai identity and the prevailing definition of Thainess. In 
Thailand, political mobilisation of grassroots groups has been viewed by both the ruling 
elites and the Thai public as an 'un-Thai' act. Villager protesters are believed to be 
encouraged by foreign agents (Attachak 2006). This un-Thai label can effectively be 
used to delegitimise the movements, thereby legitimising the use of force against them. 
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The anti-communist law of 1952 was, for example, named as Un-Thai Activities Act, 
which allowed the use of suppression against those whom the state saw as the most un-
Thai groups, Communist sympathisers (Bell 1978: 59). This shows how the ‘un-Thai’ 
label can potentially undermine and lead to the untimely collapse of a movement. As a 
result, what is considered as being Thai or not essentially determines the political 
opportunity of the grassroots challengers.  
 The term Thainess is a highly contested concept among the ruling classes. The 
role of the king, which has been in the focal point of the Thainess discourse, for 
example, has been subject to constant changes.74
 
 The change of the king's role in the 
political structure has affected not only the palace and the network monarchy (see 
McCargo 2005), but also the political landscape as a whole. Other aspects, such as the 
role of the people in the political structure, and the relationships between the ruling 
elites and the people, have also been areas of contention. But unfortunately for the non-
elite groups, this power to control the definition of Thainess has largely been in the 
hands of the ruling classes, and they have attentively sought to define and redefine it to 
fit their political gains. In other words, since the formation of Thainess in the reign of 
King Chulalongkorn, the mainstream idea of Thainess has mostly caused adverse 
impacts on the grassroots groups. To understand these impacts on the AOP, the next 
section will utilise Saichol's (2005; 2008) analysis of the concept of Thainess and its 
political implications, especially for marginalised groups. 
 
 
                                                 
74  The role of the monarch was drastically changed from the benevolent ruler during the 
absolute monarchy period to the merely spiritual centre in the 1930s and early 1940s, and from 
the 1950s onward, the Thai king has thought to be the soul of the nation and a self-assumed 
'check and balance' mechanism after the 1950s (Saichol 2005). 
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a. Characterisation of Thainess 
The core ingredient of the Thainess discourse is Buddhism. Thainess, King Vajiravudh 
argued, has a core that is no less universal than western civilisations because it is based 
on Buddhism, which is considered superior to other religions in terms of rational 
dogma and the Buddha’s royal roots (Saichol 2005: 5). Since the 19th century Chakri 
Reformation period, Buddhism has been significantly politicised to ensure the national 
security against western colonial powers as well as dominance over vassal states (see 
Keyes 1977; 1989). A royal-born Buddhist scholar, Prince Patriarch 
Wachirayanwarorot (1860-1921), for example, used Buddhist ideas to define a king-
centred concept of Thai nation, and this in turn helped to create a clear, indivisible 
ideology of the three pillars, nation, religion, and kingship (Saichol 2005: 6). 
Consequently, Thai kings are expected to be practising Buddhists as well as guardians 
of the Buddhist religion. Other ruling groups also derive legitimacy from Buddhism to 
rationalise their superior positions.  
 At the centre of the Thainess discourse, there is the king, who has been believed 
to be a moral and national guardian, the country's stabiliser, and the semi-divine figure  
(Saichol 2005; 2008). After the 1932, the role of the king as sole and absolute ruler was 
transformed into that of a constitutional monarch. In the new system, the king found a 
new role. Conservatives are convinced that the king has provided check and balance 
mechanisms to Thailand’s underdeveloped democratic system (see Thongchai 2008b; 
Handley 2006). At times of crisis, he even acts as a supreme ‘political referee’ to 
resolve the conflicts (McCargo 2005: 508). Similarly, the meaning of the term ‘above 
politics,’ has also been changed to portray this supreme status of the king. Thongchai 
(2008b: 20) argues that before the 1973 student uprising, the term ‘above politics,’ had 
been understood as beyond or out of politics. But the royal intervention, which ended 
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the 1973 massacre, gave a new meaning to ‘above politics,’—on top of or overseeing 
normal politics (ibid.).  
 Next, there is the idea of a Thai-style ruler, who acts as a benevolent and 
decisive leader. The leader is the one in control of the government and state policies. 
The sources of power of these leaders have differed throughout the turbulent history of 
Thailand. Before the 1932 revolution, it was birthright that gave the throne to the ruling 
king, but after 1932, the power of the ruling elite mainly come from military coups, 
royal appointments, and elections. On the other hand, they derive their political 
legitimacy from various sources, including paternalism, Buddhist-based ideas, 
royalism, and democracy. The ruling groups also include government officials, who 
have state authority and have no hesitation to use it achieve their goals. According to 
the King Chulalongkorn, civil servants whose functions were to serve the king, were 
regarded as more Thai than ordinary people (Saichol 2005: 5). Latterly, many royalist 
officials still see themselves as kharatchakarn nai phrabat somdej phrachaoyuhua 
(literally, the royal servants), whose functions are to serve the king, not the people, 
unlike the civil servants in other democratic countries. This view obviously places the 
officials above ordinary people.  
 According to the Thainess discourse, the majority of the people is placed at the 
bottom of the social strata. These people are believed to be royal subjects to the king as 
well as the Thai-style rulers. Ironically, the majority of the Thais are thought to be less 
Thai than the elites and bureaucrats, respectively (Saichol 2005: 5). To become a 
proper Thai, an ordinary Thai is taught to be politically passive and obedient to the 
superior. In such an environment, a patron-client relationship is a typical tie between 
people of different social status. Those with power consider themselves as phu yai 
(super-ordinate) while ordinary people perceive themselves as phu noi (subordinate). If 
a person is considered a phu yai, according to the proponents of Thainess, he or she is 
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obliged to provide some type of protection, financial assistance, or guidance to his or 
her phu noi. In contrast, if a person is in the phu noi position, he or she is expected to 
give his or her superior some respect, loyalty, or some sort of service (Hank 1979: 
100). With little or no reference to severe punishments for disloyalty, conservative 
scholars portray such relationships as a harmonious, reciprocal, consensual bond. 
Without this guidance or control, conservative royalist intellectual Kukrit Pramoj 
argued, society would be full of chaos; he believed most Thais were still stupid and 
giving them more freedom would do more harm than good (Saichol 2005: 25).    
 Moreover, Thainess proponents insist that people's social status should be 
determined by their duties, ability, and karma. Kukrit argued that the prevailing thought 
on Thainess maintained a hierarchical social structure, which would in turn lead to 
“order, stability, peace, and prosperity” (Saichol 2005: 18). Since people's social 
position is decided by their duties, ability, and karma, those in the higher positions in 
the social stratum (who supposedly perform more important duties, have greater ability, 
and possess better karma) are entitled to possess additional rights (ibid.). Such a 
description is clearly based on a structural-functional view. Moreover, Thainess 
supporters also believe in the centralised structure. Since central to the idea of Thainess 
is the king and his servants, who are intelligent and competent in making wise 
decisions (based on Buddhist ethics and selflessness), it seems logical for ordinary 
people to support the centralised structure which allows these ruling elites to govern the 
country without grassroots inputs.  
b. Thainess and People's Movements 
It is no surprise that central to Thainess is the elites, and they are those who have the 
control over what the term means and who benefits from it. This is certainly not a 
coincidence. For decades, the discourse has been carefully produced and reproduced to 
minimise the threat from colonial powers as well as non-elite challengers. But there are 
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two main problems that stem from mainstream conceptions of Thainess. The idea of 
Thainess gives support to the existence of a centralised and hierarchical structure, and it 
also discourages political participation from the grassroots.  
 First, the Thainess discourse has been effectively used to justify the 
continuation of the centralised and hierarchical structure, and this has accordingly 
impeded the development of grassroots politics. The belief in a centralised system, 
centred around the king, has hindered the decentralisation process for decades. This 
belief has resulted in thousands of state projects being carried out in rural areas, while 
local populations are denied the right to voice any opposing views. Public support for 
this highly centralised structure has worked against people's movements that campaign 
for a more decentralised structure and greater access to the system. Since the 1980s, the 
NGO movement, for example, has struggled to gain public support for their 
decentralisation campaigns. Moreover, the idea of social hierarchy, which fosters the 
patronage relationship, has a significant influence on the political behaviour of Thai 
people. Such a belief system ensures that the ordinary people are not treated as 
responsible, well-informed adults; they are rather treated as dependent, irrational 
children who cannot take care of themselves (Connors 2003: 79).  
 After decades of ideological suppression, many Thais have been discouraged 
from participating in politics and have become politically passive. Many lack 
confidence and feel their voices do not matter. The lack of political orientation is 
mainly caused by what Saichol (2005) calls the ‘know-thy-place’ mentality. According 
to Saichol (ibid: 25), the people are urged to respect the social order and behave 
according to their social status. The people in the lower classes, for example, do not get 
to exercise their political rights by questioning those at the top. The know-thy-place 
principle does not tolerate disruption of the social order, and it is the job of the ‘Thai-
style ruler’ to preserve national order by any means necessary (ibid.). The discourse is 
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an effective political tool to suppress non-elite opposition. One of the goals of many 
people's movements was that their members would be empowered and overcome this 
mentality. The AOP, for example, adopted a slogan that emphasises this view. It says, 
the people must decide their own future. This is opposite to the ideal solution of the 
Thainess discourse, one that suggests the people must obediently follow the wise 
guidance of the noble elites. 
  Moreover, the emphasis on pseudo-harmonious relationships between the ruling 
and the ruled has also been problematic. The Thainess scholars repeatedly emphasise 
the harmonious relationships between the super-ordinates and subordinates as one of 
the key elements of Thainess. Kukrit notes that:  
I think relationships among Thais also remain constant. Most of us who 
are genuine Thais are loyal to the king, respect our parents and teachers, 
and are aware of seniority in a sense that children respect elders, while 
elders are kind to children (M.R. Kukrit 1971: 266-267, quoted in 
Saichol 2005: 19) 
Not only the rigidness of the know-thy-place mentality caused the difficulty for those at 
the bottom, but it has also left no room for the ‘interference’ from outsiders. Attachak 
(2006) argues that one of the tactics used by the Thai elite in dealing with the non-elite 
challengers is: blame ‘third-hand’ group, or people who come between the elites and 
their subjects. Their line of reasoning is as follows: when is a social unrest, even if it is 
caused by the elite's bad policies or incompetency, the ruling groups would blame it on 
a ‘third hand’. It is because the relationship between the benevolent rulers and the loyal 
subjects is so strong, balanced, and consensual, so nothing can break this bond, unless 
there is an external action with malicious intentions who wants to destroy the bond and 
disrupt the harmonious social order. This third hand person should not be seen as a 
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Thai not only because of his or her bad intentions, but also because he or she must be 
influenced by foreign ideas. He or she should therefore be seen as a foreign agent.  
 Attachak (2006) argues that such perceptions of the structural harmony are 
deeply rooted in mainstream understanding of Thainess and it can be traced back to the 
Sukhothai period, where the kings were regarded as fathers and the people were seen as 
their children. And because of this public perception, elite groups have effectively 
portrayed non-elite, anti-government groups, who lend support to the villagers' political 
activism, as a ‘third hand’ with malicious intentions. In the past, the communists and 
radical students were labelled as third hand groups. In the later periods, it is the NGIs 
who unfortunately qualified for this label (ibid: Chapter II). Thaksin often used this 
tactic when dealing with the NGIs. In late 2002, he refused to allow the NGIs to assist 
the villagers during a televised meeting between him and the AOP members, 
suggesting that the presence of the NGIs would disrupt the dialogue between the 
government and the people.  
 This mentality has made it difficult for grassroots movements because outside 
support sometimes can be crucial to their success (Tarrow 1998: 79). This support is 
even more valuable for people's movements, since most of their members do not have 
sufficient necessary skills, such as management and communication. They have to 
depend on the NGIs in this respect (Shigetomi 2004a). Chantana (2004b: 239) argues 
that forming an alliance with the NGIs is a ‘necessary’ step for these movements. But 
the Thainess discourse turns this useful cooperation into a liability. The villagers are, 
according to this view, portrayed as mindless puppets, string-controlled by activists 
with hidden malevolent intentions. The AOP particularly attempted to solve this 
problem by inventing collective leadership and assigning the supporting role to the 
NGIs. This has considerably eased the negative public perception and increased its 
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legitimacy. But this ‘third hand’ tactic will continue to benefit the ruling elite and 
disadvantage grassroots activists as long as this cultural perception persists.  
 Second, political legitimacy, according to the concept of Thainess, does not 
derive from popular participation. This is contrasted with the core value of liberal 
democracy, where the only legitimate channel to the power is through popular 
participation, such as elections. But Thainess school scholars question this idea because 
they argue that this political process would harm the country's stability and social unity. 
Phya Anuman Rajathon contends that because the representatives, which come from 
elections, are chosen individually, they do not “represent the whole people” (1954: 1). 
On the other hand, the king, who observes the ten kingly virtues and four principles of 
justice, is indirectly chosen by all the people (ibid: 5). Others claim that political 
participation is a time-wasting process because it involves too much ‘politics.’ To solve 
this problem, Kukrit, proposed that there should be a ‘society without politics.’ Saichol 
writes:  
Thainess as defined by M.R. Kukrit therefore led to Thai society being a 
‘society without politics,’ or one characterized by ‘political silence,’ 
because in his principle, both ‘Thai-style ruler’ and the public are 
outside the political space. If the ruler does not have to waste time with 
‘politics’ (the situation of ‘still politics’ in today's jargon), he can fully 
devote his time to work in the nation’s best interests. Meanwhile, the 
public does not have to worry that the ruler will abuse his power, 
because being a Buddhist (as well as respecting some monks) ensures 
that he would be ethical and righteous, and the king who was ‘pure 
power’ would also supervise to make sure that the ruler rules justly 
(2005: 24). 
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Thai Buddhist morals ensure that a Thai-style ruler would genuinely work for the 
people and protect their best interests—no time wasted. This applies not only to the 
king, but can also be used by people from elite groups to demand an absolute authority. 
This may be an extreme aspect of the Thainess discourse, which may not be shared by 
all Thainess supporters. But this clearly shows that the Thainess discourse can often be 
used to reject the notion of popular participation. Its supporters reason that such idea as 
political participation is ineffective and it causes social instability.  
 However, this view against popular participation has gradually changed. In the 
1980s, the Bangkok and the provincial capitalists were allowed to participate in 
national politics (Anek 1992; Chai-anan 1989; Pasuk and Baker 1995; Surin 1997). 
Some political room was also open for grassroots activism (Prudhisan and Maneerat 
1997). In the 1990s, participation appeared to be a source for legitimacy, along with 
security and development. McCargo (2002b: 60) observes that in this period the ruling 
elite opened up some political space to accommodate the increasing pressure from the 
grassroots. But he cautions that the change rather “illustrated shifts in the character of 
elite governance in Thailand, as a military-bureaucratic elite was displaced by a new 
elite with close ties to the business community” (ibid.). I would argue that this was not 
simply a change in the elite alignment, but it was also a reflection of some change in 
the political culture. In this period, Thailand experienced a strong movement for 
political reform (see Connors 2002; Naruemon 1998), which firmly emphasised the 
idea of political participation. This campaign resulted in the 1997 constitution—the 
first constitution to include sections on human rights and participation. 
 However, it should be noted that since the 1980s, there have been attempts to 
redefine the idea of Thainess. For example, the community culturists, argue that the 
true essence of Thainess lies in the traditional rural communities, not the one promoted 
by the Thai state. Chatthip Natsupha, a prominent Thai scholar and community culture 
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advocate, contends that these traditional villages symbolise the authentic Thai culture 
because they have not penetrated by western influence and capitalism (Thongchai 
2008a; Shigetomi 2013). Chatthip portrays the traditional Thai village as a community 
with a self-sufficient economy and the villagers had strong social ties. The people were 
given land and provided mutual support (Shigetomi 2013: 11). This ideal Thai 
traditional essence, according to Chattip (1984), should be maintained because “the 
community was an organized way of life that provided villagers with happiness, 
identity, and political power” (91-95, quoted in Shigetomi 2013: 11-12). Thongchai 
(2008a) correctly illuminates Chattip's thought as he writes: 
[...] the important point Chatthip keeps emphasising is that this authentic 
essence of Thai people constitutes the culture of the Thai village. This 
Thai essence needs to be refreshed and revitalised to make the country 
strong because, we are told, ‘Thai village culture is the natural culture of 
Thai people.’ To put it the other way round, as he also asserts several 
times, Thai culture is the peasant culture, it is not the one promoted by 
the state, which is a combination of the Indian-ised, feudalistic, high 
culture and modernist culture favoured by the urban bourgeoisie, who 
are mostly Chinese  (581-582). 
To put it simple, instead of adopting the elite-produced version of Thainess, the 
culturalists promote their own version of Thainess. But his approach is proven to be 
problematic because not only it fails to challenge anti-democratic elements including 
royalist nationalism in the Thainess discourse, these supposedly new Thai elements 
also fall short in addressing important issues such as social inequality and human 
rights.  
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 Similarly, while the AOP vigorously attacks the hegemony of the national 
economic development, it fails to challenge an ideology of Thainess or national identity 
(Missingham 2003: 61). In fact, during the campaigns the protesters even use the 
symbols of the nation, religion, and the king, which are important part of the elite-
created national identity, in order to show their Thai collective identity and brush off 
the radical image (ibid: 61-62). The villagers as well as the culturalists often cite these 
conservative ideas along with other reformist notions, such as local participation, to 
attack the national development and capitalism. However, it is quite ironic that while 
these people's groups show their support for these supposedly pro-democratic, reformist 
beliefs, they also use this anti-democratic conservative national identity as part of their 
political campaigns. This trend became even more evident after the 2006 as the alliance 
of these two groups were formed to topple the pro-Thaksin groups, which were thought 
to represent western influence and capitalism (Thongchai 2008a).  
 As presented in this section, the Thainess discourse does not make it easy for 
Thais to embrace the idea of political participation. Thainess proponents argue against 
the process because they believe people are still ignorant. Despite the sharp increase in 
literacy rates and educational attainment in recent years, this perception continues to 
dominate the general public and be regularly promoted by the elite groups. The 
majority of Thais are still being looked down upon. The media still look at them with a 
sceptical eye.75
                                                 
75 Aimpong Boonyanupongsa, Interview, 4 January 2011.  
 Like other people's movements, the AOP has campaigned to increase 
the people's participation in the political process. It contests this perception by engaging 
in the politics of knowledge. The Tai Ban research projects were, for example, 
specifically designed to challenge the official view and mainstream perception of the 
Pak Mun villagers, demonstrating their ability to conduct research into their own 
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livelihood issues (see Naruemon 2006: 171-179).76
C. Institutional Structure 
 But without political strength and 
an radical challenge on the Thainess discourse, the impact of their campaigns would 
still be limited. 
The political opportunity of grassroots movements is generally determined by whether 
the challengers can gain access to the state. Authors have proposed various methods to 
measure this degree of accessibility to the state structure (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 
1998). However, Kriesi et al. (1995) propose perhaps the most influential model, which 
suggests that one needs to look at two important factors: the access points to the state 
and the state capacity to act. The analysis presented by Kriesi et al. (ibid.) emphasises 
political structure as well as three political arenas, namely parliamentary, 
administrative, and direct democracy.  
a. General Political Structure 
State strength is determined by the degree of decentralisation and separation of power. 
Kriesi et al. (1995: 28-29) argue that the greater degree of decentralisation, the more the 
access points and less the capacity of the state to act. Also, the more the separation of 
power (between different branches and within each branch), the more constrained is the 
state capacity to act. In centralised states, Kriesi et al. (ibid: 28) observe, regional and 
local access points are relatively insignificant. Also, in a federalist system like the US, 
movement leaders have greater degree of strategic flexibility and the availability of 
venue shopping (Ann-Marie Syzmanski 1997, quoted in Tarrow 1998: 81).77
                                                 
76 The Tai Baan research was a participatory resource study that involved community-based 
documentation of the local resources and their impacts on the livelihood of local people. Most 
work was usually done by local villagers under the supervision of experts. The benefits of the 
research were twofold: 1) it increased the legitimacy of the local wisdom vis-à-vis official 
knowledge and 2) it empowered the research team member by allowing them to gain new 
knowledge from working in the project (see ThaiNGO, 3 November 2010).  
77 Strategic shift of levels within the federal system. 
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 In terms of general political structure, the Thai structure should be considered as 
a strong state. This highly centralised structure is arguably a political legacy of cultural 
structure as well as an undemocratic past. As already discussed in the last section, one 
of the most important elements of the Thainess discourse is that it give support to a 
centralised structure. The core idea of Thainess emphasises the importance of the elite 
groups, who are morally and intellectually superior to the people. Giving powers to the 
ruling groups would not lead to authoritarianism, Thainess proponents argue, because   
Buddhism adequately provides check and balance mechanisms to the system. For them, 
it is therefore wise to maintain the centralised political structure.  
 The undemocratic history also has its role in this continuation of the centralised 
structure. In the decades after the end of the monarchy, Thailand was popularly labelled 
a ‘bureaucratic polity,’ a term which portrayed Thai politics as a political competition 
between bureaucratic elite groups or factions (see Riggs 1966; Wilson 1966). Such a 
structure is apparently centralised. The centralised system partially derived from the 
undemocratic constitutions and temporary charters in the early period, which gave most 
powers to the unelected government. According to Neher (1992: 587), between 1932 
and 1973, Thailand was under military governments for 36 of those 41 years. Also, the 
political participation of other political groups were mostly limited. During 
authoritarian governments, political parties were allowed to function only from 1945 to 
1951, 1955 to 1958, and 1968 to 1971 (Ockey 1994: 253). In this period, when parties 
were allowed to function, most government parties appeared to be either controlled or 
co-opted by the military. In the 1980s, Thai politics was widely described as a ‘semi-
democratic’ order where the military still played “a strong political role within the 
parliamentary framework” (Surin 1997: 152). Under the 1978 constitution, the 
bureaucrats held the power to appoint the Senate, which was given a dominant role 
over the lower House (Chai-anan 1989: 333-334). The weak position of elected MPs 
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was made possible by several provisions and procedures of the 1978 constitution and 
parliamentary rules (ibid: 334).  
 Basic democratic principles, such as human rights, participation, and 
decentralisation, were not formally introduced until the promulgation of the 1997 
constitution (see McCargo 2002a). Along with other progressive measures, these were 
thought to mark a ‘new turning point’ for democratic development in Thailand (see 
Chantana 2004a: 216). Naruemon (2006: 22-29), however, argues that these so-called 
reforms were in fact part of the post-May uprising ‘unfinished businesses’ to legitimise 
the representative democratic system. But this was not necessarily translated into 
greater space for extra-parliamentary groups. In a more critical view, McCargo (1998) 
sees these reforms as conservative project to maintain national security and check the 
power of the elected politicians. These analyses correctly explain why under the new 
constitution political institutions, such as the government, the Senate, and independent 
bodies, became significantly strengthened, while the progressive elements were largely 
ignored. The non-elite groups, who helped pushing for the new constitution (Naruemon 
1998; Chantana 2004a: 216) and hoped to utilise these channels to mobilise their 
causes, were left marginalised as a result.  
 The 2007 constitution, drafted in the wake of a military coup, also offered little 
help to grassroots groups. Although it has opened more access points to the system by 
lowering the formal requirements for popular input,78 critics observe that these changes 
were only made to appease the public opposition to the military-led drafting process.79
                                                 
78 For example, the minimum signature requirement for proposing laws in the 2007 constitution 
are lowered to 10,000 from 50,000 in the previous constitution. The impeachment process can 
now be launched by collecting 20,000 signatures as opposed to 50,000 in the 1997 constitution.  
79 This measure indicated the involvement of people's groups, notably the NGIs, who sought to 
benefit from the military's lack of legitimacy. Some joined the drafting assembly, while the 
others gave public support to the military-led drafting process (see Atchara 2010; See Hewison 
2007 and Dressel 2009 for the political background and the analysis of the 2007 constitution).   
 
The real benefiters of new constitution appear to be the old-guard elite groups that 
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secure powerful positions in the Senate (74 out of 150 seats) and the independent 
bodies. Thus, the political participation from the bottom under the 2007 constitution 
remained fairly restricted.  
 Moreover, the degree of separation of powers in the Thai system is rather 
limited. In a parliamentary system like Thailand’s, in contrast with a presidential one, 
the executive branch is not entirely separate from the legislative branch (Siripan 2006: 
75). The head of the government is, for example, chosen by the parliament, and in the 
parliament, coalition parties make sure that the government gets the resources and bills 
it wants to succeed. Although the drafting of recent constitutions has been based on the 
idea of separation of powers, in reality the system has been significantly compromised.  
 The patronage relationships of the elite groups are among the most important 
factors that have caused this setback (Chantana 2004a: 215-216). According to Ockey 
(2004: 147-149), Thai bureaucrats hold significant power vis-à-vis elected politicians. 
The bureaucrats, for example, can delay the government policies and projects, and 
these delays can cause significant damage to the elected politicians. This is because 
their working terms are short and so, slow policy and project implementations can 
easily cost them their jobs. Also, bureaucrats play an important role in the law-making 
process, so politicians have to depend on their long experience and expertise in 
detailing specific procedures and regulations. This dependency can very well develop 
into a patronage relationships between the two elite groups (ibid.).  
 Political connections can easily lead to corruption or accountability problems. 
This is because the government may find it necessary to side with the bureaucrats even 
after they fail to perform their work effectively or honestly. There are countless 
examples of the failures caused by the incompetency or dishonesty of the bureaucrats, 
but there are far fewer examples of these officials being punished for their 
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wrongdoings. Corrupt practices by politicians are often ignored or even assisted by 
these same officials. These so-called ‘go-with-the-flow’ customs has been long 
embedded in the Thai bureaucratic culture. The check-and-balance mechanisms 
introduced by the new constitutions are also constantly criticised for failing to resolve 
these problems (Chantana 2004a: 216).  
 The close connection between the two elite groups clearly ensures state strength 
as well as the marginalisation of grassroots groups. Even government compensation 
does not come without conditions. Compensation receivers are often required to sign 
document papers with terms which suggest that these compensations are simply ngoen 
chuayleua (literally, financial aid) from the government (Fieldnotes, 10 October 2010). 
This effectively means no one has ever done anything wrong. The payment is simply 
made out of mercy. This tactic is used to avoid setting precedent for other state projects 
with similar nature.80
b. Three Political Arenas 
 The 2009 settlement which Yai Hai received from the Abhisit 
government, was also carefully devised to avoid setting a precedent for other cases 
(Prachatai, 10 October 2009). As a result of this restricted implication, the impacts of 
the villagers' victories are rather short-lived and have limited significance at the 
structural level (see Chapter V).  
In addition to the political structure, Kriesi et al. (1995) propose that three political 
arenas, namely the parliamentary, administrative, and direct-democratic arenas, are to 
be examined in order to measure the strength of the state. First, in the parliamentary 
arena, the Thai state has been mostly weak, except during the Thaksin government. 
Generally, proportional representation allows more access to the political system than 
plurality or majority methods. With proportional representation (without threshold), 
                                                 
80  Chuan notably used this specific reason to reverse the cabinet resolutions made by the 
preceding Chavalit government that award financial settlements to thousands of state-project 
victims (see Missingham 2003: Chapter VIII; Naruemon 2006: 181).   
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more parties are allowed to enter the parliament, and the movement are, as a result, 
more likely to find allies in legislature. Also, the number of parties in the coalition has 
an important impact on the strength of the state. The less the diversity and the more the 
discipline, the greater the capacity of the state to act.  
 Throughout Thai political history, three forms of electoral system have been 
used, namely proportional representation (also known as the party list), the multi-
member district system, and the single-member district system. The first two allowed 
the creation of fragmented parliaments and government coalitions (see Chapter V). In 
contrast, the single-member district system, which was used in the 1997 constitution, 
helped to create the least diverse elected legislature and the strongest civilian 
government Thailand has ever seen during the Thaksin regime. However, it is fair to 
say that judging from the parliamentary area, the Thai state has been mostly weak. It is 
because the 1997 constitution was in use for only ten years, compared to decades of a 
fragmented legislature, and the 2007 constitution has also ensured greater elite control 
over elected politicians by dividing them. 
 Second, in the administrative area, the Thai state is largely weak as well. The 
access points and the capacity to act, according to Kriesi et al. (1995: 31), are 
determined by the amount of resources at the disposal, the degree of its coherence, 
internal coordination, and professionalisation. The greater the degree of these elements 
is, the stronger the state will be. The lack of these elements, on the other hand, makes 
the administration dependent on interest groups in the interest-intermediation system. 
And when the state is weak but established interest groups are strong, there is little 
room left for the non-elite challengers because the interest groups can very well prevent 
the outside challengers from getting access to state (ibid.). The Thai administration has 
been weak because of the lack of resources at the disposal, structural fragmentation, the 
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lack of internal coordination, and professionalisation, thereby having smaller capacity 
to act.  
 Moreover, interest groups in the form of political factions as well as business 
associations have been quite strong. Formally and informally, the gradual integration of 
these groups into the political structure has been increasingly apparent since the 1960s 
(see Anek 1992). Some of these groups, which are represented in the National 
Economics and Social Development Board, are proponents of state-led development 
schemes as well as neo-liberal policies. These plans are clearly what the AOP and other 
grassroots challengers have been up against. In other words, while the state has been 
weak in this area, little access is made available for the grassroots protesters because of 
the strong influence of the organised interest groups. 
 Third, the direct democratic function can give access points to the outside 
challengers. A system with direct democratic tools, such as popular initiatives and 
referendums, is seen as a weak state because it offers multiple access points (Kriesi et 
al. 1995: 32). The rights to propose bills and referendums were first introduced in the 
1997 constitution. These measures were hailed as ones of the most progressive 
elements in the so-called people's constitution. In reality, however, grassroots groups 
have complained that the measures offer little help to the non-state challengers. Most of 
the legal processes are still dominated by elite groups. Several bills proposed by these 
groups end up being either severely amended or dropped from the legislative agenda. 
The Community Forest Bill is a good example of this. Without the availability of 
functional direct democratic tools, the state is certainly strengthened in this arena.  
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Table 4.1: Institutional Strength of the Thai State 
General Political 
Structure 
Parliamentary 
Arena 
Administrative 
Arena 
Direct Democratic 
Arena 
Overall 
Strong 
Mostly Weak 
(Except during the 
Thaksin 
government) 
Weak 
(Strong interest 
groups) 
Strong Strong 
†Adapted from Kriesi et al. (1995: 33). 
 According to the model proposed by Kriesi et al. (1995), the institutional 
structure of Thai state is quite strong (see Table 4.1). The highly centralised structure 
and limited separation of power put the Thai state in a strong position. In the 
parliamentary area, the Thai state has been largely weak, with the exception of the 
Thaksin government period. The Thai state is also weak in the administrative arena, but 
with established interest groups, the non-elite challengers are left with little access to 
the structure. With limited direct democratic mechanisms, the Thai state has not been 
weakened as many had thought. All in all, the analysis of the institutional components 
of the state suggests that the Thai state is largely closed to outside challengers. 
D. Prevailing Strategies 
The mobilisation of non-elite challengers may be encouraged only by a weakness of the 
state, but many choose to take collective action even when the state is strong, merely 
because of a change in prevailing strategies. Repressive strategies are, for example, 
likely to deter the challengers to think twice before taking any collective action (Tarrow 
1998: 80). The elite's choice of prevailing strategies, therefore, has a direct impact on 
the grassroots mobilisation. Kriesi et al. define prevailing strategies as “the procedures 
that members of the political system employ when they are dealing with challengers” 
(1995: 33). They argue that prevailing strategies should be distinguished from cultural 
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the aspects of the POS, as opposed to Gamson and Meyer (1996) who propose two 
stable aspects of POS, the institutional and cultural structure. Kriesi et al. (1995: 33-34) 
explain that the prevailing strategies can be categorised as exclusive (repressive, 
confrontational, polarising) and integrative (facilitative, cooperative, assimilative) 
strategies. Kriesi et al. (ibid: 34-36) contend that the prevailing strategies are embedded 
in the political system and they are closely linked with the country's history and 
tradition. In Germany, for example, the state frequently uses more exclusive strategies 
when dealing with non-elite contenders regardless of the change in regime. French 
elites also find themselves using more brutal tactics to counter their challengers (ibid: 
34-35). On the other hand countries, like Switzerland and the Netherlands have a 
tradition of using integrative strategies to deal with non-elite challengers. The 
introduction of proportional electoral system was specifically made to accommodate 
the demands from these minority groups (ibid: 35).  
 The choice of prevailing strategies in developing countries is a different story. 
The elite groups are more likely to employ the more repressive strategies to ensure the 
survival of their regimes. As a developing country, Thailand is no exception. The Thai 
elite has a strong tradition of using violence against non-elite challengers, especially 
when these groups are perceived as threats to the government. This was even more true 
during the undemocratic period when the use of violent measures was systematically 
applied against their challengers. During military governments (1947 – 1973), the local 
population became the victims of systematic state killings. Governments led by Phibun 
Songgram and Sarit Thanarat harshly implemented massive anti-communism 
campaigns from 1952 to 1958. As a result of these campaigns, dissident party members 
were either arrested or assassinated. It is reported that 1,080 communist suspects were 
rounded up and many local leaders were executed (Morell and Chai-anan 1981, 84-85).  
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 In the 1970s, the use of violence was aimed to suppress the farmer and labour 
strikes, and it appeared to work. The number of the strikes gradually declined. While 
there were 501 strikes in 1973, this number steadily decreased to 357 in 1974, 241 in 
1975, and 133 in 1976 (Pasuk 1997: 335, quoted in Prapas 1998: 22-23). Farmer 
activists were also among the prime targets of the assassinations; four farmers’ leaders 
were murdered in 1974, twenty were killed in 1975, and eight more were executed in 
1976 (Prapas 1998: 23). In 1975 from early April to August, the number of farmers’ 
leaders killed was at a rate of roughly one murder per week (Pasuk and Baker 1995: 
307). However, no serious attempts were made by law enforcement agencies to 
investigate these systematic killings, and no culprits were ever brought to justice. The 
decrease in the number of protests over the years indicates that organised crimes 
against the farmers’ leaders surely had an immense impact on the rest of the farmer 
activists.  
The most terrifying incident happened in 6 October 1976 when over a hundred 
students were killed, and 1,300 more were arrested around Thammasat university area 
(Pasuk and Baker 1995: 311). The post-October massacre period, according to Prapas 
(1998: 25), was the ‘dark age’ for popular movement. Although there were still some 
demonstrations after the student massacre, they were very different from the protests 
during the democratic period. First, there was a drastic decline in the number of the 
protests. In 1978, for example, there were only 17 protests organised by workers, which 
sharply contrasted with over 200 strikes that took place only three years earlier (Prapas 
1998: 27). Second, the protests were less organised and rather short-lived since there 
was no longer a permanent farmer coordinating organisation. Third, there were also 
some movements by the farmers but they appeared to be either supported or controlled 
by the state (Prapas 1998: 25-26). These changes in popular mobilisation indicated the 
effectiveness of the state suppression.   
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 In the 1980s, the bureaucrat-led government managed to allow some open space 
for other non-bureaucratic groups. The 1970s student activists were encouraged to 
return home and resume their ‘normal’ lives. Essentially, the government now changed 
its approach from using exclusive strategies, which included intimidation and 
suppression, to using more inclusive means, such as cooptation, cooperation, and 
incorporation, to deal with emerging social forces (Chai-anan 1989: 331, 334). 
Consequently, there were a moderate increase in the number of protests concerning 
general economic issues, such as the rising prices of bus fares and sugar (Prapas 1998: 
27). But generally, the role of the emerging social forces remained restricted by 
constant controls by the military and the government (see Chai-anan 1989: 336-337; 
Suchit 1987: 53-58).  
 The use of violence persisted in the 1990s, but it was considerably reduced 
when compared with the earlier periods. The 1992 Bloody May incident significantly 
diminished the military’s political influences and paved the way for the emerging 
importance of political parties and civilian governments. The capacity of the civilian 
government to use force was much more limited than that of the military regimes.81
                                                 
81 It should be noted that after the May uprising, the new government was under pressure to 
observe the rule of law more than the governments in the past. This was because the authorities 
were afraid the violence could escalate and lead to another ‘Bloody May.’ Also, the democratic 
governments learned the lesson from the Cold War period that such brutal methods would only 
push the confrontation further, and therefore, they learned to tolerate grassroots movements 
more (Somchai 2006: 110). 
 
This led to a steep rise in the number of protests. During the Chuan government (1992 
– 1995) there were roughly two protests took place per day, or about 739 protests per 
year (Prapas 1998: 120). One of the most prominent farmers’ organisations, the Small 
Scale Farmers’ Assembly of Isan, emerged and carried out some major protests during 
this period (see Somchai 2006: Chapter 4).  
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 Despite the constraints, the use of violence remained a usual means for the Thai 
authorities to deal with protests. From September 1994 to August 1995, for example, 
three farmers were killed by the violent suppression of state forces. And it was reported 
that the use of force was employed to suppress and intimidate the protesters on 21 
separate occasions, whereas in 11 incidents, mob-chon-mob 82
 The situation did not improve much in the 2000s. At the beginning, civil society 
groups responded positively to the rise to power of the Thaksin in 2001 due to his 
government's pro-poor policies and personal connections.
 (literally, mob versus 
mob) operations were also carried out (Prapas 1998: 124). Also, the arrests of more 
than a hundred NGIs and local leaders were also issued during this period. Moreover, 
the government declared a martial law and used armed forces to violently disperse the 
anti-Sirinthorn Dam and anti-Pak Mun Dam protests, which altogether resulted in 
several injuries (ibid.).  
83
                                                 
82 Mob-chon-mob is another counter-movement strategy, which is mostly carried out by the 
state or local influential figures by hiring a group of local toughs, thugs, unemployed people, or 
in many cases, people from another locality, to provoke the local protesters. Normally, the 
confrontation ends up with a violent clash between the two. This tactic is used to achieve the 
following goals: 1) demoralising the protesters, 2) discouraging other people to join the protest, 
and 2) making the public believe that there are other local groups who disagree with the 
protesters. 
83 Ubol Yoowa, Interview, 16 August 2010. 
 But after gaining political 
strength, Thaksin’s attitude towards grassroots movements gradually changed. NGIs 
were systematically harassed during the Thaksin government. The activists were 
labelled as culprits who worked for foreign organisations to undermine the economic 
development of the country. In early 2002, twenty leading Thai NGIs and forty-four 
foreign assistants were investigated by the Anti Money Laundering Office, which was 
established to fight organised crime (Pasuk and Baker 2009: 145).  
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 Moreover, protests, notably against the trans Thai-Malaysian gas pipeline and 
Pak Mun Dam, were met with state violence. In December 2002, a peaceful protest 
against the pipeline project by community activists and NGIs in Hat Yai, a town near 
the pipeline route, was violently suppressed by the police force. The clash left 38 
protesters and 15 policemen injured (Simpson 2005: 21).84
                                                 
84 In January 2013, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled the police used excessive force 
against the protesters (Prachatai, 16 January 2013).  
 In the same month, an AOP 
protest camp in Bangkok was raided by a gang of unidentified men (Matichon, 6 
December 2002). It was speculated that it was ordered by a general with a close 
connection with the government (Khaosod, 10 December 2002). A week later, the AOP 
protest camp at Pak Mun in Ubon Rathchathani was burnt to the ground by a gang of 
arsonists who were reportedly close to the EGAT (Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand) (Krungthep Thurakij, 17 December 2002). In early 2003, the protest camp in 
Bangkok was demolished, and the hundreds of villagers were forced to go home 
empty-handed.  
 Between 2001 and 2005, at least seventeen community leaders and activists 
were murdered by non-uniformed assassins. Almost all of these slain activists had led 
protests against development projects (Simpson 2005: 15). Yet, Thaksin seemed to turn 
a blind eye to the murders. This has important implications as Simpson writes:  
The lack of successful prosecutions in almost all cases has also 
suggested an unwillingness on Thaksin’s behalf to pursue the 
perpetrators which could, in addition to Thaksin’s attacks on the 
legitimacy of NGOs and environmental activists, encourage further 
assassination attempts on those that speak out against development 
projects (ibid.). 
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For a grassroots movement, surviving during the Thaksin government was one difficult 
task.  
 The prevailing strategies during the post-coup period were no better. Although 
there was no reported incidence of open violence, the villagers were widely intimidated 
during the military-backed government (2006 – 2007). During the military government, 
security concerns limited the AOP activities. Two months after the coup, the military 
government partially lifted martial law in forty one provinces. But it left thirty-five out 
of seventy six provinces under tight restriction. Most of these were in the North and the 
Northeast where the majority of the AOP members resided (Prachatai, 14 July 2007). 
For example, in Sisaket, a province in the Northeast, an assistant district officer 
attended an AOP local meeting and took the names of the villagers who attended the 
meeting. The officer then took photos of the event and made copies of villager's 
identification cards. That evening, military officers called on the villagers and asked 
more questions about the AOP activities (Assembly of The Poor, Official Statement, 29 
November 2006). Under martial law, non-cooperation was an arrestable offence. 
 In many areas, the local officials took this opportunity and took the action 
against the villagers despite the on-going negotiation. In Trang, for example, the 
officials from the Forest Department raided the disputed lands. Open resistance to the 
official actions was not an option. Political activities were banned under the marital law 
(Khao Sod, 13 January 2007). Similarly, thousands of villagers from Ubon Ratchathani, 
Si Sa Ket, Surin and Roi Et were stopped from travelling to Bangkok by the military 
(The Nation, 22 May 2007). Many forms of intimidation were also used. In Sirindhorn 
district, military tanks were used to create a roadblock, and preventing the villagers 
from using their trucks. The villagers and their meetings received regular visits from 
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military officers. 85
 However, the 2009 and 2010 military crackdowns may indicate otherwise. It 
was a civilian government that ordered the suppression of the red-shirt protests by 
armed forces that had not been trained to deal with protesters. The use of live bullets 
was also permitted (See (Human Rights Watch Report 2011). This clearly shows that 
Thai civilian governments are capable of and willing to use repressive strategies, and 
confirms what Kriesi et al. (1995) explains: the choice of prevailing strategies is closely 
linked with historical roots. In the case of Thailand, it is connected with deep-rooted 
 Despite these obstacles, the AOP managed to stage a protest of 
around 1,000 participants at Government House in May 2007.  
 However, it should be noted that during the Abhisit government, military force 
was used during the 2009 and 2010 crackdowns on the red-shirt protesters. Between 
April and May 2010, the military deployed more than 67,000 troops and used 117,923 
live bullets to suppress the red-shirt protesters. This armed suppression resulted in more 
than 94 deaths (76 civilians) and 1,283 injuries (Khao Sod Online, 23 May 2013). This 
was the clearest indicator yet that repressive strategies would continue to be an option 
for elite groups if they perceived the challenge as a threat.  
 In Thailand, the type of regime is not necessarily correlated with the choice of 
prevailing strategies. Although the use of violence may be more systematic and 
widespread during military governments, civilian governments can also use repressive 
strategies, if they perceive the outside challengers as threat. Early analyses, such as 
Prapas (1998: 120-127), suggest that regime type is an important factor that determines 
the number of the protests. He notes that protests are generally discouraged during the 
non-democratic periods because there is a strong tendency that the military elite may be 
more capable and willing to suppress the non-elite protesters.  
                                                 
85 Baramee Chairat, Interview, 10 August 2010. 
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notions of Thai identity and the Thainess discourse. Once the challengers are perceived 
as threat to the national security and social order, the use of repressive tactics against 
the challengers may be presented as a legitimate choice. Also, it is because Thailand 
has developed a culture of impunity, since the country has experienced several state-
sponsored mass killings, and yet no one has ever been seriously put on trial for these 
murders (see Human Rights Watch, 15 May 2012).  
 Unlike governments in the West, where their legitimacy to a certain extent 
stems from their observing the rule of law and adhering to principles of human rights, 
the legitimacy of Thai governments stems mostly from other factors, such as their 
ability to deliver development, economic prosperity, and national security (see 
McCargo 2002b). It was not until the 1980s that democratic principles, like political 
participation, were first given some importance (ibid: 58-59). But still, with limited 
resources and little power, poor protesters were often subjected to brutal suppression by 
the state. As discussed in the previous chapter, the AOP adopted a non-political 
approach which allowed them to use radical tactics with much less harsh consequences. 
But that means they have to limit their goals and make sure that their collective actions 
are not viewed as serious threats to the status quo.  
E. Conclusion 
This chapter explored three stable aspects of the POS in Thailand, and it showed that 
the components have rather impeded the development and mobilisation of the Thai 
grassroots movements. First, in terms of cultural structure, the Thainess discourse, 
which is largely controlled by the elite, has caused some serious problems to the 
grassroots movements for decades. First, its support for the existence of centralised and 
hierarchical structure has partially led the political passivity among Thais. The people 
have been led to believe that they should ‘know their place’, and not voice their 
opposition to the ruling elites. The portrait of a harmonious relationship between the 
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elite groups and their subjects is overemphasised by Thainess proponents, while the 
politically active groups, such as radical students and activists, are often labelled as 
‘third hand’ instigators. The Thainess discourse also rejects the idea of popular 
participation. Not only this effectively rejects the rights of the people to participate in 
the political process, it also makes it difficult for the movements to campaign for a 
more participatory system.  
 Second, as regards institutional structure, by considering the degree of 
decentralisation and separation of power, Thailand should be regarded as a strong state. 
Thailand is also quite strong in three political arenas, namely parliamentary, 
administrative, and direct democracy. The Thai state has been largely weak in the 
parliamentary area, except during the Thaksin government. In the administrative area, 
the Thai state also appears to be weak, but this does not leave much room for the 
grassroots groups because Thai interest groups are rather strong and well integrated 
into the system. Although there are direct democracy channels available in recent 
constitutions, most of the legal processes are tightly controlled by the elite groups, so 
this area is also limited for grassroots groups as well.  
Third, Thailand has a long history of the elite using repressive strategies against 
the people. They justify their choice of prevailing strategy by citing the Thainess 
discourse. It appears that during the undemocratic period, the use is violence was more 
systematic and more prevalent than that of the democratic period. This resulted in sharp 
increase in number of protests in the 1990s. However, the 2009 and 2010 military 
crackdowns suggest that civilian governments can also be capable of and willing to use 
violence against the non-elite challengers if they are perceived as a threat. People's 
movements, such as the AOP, have adopted a non-political approach which has enabled 
them to mobilise in a more radical manner without harsh consequences. But this 
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approach also comes with a price. Any movement has to limit its political ambitions 
accordingly.  
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Chapter V: Volatile Political Opportunity Structure: Elite 
Divisions and Media Access 
A. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I argued that the stable aspects of the POS, which were 
partially controlled by the elite groups, have made it difficult for grassroots movement 
to develop and mobilise. But there have been a few moments in history where the 
grassroots politics was allowed to flourish, such as in the mid-1970s and especially the 
1990s. Other than the internal readiness, which I already discussed in the Chapter III, 
this chapter argues that there are other structural elements that have permitted the Thai 
popular movements, especially the AOP, to emerge and develop. These external 
elements are known as a volatile political opportunity structure. Unlike the stable 
aspects of the POS, these elements can change instantly. And because the volatile 
elements are not deeply embedded with the structure like the stable ones, these factors 
can also be influenced and changed by the movements. Gamson and Meyer explain 
that:  
The volatile elements [...] are more useful in understanding the process 
of interaction between the opening and closing of political space and the 
strategic choices of movements. The volatile elements help us to 
understand movement outcomes as involving structures which shape and 
channel activity while, in turn, movements act as agents that help to 
shape the political space which they operate (1996: 289). 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus concerning what elements should be part of the 
volatile political opportunity structure (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 282-283). Different 
researchers utilise different sets of variables in analysing different political 
environments depending on various factors, such as the types of the movements and 
state. In this thesis, the emphases are on two changeable aspects of the VOS, the elite 
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divisions and the media access. Along with some others, these components are 
commonly used to study the movements in many developing countries (see Tarrow 
1998; Schock 1999; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Kriesi 2004), and they have played an 
important role in facilitating and impeding the development and mobilisation of the 
AOP since its inception in 1995.  
 As for this chapter, it is my argument that the elite divisions had significant 
impact on the AOP during the Thaksin government, especially between 2002 and 2005, 
while the media access played the key role in limiting the AOP mobilisation between 
late 2005 and 2010 when the country was deeply polarised. During most of his term, 
Thaksin was able to control the elite and leave little space for grassroots mobilisation. 
But the elite factors no longer had a significant impact on people's movements after 
2005 when the country became polarised. The AOP, however, still struggled to 
mobilise in this period because its organisation had been substantially weakened and 
the coloured politics took most of the media space. This chapter is divided into two 
main sections. The first section deals with the elite divisions, while the second one 
discusses the media access and its impact on the AOP’s mobilisation.  
B. Elite Divisions 
In terms of elite factors, instead of utilising shifting alignments and divided elites as 
separate factors, this thesis combines these two dimensions into one, referred to here as 
elite divisions. Schock (1999) employs this approach to analyse the social uprisings in 
the Philippines and Burma during the 1980s. In some cases where both factors share 
certain similarities this combination is quite useful. According to Schock (ibid: 357), 
the combination reflects McAdam's (1996) study on the element of instability of elite 
alignments. Generally, when elite divisions are present, the challengers have incentives 
to mobilise because a segment of the elite groups may find support from the 
challengers to gain some advantage over their rivals (Schock 2005: 33-34; Jenkins and 
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Perrow 1977). But when elite groups are unified, the political opportunities of the 
challengers decrease and so the challengers may be discouraged from taking collective 
actions.  
 Elite divisions vary in different political systems. In democracies, elite divisions 
generally occur over political or economic policies, or social issues rather than the 
structural system. In democratic regimes, elections are institutionalised instruments for 
elite realignment and so, the elite groups must seek mass support. The challengers may 
gain political leverage if ruling coalitions are highly divided (Schock 2005: 33). By 
contrast, with the lack of regular and institutionalised mechanisms in non-democracies, 
elite competition can potentially result in political contention (Schock 1999: 361-362). 
Elite divisions in democracies occur mostly in parliamentary systems, but in non-
democracies, these divisions mainly involve the bureaucratic elite.  
 Thailand is neither a non-democracy nor a full democracy. While most 
governments in the recent years have come from elections, bureaucratic interventions 
and the violation of human rights are not uncommon in Thailand. In many cases, 
elected elites also show signs of authoritarianism. Elite divisions occur mostly in the 
realm of socio-economic policies, but sometimes elite groups are also divided over the 
preferred choice of political system. In Thailand, it is insufficient for students of Thai 
politics to understand elite divisions within the parliament alone. Given the high 
frequency of military coups and coup attempts, it is imperative that considerable 
attention has to be paid to the bureaucratic elites as well. Since the 1950s, the Thai 
army in particular has played a central role in stabilising and destabilising the entire 
political structure.  
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 Historically, Thai grassroots challengers often mobilised during divided 
periods, such as in the mid-1970s and between the late 1980s and mid-1990s. The 
unstable political periods coupled with weak governments provided the movements 
with bargaining power. With regard to the AOP, the elite divisions at the beginning of 
the Thaksin government gave the protesters incentives to mobilise. But as the elite 
groups became relatively controlled by the TRT government, the AOP as well as other 
grassroots groups found it nearly impossible to successfully mobilise their movements.  
 Other elite components, like influential allies, are on the other hand less 
emphasised in this thesis because of their lesser relevance to the subject. The Thai elite 
has found forming an alliance with people's movements less fruitful for their political 
manoeuvres, since such movements are less interested in bringing down the 
government. The elite groups who have sided with these movements mostly consisted 
of the conservative reformist doctors and academics with limited political ambitions. 
Their support can occasionally help to boost the media coverage, but their role in the 
movement activities is restricted, especially after 2005 when intense political 
polarisation took place. These figures include well-known faces, such as Sulak 
Sivaraksa and Dr. Prawase Wasi.  
 Moreover, some other elite groups may side with the protesters to strengthen 
their political position, but these alliances are mostly short-term and fairly limited. 
They are by no means ‘natural allies’ of the AOP. The Democrat Party, for example, 
sided with the protesters in 2005 when they were mounting a political struggle to 
oppose the Thaksin government. This was quite interesting, given that only a few years 
before they had viewed the protesters as trouble makers and took some harsh measures 
against the villagers (see Baker 2000; Missingham 2003). Thaksin showed temporary 
support for the movement when he was trying to gain public support for his up-coming 
trial in the Constitutional Court in 2001. Abhisit also sided with the villagers again 
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when he needed to boost his pro-poor image after his government ordered a violent 
crackdown on the red-shirts in 2009.      
a. Thaksin and the Elites  
Under a new political environment and under the firm direction of former police officer 
turned telecommunications tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, the government led by the TRT 
from 2001 to 2006 became the strongest elected government in Thai political history. 
Outside the parliament, the personal networks of Thaksin in bureaucratic circles 
significantly helped him keep politics under control. These factors were the key 
elements that effectively stabilised politics and contained the elite groups. Inside the 
parliament, TRT's control over the political process was greatly assisted by the 1997 
constitution and election laws, which were biased against minor parties. Moreover, the 
TRT also attracted millions of rural voters by successfully managing electoral networks 
as well as offering pro-poor policies.  
The Bureaucratic Elite 
In Thailand, political activities do not always occur in the formal parliamentary 
structure. In fact, a number of significant political developments that the Thais have 
experienced happen outside the formal structure, such as military coups and uprisings. 
These events are directly and indirectly connected to the bureaucratic elites. These 
ruling classes have played a key role in determining the country's stability since the 
1940s. However, their role in politics became less active in the 1980s and after the 
1992 uprising, their open political influence has been significantly reduced. However, 
McCargo and Ukrist (2005: 127-129) argue that the role of the military in politics did 
not cease after the uprising, but it simply changed in form. They observe that that 
unlike a professional military which recognises its limited roles and stays under the 
control of the elected government, “the Thai military has never recognized clear limits 
to its functions, nor has it genuinely subordinated itself to civilian control. Since 1992, 
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it has instead been willing to pretend to accept limits and controls, on condition that it 
remained unreformed, with its privileges essentially intact” (McCargo and Ukrist 2005: 
129).        
 When Thaksin took office in 2001, he wasted no time to ‘repoliticise’ the 
military. McCargo and Ukrist survey Thaksin's background and argue that the 
billionaire-turned-prime minister was deeply interested in the military. Thaksin learnt a 
lesson from his admired politician, the former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, 
who lost his premiership to the 1991 coup after his government had open conflicts with 
the army. Thaksin knew how essential it was for him to keep a good relationship with 
the armed forces (2005: 121-125).  
 For several years he not only kept them happy, but he was also able to keep the 
generals under his control. During his reign, Thaksin appointed his relatives and dozens 
of his Class 10 classmates from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School—
where he had studied alongside future army officers as a young police cadet—to key 
posts in the military. More importantly, Thaksin succeeded in replacing Prem 
Tinsulanonda's patronage network with his own. Prem, who served as the President of 
the Privy Council, held strong political power and had significant influence over the 
appointments of military posts over the years (McCargo and Ukrist 2005: 134-152; 
McCargo 2005). Importantly, Thaksin managed to control the leading faction of the 
bureaucratic elite as no other civilian leaders had been able to do before. Also, given 
that Prem's position was closely linked to the palace, Thaksin's successful challenge to 
Prem's authority reflected the dominant political position that Thaksin gained during his 
tenure outside the realm of party politics.  
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 Thaksin's control over the bureaucrats had considerable impacts on grassroots 
politics. The control gave confidence to the government to pursue its development 
policy with little concern about political instability. Historically, the bureaucratic 
interference had been the most threatening ‘check and balance’ mechanism to civilian 
governments. Popular dissatisfactions could easily be used to justify a military coup. 
One can see that after having consolidated his power, Thaksin made little effort to 
respond to criticisms from people's groups. He knew that their dissatisfaction would not 
be sufficient to turn the bureaucratic elite against his government (Fieldnotes, 25 
September 2010).  
 Also, in Thailand the bureaucrats have the resources and capabilities to control 
the masses. Senior officials had long viewed grassroots activism as something that 
needed to be closely monitored and contained. Control over these bureaucratic 
apparatuses gave Thaksin extra eyes and ears to check on the activities of the villagers. 
It is therefore important for the AOP to take the bureaucrats' political position into 
account, given their shaky adherence to the rule of law and poor human rights records. 
According to one villager, protesters had to very careful when military men were 
present because they could be merciless when dealing with dissidents (Fieldnotes, 10 
October 2010). It was not uncommon for villager leaders to be visited military officers 
at home to check on their movements and plans. 86
                                                 
86 In fact, when I was interviewing Sawat Uppahat, we were visited by a few military officers. 
The men came as a casual visit, and we talked only a few minutes, perhaps because I was 
present. Sawat said that the purpose of the visit was to gather information regarding his 
political activities. Sawat did not feel threatened by the visit because it was not uncommon for 
him, but for typical villagers this type of visit could easily be perceived as a form of 
intimidation (Sawat Uppahat, Interview, 15 August 2010.).  
 Military cooperation certainly 
benefitted the Thaksin government in containing  grassroots challengers. 
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 The military can also be used for ‘unofficial’ tasks. On the early morning of 4 
December 2002, the AOP protest camp near the Government House was raided by 
around 30 unidentified men. It took them about 10 minutes to vandalise the tents, throw 
possessions into the canal, and take away protesters' signs and banners. The financial 
loss was around 6,000 baht (Khao Sod, 7 December 2002), but the psychological 
damage was far worse. The fact that the incident occurred right next to Government 
House, that the normal lights from the adjoining official buildings were mysteriously 
turned off that night, and that the usual police patrol did not appear, indicates that other 
state officials might also take part in this incident (Matichon, 7 December 2002).  
 Although there is no clear evidence proving the government was behind the 
raid, the government who benefitted the most from what happened. The presence of the 
AOP at Government House damaged the image of the administration in the eyes of the 
public, as well as undermining the decisive, powerful image of Thaksin (Khao Sod, 6 
December 2002). And the raid took place only two days before a major dinner party for 
the King’s birthday, which was hosted by the government ( Matichon, 7 December 
2002). The protest camp would have been quite embarrassing for the hosts. Despite the 
high profile of incident, the raiders were never identified. It was widely believed that 
military men, who were close to or worked with the government, were involved. The 
media widely speculated that the raid was ordered by Seh Ice, (Major General Triarong 
Intharathat) Thaksin’s classmate, well known for his ‘influential image.’ He denied the 
accusation (Khao Sod, 10 December 2002).   
 However, Thaksin may not have full control over the bureaucratic elite. The 
military was after all quite fragmented. Cleavages in the armed forces are usually 
caused by cliques and inter-class rivalries. Control over the military generally derives 
from the ability to control the generals in the top posts, notably the Commander in 
Chief of the Royal Thai Army. Most successful military coups in the past were staged 
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or backed by these top officers. But one has to keep in mind that there is always 
competition among classes and cliques within the military. Most importantly, the 
palace had a significant influence within the military (see McCargo 2005). It would be 
extremely difficult for the generals to openly act against the monarchy or the people in 
the royal network, especially in recent years. Between 2002 and 2005, Thaksin may 
have in control of the military, but as it turned out, this control was quite limited. The 
premier lost his power to a military coup on 19 September 2006.  
The Elected Elite 
 In the 2001 elections, the TRT secured 248 seats in the general elections and the 
figure went up to 377 out of 500 in Thaksin’s second term, which began in 2005. No 
prime minister had ever achieved this level of success in elections before. While 
control over the bureaucrats gave Thaksin political stability, it was largely this 
parliamentary dominance that gave his government the ability to keep the grassroots 
groups at bay. This dominant position allowed Thaksin to reduce the political space 
available to grassroots activists, including the AOP. There were two main sets of 
factors that contributed to this success: 1) the 1997 constitution and the election system, 
and 2) the TRT's electoral network and its populist policies.   
The Constitution  
 It was the 1997 constitution and the new electoral system which allowed major 
parties to benefit at the expense of the minor ones. A decade prior to the 2001 elections, 
Thai governments were generally weak and Thai politics was also unstable. Between 
1992 and 2000, there were four governments, and on average, a government term lasted 
only two years. Two out of four were ended by corruption scandals, and another one 
faced its demise as the country was on the verge of economic collapse. Government 
coalitions were weak. Factionalism dominated political life, and faction leaders 
controlled the fate of the government (see Chambers 2003). During his one year term, 
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Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (1996 – 1997), for example, had to constantly balance the 
interests of six partners in his coalition to survive numerous internal conflicts 
(Borwornsak and Burns 1998: 238). Many saw this factionalism as the main cause for 
what Chai-Anan (1982) called Thailand’s ‘vicious circle,’ which began with a weak 
civilian government being elected and then ended up with that government being 
ousted by a military junta.  
 There was also a public outcry for political reform. The 1992 May massacre, 
which was a direct result of the 1991 coup, convinced the public that the role of the 
military leaders should be minimised, and that a coup should never happen again. From 
a more liberal point of view, the reforms were primarily about increasing the 
transparency in government, dealing with issues such as vote-buying, corruption, and 
legal efficiency (see Bowornsak and Burns 1998: 234-237).  
 But for the conservative elite, the reform agendas were a totally different story. 
For them, the reforms were a necessary step to prevent violent social disorder, control 
the increasing influence of the politicians, and increase the political role of virtuous 
technocrats (McCargo 1998: 13-22). However, both liberals and conservatives agreed 
that the new civilian governments should be vested with more powers to guarantee their 
survival as well as increase its effectiveness. As a result, a series of reforms were 
initiated and pushed forward by a coalition of NGO activists, womens’ rights groups, 
academics, technocrats, and conservative reformists (see Connors 2003; Naruemon 
2002). These efforts were transformed into what became widely known as the ‘people's 
constitution,’ due to the unprecedented popular input.  
 The 1997 constitution aimed to strengthen the civilian government by creating 
both stronger political parties and more powerful prime ministers. The constitution 
aimed to create a two-party system, which was believed to be a more stable structure. 
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According to Rungsan (2003a; 2003b), the 1997 constitution contained some size-
biased features, which punished minor parties for their smallness. By contrast, the 
charter rewarded major parties, notable the TRT and the Democrat Party (DP), with 
more parliamentary seats and resources. Rungsan (2003b: 226) argues that many 
drafters had previously worked for non-democratic governments in the 1970s, and 
preferred a political system with fewer major parties. For them, more parties meant 
greater negotiation costs than the government was able to pay (ibid: 225).  
 Although there were several measures which worked in favour of major parties, 
such as the 5,000 party member requirement and the party development fund,87
 The impact of the party list on the size of the party was astonishing. Several 
medium- and small-sized parties were either significantly reduced in size or simply 
disappeared from Thai politics. In the 2001 elections, for example, thirty-two minor 
 it was 
the electoral systems that were most strongly criticised for disproportionately favouring 
larger parties. The constitution introduced two new electoral systems, the party list and 
the single-member district systems. Generally, the party list, better known 
internationally as a proportional representation system, is used to give more political 
space to minor parties. However, this was not the case with the party list system 
introduced into Thailand under the 1997 constitution. The charter set up a 5-percent 
threshold, which effectively barred parties that received less than 5 percent of the vote 
(most likely minor parties) from gaining parliamentary seats.  
                                                 
87 Under the new Constitution, forming a party was not a burden, but it was much more difficult 
to operate one (Rungsan 2003b: 135). While only fifteen members were required to register a 
party, the party law required 5,000 additional members from different regions had to be 
registered within 180 days. A party was also required to establish party branches in all the 
regions in the country. This was a costly requirement for minor parties. Moreover, one of the 
innovations in the new constitution was creating the party development fund, which awards a 
financial support for a party, based on; 1) the number of the party’s MPs, 2) party list votes, 3) 
the number of registered members, and 4) the number of branches of the parties. The 
calculation on this basis was basically to award the party that did well during the elections and 
had greater resources. They were mostly likely to be major parties. 
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parties, which altogether received 14.31 percent of the vote (4,095,687 votes), did not 
gain a single seat in parliament in the party list system. Only the five major parties, 
which captured 85.69 percent of the vote, were able to compete in the elections and 
gained all 100 seats allocated under the party list system (Narut 2005: 101-104).  
 The change of electoral system from the multi-member district system to the 
single-member district one also changed the Thai political landscape. According to 
Duverger (1954), a single-member district system has a tendency to create a two-party 
system. As the winner-take-all system was put in place, the two major parties became 
the two main beneficiaries. In the 2001 elections, for example, out of 400 parliamentary 
seats, two major parties (the TRT and the DP) were able to grab about three-quarters of 
the seats (297 seats), while nearly all the other seats (99 seats) were captured by 
medium-sized parties. Only four seats (about 1 per cent) were left for the minor parties 
(Narut 2005: 103). 
 The 1997 constitution also gave greater power to the prime minister, so that he 
or she would have greater control over the electoral machine. Unlike in the past, the 
new rule stipulated that once an MP was given a ministerial post, he or she had to give 
up their parliamentary seat. This meant once their post in the cabinet was taken away 
by the premier, who was vested with the power to reshuffle the cabinet, his or her 
political career would also be over. This measure significantly empowered the prime 
minister to a great degree because cabinet members would, in Sombat’s words, “[…] 
have to think twice before going against the leadership of the premier” (2002: 205).  
 Moreover, the constitution also made it more difficult for MPs to switch party, 
thereby reducing their bargaining power. In the past, party members had had the 
freedom to switch parties without any time constraint, but the 1997 charter stipulated 
that an eligible candidate had to be a member of a party for a consecutive period of no 
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less than ninety days. With these measures in place, factionalism and internal conflict 
became much more manageable for the prime minister.  
 Also, check and balance mechanisms were hampered during the TRT 
government. Although the constitution was deliberately designed to create a ‘stable 
politics’ by eliminating minor parties and giving more powers to the executive branch, 
it was equipped with ‘independent bodies.’ These institutions were intended to provide 
check and balance structures (McCargo 2002a: 10-11). But these mechanisms were   
considerably disabled soon after Thaksin consolidated his power. Pasuk and Baker 
(2009: 173-174) explain that Thaksin ‘managed’ the constitution by controlling the 
Senate because the purpose of the Upper House was to check on the executive and to 
select the final candidates for the independent bodies. In mid-2001, Thaksin began 
building an effective majority in the Senate. Soon the Senate gradually installed people 
from Thaksin's network onto the independent bodies. In 2003, for example, five of the 
seven new appointees of the National Counter Corruption Commission were closely 
linked with the government (Pasuk and Baker 2009: 175). The Constitutional Court, 
which had previously been perceived as relatively independent, was also brought into 
the control of the government after eight out of fifteen judges were installed who had 
links with Thaksin (ibid: 176).  
 To disable the check and balance mechanisms further, the TRT expanded its 
size by merging with other smaller parties. The TRT successively absorbed the 
Seritham Party (July 2001), the New Aspiration Party (January 2002), and the Chart 
Pattana Party (September 2004). The merger helped the TRT to control over 300 seats 
in the parliament (Somchai 2008: 117). Not only this could increase their chances of 
winning seats in the next elections, but it also strengthened the government in the 
parliament. Under the 1997 constitution, at least one-fifth of the votes (100 seats) were 
required for a motion against a minister and two-fifths for a motion against the prime 
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minister. With this requirement, launching a no confidence debate against the prime 
minster became an impossible task after the 2005 election, which the TRT managed to 
win a landslide victory of 375 seats.  
 This was by no means coincidental. Thaksin made it clear that he targeted an 
absolute majority in the parliament for a stable government. Connors (2005: 372-373) 
argues that given the close connection between the government and business, it makes 
sense that Thaksin wanted to avoid facing a censure motion, which could potentially 
make him and his government look sleazy.  
The Electoral Networks and Populism    
Thaksin also controlled the elected elite by exploiting local electoral networks as well 
as directly luring the voters with pro-poor policy packages. Somchai (2008) has offered 
a detailed analysis on the electoral successes of the TRT in the Northeast. Despite the 
emphasis on the Northeast, Somchai's analysis can apply to the TRT's strategies at the 
national level. He argues that the success of the TRT derived from a combination of 
both old- and new-style politics.  
 On the old-style aspect, Somchai contends, the TRT used old tactics such as, 
vote buying, MP buying, and patronage networks. There were three types of candidates 
that the TRT was after. First, the party sought to recruit former MPs. They were 
believed to possess the greatest chances of winning seats. Somchai (2008: 110-111) 
explains that since the beginning the TRT took advantage of its vast resources to lure 
these candidates from other parties. This tactic was nothing new in Thai politics. 
Second, the TRT recruited local politicians who previously had either helped the 
national politicians to win elections or ran for local seats themselves. Many of them 
were seen as ‘influential figures’ (or phu mi itthipon) with semi-businessman/semi-
gangster status. With new smaller constituencies stipulated in the 1997 constitution, 
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local politicians had greater chances of winning parliamentary seats (ibid.). Third, 
many TRT candidates were ‘new faces’ in politics who were from local business circles 
or other professions, such as teachers and policemen. Many of them were former 
canvassers, the wives and relatives of former MPs, and some of them were local 
politicians who failed to win an election (ibid: 112).  
 Moreover, the selection of the party candidates was not exactly participatory. 
Generally, candidates were picked based on their local popularity. Polls were taken 
regularly to determine the candidates (Somchai 2008: 112). But personal connections 
also had an important part in the selection process. Some candidates were chosen 
primarily on the basis of their connections (ibid: 113). Interestingly, Somchai concludes 
that these three groups of TRT candidates were selected essentially from what appeared 
be ‘traditional political networks’ (ibid: 112) and these were not “particularly new or 
innovative means” (ibid: 113).    
 The new-style politics, on the other hand, was to win votes by offering a set of 
policies that interested widely divergent sectors of the voters. These so-called ‘populist 
policies’ (or pracha niyom), according to Pasuk and Baker, “developed over time in 
response to social demand; that it has strong affinities with political trends elsewhere in 
the world owing to a common political economy” (2008: 63). Pasuk and Baker are 
convinced that Thaksin's populism was in fact his response to increasing political 
threats. They argued that Thaksin should not be described as populist but rather a 
modernist reformer. Before competing in the 2001 elections, Thaksin built an image of 
himself as a reformer whose main mission was to rescue Thailand from the 1997 
financial crisis (ibid: 63-64). But once facing assets concealing charge in the 
Constitutional Court in 2001, Thaksin exploited all the channels that would build a 
public support, including producing and implementing the pro-poor policies ‘with 
extraordinary speed’ (ibid: 66). Similarly, Thaksin took another populist stance after 
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facing mounting opposition prior to the 2005 elections. He replaced the ‘think new, act 
new’ slogan with a more intensely populist one, ‘the heart of TRT is the people’ (ibid: 
67). Then the premier began his ‘mobile cabinet meetings’ in a number of provinces, 
where he gave personal promises and allocated budgets based on local needs (ibid: 66-
67). The tour attracted considerable media attention.    
 Pasuk and Baker (2008) argue that Thaksin's populism had three important 
messages. The first message, I give to all of you signified the availability of the 
government programme to all. Thaksin’s healthcare scheme was, for example, available 
to all Thais, not just particular groups like the previous healthcare programme (ibid: 
68). The second message, I belong to you suggests how Thaksin tried to make the 
public see him as ‘public property’ and that the people felt they had some ownership 
over him (ibid: 69). Third, Thaksin also conveyed the message, I am the mechanism 
which can translate the will of the people into state action. Thaksin built an image of 
himself as a strong leader with a can-do attitude who made it all possible for the 
government to deliver the state policies. At the same time, Thaksin blamed other 
agencies, including the parliament and NGOs, for obstacles to his work for the people. 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of Labour Force, 2004 
 
Source: Pasuk and Baker (2008: 71) 
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 According to Pasuk and Baker (2008), the heart of Thaksin's populism was to 
win the support from the informal mass (see Figure 5.1 above), which is made up by 
the agricultural and informal sectors. Together both groups comprise about two-thirds 
of country's labour force. These sectors are the result of the outward-orientated strategy 
of development in the last few decades. Despite the size, their aspirations and 
insecurities had never been sufficiently addressed by the previous governments (ibid: 
72-73). With the help of former student activists from the 1970s, the TRT came up with 
the three-point programme, which included cheap healthcare, agrarian debt relief, and 
village funds.  
 Perhaps the most popular populist policies were the healthcare and the village 
fund schemes. The universal healthcare programme, widely known as 30 baht raksa 
tukrok (literally 30 baht cures every sickness), was often cited by Thaksin supporters as 
his most celebrated legacy. It transformed the healthcare system, which had previously 
denied millions of poor rural dwellers access to medical treatment. The healthcare 
scheme covered 47.5 million people (75 percent of the population), and it helped the 
people save up to 10,634 million baht per year. A survey suggested that 95.7 percent of 
the respondents were satisfied with the scheme (Anek 2006: 93-94). Also, the 
government also offered the village fund scheme, which made a loan of one million 
baht 88
                                                 
88 Approximately 20,000 GBP.  
 available for each village. The distribution of the loan money was largely 
decided by the villagers themselves. The scheme offered the loan to about 80,000 
villages, and approximately 18 million villagers benefitted from it. Although critics 
claim that the loans were not used as investments for small businesses (only less than 
10 percent were found to be used in this way), the large majority of the borrowers (94 
percent) were able to pay back the money (Somchai Jitsuchon: 2006, quoted in Anek 
2006: 94-95). The scheme was very popular, so that even Thaksin opponents, including 
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Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva adopted a similar approach during his 
premiership.     
 These state-offered services also have important implications in other aspects. 
Pitch Pongsawat, for example, argues that the people felt empowered by these policies 
because their demands were addressed by the government (2004, quoted in Pasuk and 
Baker 2008: 68). Moreover, in these schemes, every citizen was in “equal and direct 
relationship with the state” (Pasuk and Baker 2008: 68). The healthcare scheme also 
gave a new meaning to the term ‘citizen’. In the past, those who had no access to the 
healthcare system had to depend on charity, but the introduction of the scheme 
suggested that it was the duty of the state to look after its citizens. Access to healthcare 
for the first time became people's basic right.      
 Thaksin's populism bypassed all the ‘middlemen.’ In the past, the voters were 
attracted mainly by the candidates and their electoral networks. But the pro-poor 
policies changed all this. Significant numbers of people actually voted for the party and 
its policies. A former NGI, Phumtham Wechayachai who transformed himself to a key 
adviser to Thaksin, argued that the main reason behind these populist policies was to 
respond directly to the people's needs and demands. The ‘middlemen,’ which included 
the bureaucrats and the NGIs, were also bypassed as a result of these policies. 
Phumtham explained:  
What I did in the TRT was building the policy making process. We 
focused on engaging in direct discussions with the people and NGIs in 
all areas. Thaksin himself also took part the discussion because I wanted 
him to understand and be in touch with the problems. So I arranged a 
series of discussion between the party representatives, NGIs, and 
academics in all regions. It was a hearing process. The people and NGIs 
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responded positively because no one had listened to their voices before. 
After the hearings, the party researchers used this information to find the 
solution to these problems. [...] We proposed the policies that responded 
directly to the needs of the people. What we the TRT did was trying to 
bypass the bureaucracy and go straight to the people. And that was why 
the all middlemen were little troubled because the TRT policies 
bypassed them.89
These policies coupled with their sophisticated electoral networks enabled the TRT to 
successfully mount highly effective election campaigns.
   
90
 During the first five years of the TRT government, Thaksin was able to control 
the elite groups both inside and outside the parliament. Thaksin repoliticised the 
military and promoted people in his personal network to key posts. These new 
arrangements provided the government with stability and additional support in dealing 
 While control over the 
bureaucratic elites provided the government with a sense of security, it was control 
over the parliament that made it possible to create and implement the programme. The 
TRT became hugely popular. The party was the first to win the landslide victory of 248 
seats out of 500, and better yet, it won 375 seats in the 2005 elections. Thaksin's 
personal popularity also rose from 30 percent in December 2000 prior to the election to 
70 percent in May 2001 after the implementation of the programme took place (The 
Nation, 7 January 2002, quoted in Pasuk and Baker 2008: 66). His approval ratings 
remained consistent over the years. After the landslide election victory of 2005, 
Thaksin received an approval rate of 77.5 percent in a nationwide survey by ABAC 
Poll (Irrawaddy, 11 July 2005).     
                                                 
89 Phumtham Wechayachai, Interview, 19 January 2011. 
90 The TRT also utilised other political tools, which help the party win elections as well as 
popularity. Some of these instruments were quite new in Thai politics, such as regular polling 
and political marketing (see McCargo and Ukrist 2005).   
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with grassroots groups. Inside the parliament, the 1997 constitution and new electoral 
system, along with the TRT's electoral networks and populist policies gave the 
government considerable control over the elected elites.  
b. The Assembly of the Poor and Controlled Elites 
The AOP and the TRT government started off on an optimistic footing. After winning 
the 2001 elections, one of the Octobrists in the TRT personally assured the AOP 
leaders that their problems would be looked after.91 On his very first day in office 
Thaksin visited the AOP’s protest camp outside the Government House and had lunch 
with the protesters.  Promises were made and the protest camp was later dissolved 
(Pasuk and Baker 2009: 144). The government appointed a committee, chaired by 
Deputy Prime Minister Pongpol Adireksan, and seventeen subcommittees to look into 
the AOP cases (Naruemon 2006: 188). This was followed by the government granting 
an opening of the Pak Mun sluice gates for four months for an environmental study 
(Matichon, 18 April 2001).92 The government also promised that the AOP's problems 
would be solved within 45 days (Matichon, 19 May 2001). All the charges against the 
villagers who stormed Government House during the Chuan government were also 
dropped.93
 Despite all these developments, nothing concrete actually happened. Towards 
the end of 2001, some villagers ran out of patience and began to put pressure on the 
government. In October, around a hundred villagers kicked off their ‘long march’ from 
Ubon Ratchathani to Bangkok, campaigning for permanently opening the sluice gates. 
As the march reached Nakhon Ratchasima, secret negotiations between the government 
  
                                                 
91 Kessakorn Silarak, Interview, 19 August 2010. 
92 It took the EGAT two months to comply with the order, but only after EGAT received threat 
from the government of possibly removing its governor (Naruemon 2006: 171).  
93 The attorney general added the AOP members had no ill intention and the pursuit of the case 
would not do the public any good (Matichon, 20 November 2001). 
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and AOP leaders resulted in a compromise.94
 In October, the AOP came back for a second round. The protesters took to the 
streets in Bangkok immediately after the government endorsed the EGAT proposal, 
which specified that the hydraulic gates would be open for four months and dam 
operations would resume for the remaining eight months. The decision was made 
despite the fierce opposition from the AOP. This also conflicted with a study by the 
Ubon Ratchathani University (UBU), which was commissioned and funded by the 
Thaksin government.
 The government ordered the sluice gates 
to remain open for a whole year and the march changed its destiny from the Bangkok to 
marching around the Northeast for a few more months. Some big-name figures, such as 
Sulak Sivaraksa, also visited the marchers and gave them public support (Matichon, 5 
December 2001). In March 2002, the AOP came back to Government House and began 
their first encampment during the Thaksin government. Around 300 people participated 
in the demonstration, but later they were joined 1,000 more people. They agreed to call 
off the protest after the government set up another committee, chaired by Deputy Prime 
Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. The protest lasted over two months.  
95
                                                 
94 Kessakorn Silarak, Interview, 19 August 2010. 
95 The UBU study, which cost the government 10 million baht, proposed 4 policy options as 
follow: 1) the gate was to be permanent closed for the whole year (full electricity production), 
2) the gate was to remain open for 5 months and closed for 7 months, 3) the gate was to remain 
open for 8 months and closed for 4 months, and 4) the gate was to be permanently open (no 
electricity production). The research itself recommended that the sluice gates be open all year 
round for five more years for further study. The study argues that the dam was useless in terms 
irrigation and shutting it down would have no significant impact on the electricity supplies in 
the lower north-eastern region. Moreover, without the dam, it would be better for the local 
people (over 8,000 families) financially (Krungthep Thurakij, 5 November 2002).  
 The government never gave a clear explanation why the option 
was chosen, but it clearly suggested a compromise. Some blamed the UBU rector, who 
was not in the UBU research group, for giving this idea to the government (Khao Sod, 
4 November 2002). In November, the government passed a cabinet resolution based on 
the EGAT proposals. Around 300 protesters staged a protest camp at Government 
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House. This was joined many social activists and intellectuals. Despite the media 
attention, it did not protect them from the use of violence. In early December, the AOP 
protest camp was raided by unidentified men. Influential figures close to the 
government were believed to have been behind this illegal act. Both sides played the 
blame game for a few days, before Thaksin rekindled the protesters’ hopes by paying 
them a visit. Thaksin promised he would look into their case and spent 7,000 baht 
treating the villagers to snacks and ice cream (Bangkok Post, 9 December 2002).  
 Although the protesters were supported by a number of high profile figures and 
studies,96 they were no match for Thaksin. The protesters failed to mobilise a massive 
protest along the lines of the 1997 demonstrations, which meant less pressure was put 
on the government. In the beginning, there were three hundred protesters, but the figure 
went up to 1,000 in December. The figure was much smaller than their 99-day protest 
where over 25,000 people participated. Also, despite the media coverage, especially in 
the print media, the villagers were unable to convince the public to take their side, 
largely due to Thaksin's popularity.97
 Perhaps, a poll by King Prajadhipok's Institute reflected this reality. The poll 
surveying public confidence on various institutions showed that the public had trust in 
the institutions, which were linked with stability, not conflict. The following is the list 
of institutions included in the survey: the army (94 percent), television (92.3 percent),
  
98
                                                 
96 Besides the UBU study, the AOP also backed their case with Tai Ban research (research 
project carried out by the villagers and supervised by professional researchers on local topics) 
and a study by the World Commission on Dams (see Naruemon 2006: 171-177).   
97 Actually, the Thaksin's approval ratings in opinion polls went down from 68.77 percent in 
February (Phujadkarn Raiwan, 26 February 2002) to 40.90 percent (Matichon, 28 October 
2002), but when compared with the NGOs and street protesters, Thaksin was still far more 
popular.   
98 Generally, television is more controlled than the printed media in Thailand.  
 
the prime minister (88.5 percent), the National Human Rights Commission (85.5 
percent), ministers (84.7 percent), political parties (71.2 percent), the Anti-Money 
162 
 
Laundering Office, the police (63.7 percent), newspapers (59.2 percent), and NGOs 
(57.4 percent) (Thai Post, 2 November 2002). The first five, excluding the National 
Human Rights Commission,99
 In mid-December, the government came up with a new tactic. Thaksin invited 
the villagers to a televised meeting broadcast on Channel 11. No NGO advisers were 
allowed to take part of the negotiation; only Thaksin and the villagers. In Thaksin's 
view, it was between the leader and its people, no middle men. To add more drama to 
the event, before the scheduled meeting the AOP protest camp at Pak Mun Dam was 
burnt down by dozens of masked men.
 were associated with stability and a nationalist discourse, 
while rest were linked with conflict, especially NGOs. Since NGIs worked closely with 
the protesting villagers, this might reflect how the public perceived the AOP as well.  
100
 Interestingly, it was the Octobrists who played the key role in this blame game. 
Phumtham, for example, hinted that the timing of the incident was suspicious. He also 
added that the investigation of the raid had not progressed because there was not much 
evidence provided by the AOP members, implying that they had withheld some 
information. He added that “the incident was an intention to impede the dialogue, set 
for 20 December, between the prime minister and the villagers from taking place” 
(Krungthep Thurakij, 17 December 2002). Phumtham's statement was easily 
interpreted as an attempt to blame the activists for the arson because the government 
 The incident expectedly hit the media 
headlines. The AOP blamed the government for failing to ensure the rule of law and 
protect the protesters. The government, on the other hand, raised some suspicions 
suggesting that the arson might be self-inflicted.  
                                                 
99 The National Human Rights Commission was not invested with powers and had limited role 
in promoting human rights through reports and fieldwork. It largely avoided direct 
confrontation and preferred cooperative approach. 
100 The arsonists were later identified as local people who had worked with EGAT and had 
conflict with the anti-Pak Mun Dam group. The head of the group said that he was unhappy 
with the villagers and their protest against the cabinet resolution (Krungthep Thurakij, 17 
December 2002). 
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often branded the NGIs as ’the middle men,’ who tried to ruin the harmonious 
relationship between the leader and the people. Ironically, Phumtham himself was a 
former NGI. 
 This incident, coupled with the Bangkok raid, appeared to gain the AOP some 
media coverage and public sympathy, but it was still insufficient to cope with the 
government. The televised meeting took place as scheduled, and it lasted five hours. 
The villagers appeared to be nervous but they presented their cases adequately 
(Bangkok Post, 21 December 2002). On several occasions, Thaksin stressed that he was 
not to be pressured and he had to make decision based on ‘the interests of the majority.’ 
He once again delayed making the decision and claimed that he would have see the 
dam site himself. On December 24, Thaksin flew to the dam site along with two 
villager representatives. He insisted again that he had to take the interests of the 
‘majority’ into account (Khao Sod, 25 December 2002).  
 Although Thaksin often asserted his neutrality, it was clear that he intended to 
side with EGAT. His support for the AOP at the beginning of his term was a ploy to 
win sympathy and support from the public over his asset-concealment case with the 
Constitutional Court (Simpson 2005: 9), which had since ended. While the AOP 
mobilised around the UBU study, Thaksin countered with some EGAT-sponsored 
research, which was conducted by the Institute of Science and Technology of Thailand 
(RISTT). But since the EGAT paid for the RISTT study, its academic objectivity was 
called into question. Aware of this weakness, Thaksin then ordered the National 
Statistical Office (NSO) to conduct a 3-day survey on 3,750 respondents from three 
districts in Ubon Ratchathani (Khao Sod, 21 January 2003). He claimed the UBU 
research only studied those who were impacted by the dam, but it did not include those 
who lived in the Pak Mun basin area. And to make this about ‘interest of the majority,’ 
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the survey was designed to include as many villages from the three districts as possible 
(ibid.). These people, according to Thaksin, were supposed to represent the majority. 
 However, critics slammed this survey's sampling method and the time 
constraints used when conducting it (Khao Sod, 20 January 2003). They questioned 
why the survey selected respondents who lived over 100 kilometres away from the site 
(Khao Sod, 14 January 2003). One researcher was also perplexed with the fact that the 
majority of the respondents (75 percent) were farmers, while the most impacted 
population, that of fisherfolk, made up only 20 percent of the respondents (Khao Sod, 
21 January 2003). Naruemon points out that the selection of the respondents who were 
not affected by the dam project raised the question of stakeholder participation (2006: 
139). Also, the NSO had only less than a week to prepare the questions and only three 
days to carry out the survey. There was no open debate where both sides were allowed 
to present their cases. Many respondents were less than prepared to voice their opinion.       
 Unsurprisingly, the survey results favoured the government. Most respondents 
(24 percent) supported keeping the gate open for four months and second group (19 
percent) selected the option that read ‘as the government saw fit’ (Foran 2003, quoted 
in Naruemon 2006: 159). The villagers, however, did not back down. The protest 
continued, but not for long. The government finally gave the green light for a more 
drastic measure. In the morning of January 29, the Bangkok governor, Samak 
Sundaravej, citing traffic and public health laws, personally directed the demolition of 
the protest camp. Over 1,000 municipal police officers (thesakit) from all fifty Bangkok 
districts were deployed to knock down the camp. The protesters—mostly elders and 
children—were left with shocked and distressed. The officers met no resistance from 
the villagers, and the protesters had once again left home empty-handed (Khao Sod, 30 
January 2003).  
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 Later in 2003, during a PKY meeting, the AOP leaders admitted their recently 
weakened organisation and agreed that more work had to be done at the local level 
(Fieldnotes, 25 September 2010). In the next two years, most activities took place in 
local communities, and the AOP's political relevance has since then become gradually 
decreased. In March 2005, around 1,000 protesters organised a two-day demonstration 
shortly after the TRT won a landslide election victory (Bangkok Post, 16 March 2005). 
The protest attracted some media attention partially because of the fact that it was led 
by Yai Hai and received a visit by the opposition leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva (The Nation, 
17 March 2005).  
 However, the protest was hardly a success. The collective action put little 
pressure on the highly popular TRT government. Thaksin himself paid a little attention 
to the protesters as he spent time with his family on a five-day vacation in Japan 
(Matichon, 18 March 2005). This indicated yet another clear sign of the AOP's decline 
since Thaksin became the prime minister. Suriyasai Katasila, a former adviser to the 
AOP, who later became the PAD spokesman, recalled his view of the AOP during the 
anti-Thaksin campaign in 2006. When I asked Suriyasai whether the PAD leaders tried 
to contact the AOP to join the anti-Thaksin campaign, he replied, “The PAD was not 
interested in contacting the AOP, speaking plainly. Politically, they think [the AOP] 
had no value. It is as simple as that. It lost its role. It declined. It has already gone.”101
c. The Assembly of the Poor and Elite Divisions 
 
Overall, the AOP struggled to run a successful campaign during the TRT government. 
The elite divisions at the beginning of the Thaksin government gave the villagers the 
incentives to mobilise. The AOP had long struggled with the previous government led 
by the DP. The pending asset concealment case in the Constitutional Court provided 
                                                 
101 Suriyasai Katasila, Interview, 28 July 2010.  
166 
 
the AOP more bargaining power. However, after Thaksin consolidated his powers and 
successfully controlled the elite groups both inside and outside the parliament, the fate 
of the grassroots protesters took an opposite turn. Externally, the AOP failed to 
persuade the public to support their cause. This failure arose despite a great deal of 
publicity and public attention they received. Internally, the AOP were significantly 
weakened during the TRT government. Many local groups were co-opted and left the 
movement. Not only was the protest smaller in size, the sense of enthusiasm also 
noticeably diminished. A villager-turned-NGI, Kessakorn Silarak recalled the difficult 
experience in protesting the Thaksin government.  
The problem was that there was no collective sentiment [...] if there was 
a collective sentiment and we came as two thousand, all two thousand 
would participate [the activities]. On the other hand, if we came as two 
thousand but only two hundred participated, we [the leaders] needed to 
be worried. Most people just stood still, they only followed their leaders' 
orders.102
                                                 
102 Kessakorn Silarak, Interview, 19 August 2010.  
     
In the past, it was easy for the AOP leaders to portray an image of evil, greedy 
politicians who wanted to steal local resources for their own interests. But during the 
anti-Thaksin protests, the leaders found it more difficult to gain support for their 
course. The AOP advisers, for example, who had worked with the villagers for years, 
tried unsuccessfully to convince the villagers to go against the premier during the anti-
Thaksin protests. Most AOP members supported the AOP on key issues, but only a few 
felt that the government needed to be changed.  
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 The NGIs also faced a significant setback during the TRT government. The 
government quite successfully tarnished the NGIs' image. Thaksin portrayed the 
activists as ‘naina kha khwamjon’ (literally, poverty-selling agents) who stood between 
the benevolent government and its people (Phujadkarn Raiwan, 5 April 2001). Thaksin 
also publicly denounced the NGIs as foreign agents who benefitted from the poor as he 
suggested “Some of them want to make their presence felt. They record their rallies on 
video and send the tapes overseas to get financial support” (The Nation, 31 July 2002, 
quoted in Pasuk and Baker 2009: 147). Thaksin labelled the workers as a ‘third hand’ 
who were no longer needed in Thai political life (Pasuk and Baker 2008: 69; 2009: 
144-149). It was no coincidence that the overwhelming majority of NGIs later 
supported the anti-Thaksin campaign. According to Prapon Singkaew, around 70 
percent of his fellow NGIs joined the anti-Thaksin movement. He added it was quite a 
trend at the time for NGIs to oppose Thaksin.103
 Before the constitutional amendment in 2011, the new electoral system 
provided that the MPs came from a combination of multi-member constituencies (400 
      
 The country began to be explicitly politically divided in late 2005. This 
cleavage also emerged among the ruling groups. The divisions continued even after the 
2006 coup, which was supposed to restore order and stability. The coup makers 
installed an interim government and appointed Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) 
to write a new constitution. Ploy correctly sums up the primary goal of the CDA: 
“rather than looking at all possible institutional options and calculating their probable 
consequences, the CDA of 2007 chose to start with the 1997 constitution and merely 
introduce some changes thought to be necessary to prevent another Thaksin from 
occurring” (2010: 6). To achieve this, the new charter was designed to restore the pre-
1997-constitution period where the elected elites were fragmented and weak.  
                                                 
103 Prapon Singkaew, Interview, 27 December 2010.  
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seats) and party list (80 seats). The multi-seat constituency system allowed voters to 
choose more than one party, which tended to increase the chances of candidates from 
minor parties to win seats. Moreover, unlike the party list in the previous constitution, 
the new party list system had no 5 percent threshold and instead of one big 
constituency, the country was divided into eight constituencies. The removal of the 
threshold would allow more minor parties to gain seats, while the greater number of 
constituencies would reduce the influence of the voters from the North and Northeast 
(who were most likely to vote for pro-Thaksin party). The number of voters from these 
two regions makes up more than half of the total number of voters in the country. 
Under the new constitution, the executive was also deliberately undermined. For 
example, it is easier now for the opposition to file for a no confidence motion against 
the government. It takes only one-fifth of MPs(previously two-fifths) to initiate such a 
debate against the prime minister and one-sixth (previously one-fifth) for individual 
ministers (Dressel 2009: 309).  
 Perhaps, the most damaging is the ‘judicialisation’ of the politics, which may be 
defined as the transfer of the power from parliament to judicial and independent bodies 
that have limited accountability (Dressel 2009: 309). The judges as part of the 
unelected elites have been given a new controversial role to counterweight with elected 
leaders. The judges along with the heads of independent bodies, for examples, have the 
power to appoint half of the senate, whose primary duty is in turn check and balance 
the elected elites and the government. To polarise the politics further, the judges have 
also played a more offensive game. So far, the courts have dissolved four major parties 
(two pro-Thaksin), removed two pro-Thaksin prime ministers, and temporarily barred 
no fewer than two hundred politicians from politics (most were from pro-Thaksin 
parties). This assault on representative democracy has resulted in deep political 
divisions in the ruling groups and the rest of the people alike.   
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 However, the unstable polity and elite divisions did not provide the AOP with 
political opportunities as many hoped. Internally, the AOP had been significantly 
weakened since the Thaksin period. The mobilising capacity of the movement was 
greatly reduced. The number of demonstrators has been gradually reduced since the 
1997 protests from tens of thousands to no more than two thousands. And externally, as 
the political situation became intensified, the less radical movements such as the AOP 
with limited political ambitions became increasingly irrelevant. As this will be explored 
in the next section, the movement lost the public and media attention it once enjoyed. 
With limited mass mobilisation and less radical strategies, when compared with the 
coloured movements, the AOP was no longer a media magnet. This lack of media 
access has become a key obstacle that prevented the movement from running a 
successful political campaign from late 2005 onwards.  
C. Media Access 
During an interview Pipop Thongchai, one of the five core PAD leaders and a leading 
NGI, made some interesting points about the media and social movements. At one 
point he said:  
Sonthi Limthongkul had an advantage over NGIs only because he 
owned the media. If the NGIs had the media like he did, they would also 
have the power. We could find a good public speaker like Sonthi. We 
could find a person with courage like Sonthi. But the villagers, the 
NGIs, and the academics did not own the media. Sonthi had this strength 
and Thaksin underestimated this.104
                                                 
104 Pipop Thongchai, Interview, 30 July 2010. 
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Pipop may have played down the role of Sonthi Limthongkul in the anti-Thaksin 
movement, but he certainly raised an important point. Access to the media is crucial for 
movement mobilisation, and Thailand is no exception.       
 Studies show that media access is one of the most important factors that 
determine the development and mobilisation of social movements. As non-institutional 
actors, Gamson and Wolfsfeld argue, the movements are dependent on the media for 
three main purposes. First, movement mobilisation depends on public discourses, and 
protesters need the media to convey their messages to create these discourses. Second, 
the media can be used to validate the movement's status and collective actions. And 
third, the movements need the media to expand the scale of the conflict. A broadened 
audience can be transformed into greater support if the media highlights positive 
aspects of the movements and their activities. The media as a result can generate public 
sympathy for the movements as well as turn mere bystanders into movement activists 
(1993: 116). Moreover, Koopmans (2004a) emphasises the importance of the mass 
media by arguing that both the challengers and authorities often no longer engage in 
direct, physical confrontation in concrete locations, but instead they publically interact 
in an indirect, mediated manner via the media. The discursive opportunities of the 
movement are largely determined through this process.  
 Successful social movements in most societies depend on gaining the access to 
media. In democracies, studies show that the media coverage contributes to the rise in 
membership of environmental organisations. Similar pattern occurs with the Dutch 
environmental organisations and the Friends of the Earth (Vliegenthart et al. 2005; 
Smith 1999, quoted in Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2012: 392). Access to the media is 
even more crucial in dictatorial regimes. By using qualitative comparative analysis, Osa 
and Corduneanu-Huci (2003) conclude that media access along with social networking 
are two key factors that can sufficiently produce mobilisation in non-democratic 
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countries. In a developing democracy like Thailand, the media also has a big role in 
influencing the success of people's movements. Prapas and Uchane (2006) argue that 
because of the lack of institutional channels, people's movements, such as the AOP, 
have to rely on extra-parliamentary politics as their main strategy, and this largely 
depends on the media coverage.  
 As part of the POS, media has both structural and dynamic elements. The stable 
aspects of the media include ownership, the pattern of media consumption and the 
relationship between the media and the state (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 287). Media 
bias is also structural. During the 1970s, studies show that the American media 
portrayed negative image of protests. The bias is embedded in the structure of media 
organisations (Koopsmans 2004a: 369). Similarly, one can say that the mainstream 
Thai media is not particularly fond of grassroots activism and street protests. But 
grassroots activism can occasionally gain significant space in the media, especially the 
print media. Gamson and Meyer calls this phenomenon double role. They explain it as 
follows:  
On one hand, the media plays a central role in the construction of 
meaning and the reproduction of culture. Journalists choose a story line 
in reporting events and commentators of various sorts develop 
arguments and images that support particular frames. On the other hand, 
the media are also a site or arena in which symbolic contests are carried 
out among competing sponsors of meaning, including movements 
(1996: 287). 
In other words, the Thai media has an essential function in reproducing the Thainess 
discourse which often depicts the villagers as passive and apolitical people and so, their 
political activism can only occur under an influence of third party for their political or 
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economic interests. But the media also allows open competition for discursive space for 
various political groups, including people's movements. Unlike the cultural discourse, 
this open competition is more dynamic and forms a volatile aspect of the POS.  
 But how should the limited media space be distributed? The answer to this 
question lies in the concept of news values. According to Koopmans, news values 
structure how the journalists and editors assign newsworthiness to certain events. Every 
day hundreds of events occur but only a few are selected for media coverage based on 
certain newsworthiness factors, which include geographical proximity, the status of the 
speaker, the seriousness of conflict, the relevance of an issue, the potential 
dramatisation, and the novelty of a story (2004a: 373).  
 Generally, when the government of the day was not unified and the movement 
was strong, the AOP would be regarded as a major social force. And because of that, 
the protesters were given considerable media attention. However, as the government 
grew stronger and the movement became weaker, the media started to look elsewhere 
for their headlines. As the pro- and anti-Thaksin polarisation emerged, the AOP 
became significantly weakened, while the colour-coded movements rapidly became 
stronger, so these groups were seen as the agents of change instead. The media as a 
result turned their attention away from the villagers to the colour-coded groups. 
However, the AOP could occasionally gain media coverage when their activities were 
somehow linked to the colour-coded politics.  
a. The Assembly of the Poor and Media Access: Historical 
Background  
In the past, the AOP protesters had proven to be no amateurs when it came to gaining 
attention from the media. The protesters employed a variety of activities, ranking from 
prolonged encampment, sit-ins, staging plays, engaging in symbolic activities, and 
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occupying official buildings. Rungrawee argues the protesters deliberately and actively 
made their problems newsworthy to attract the media attention. She adds that:  
As a potent venue of public communication the media has enabled the 
AOP to push forward its agenda, allowing it to create a nationwide 
public conversation about the plight of Thailand’s rural villagers, to rally 
support from other civic groups and media-consuming citizens, and to 
enhance the possibility for dialogue and negotiation with the 
government (2004: 542).  
During the 99-day protest in 1997, the protesters successfully created an unprecedented 
amount of media coverage and gained tremendous bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
government as a result. Baker writes, “The protest itself came under siege by the 
media” (2000: 20). Prapas contends that during the historical protest, the AOP was 
given a large amount of media space in both electronic and printed media. But the 
movement gained particularly favourable coverage from the printed media due to its 
greater independence. During the 1997 campaign, the protesters and their demands 
were, for example, reported 128 times in newspapers. Most of these reports detailed 
positive aspects of the movement, such as its demands, the protesters’ backgrounds and 
their daily life in the protest camp (1998: 131-135). Such coverage significantly helped 
the protesters to pressure the government, which in turn resulted in historic concessions 
for its members.     
 However, the fate of the movement changed its course after the 1997 economic 
crisis. The crisis radically changed public sentiment. Following this, the news reporting 
switched its focus from the dramas of street protests to the stability of parliamentary 
politics. Some media depicted the AOP as troublemakers, and they were afraid that the 
protests would give a negative image to the foreign investors amidst the financial crisis 
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when foreign investments were extremely needed (Rungrawee 2004: 545; Prapas 1998: 
136). The crisis also brought about the nationalist sentiment, and the protesting was 
portrayed as un-Thai activity (Prapas and Uchane 2006: 23-27). The media itself also 
faced a difficult period. Media space for serious debate on social and environmental 
issues was sharply reduced. Reporters, who had built up sympathy from working with 
the movement, were either laid off or promoted to desk jobs (ibid: 23-27). Responding 
to this limitation, the AOP adopted a new strategy, called dao krajai (scattered-stars). 
The new approach was a failure. To summarise this, Rungrawee writes:  
Thirteen months of scattered-star actions yielded nothing of political 
worth [...] The AOP protests received scant publicity and the Chuan 
government ignored them completely. In the absence of media attention 
the AOP found it difficult to make its presence felt. As one media 
scholar put it, ‘a demonstration with no media coverage is a non-event’ 
(2004: 546). 
Without the drama and geographical advantage of being in Bangkok., the protests 
failed attract media attention.  
b. The Assembly of the Poor and Media Access under the Thaksin 
Government and afterwards 
The situation temporarily improved during the Thaksin government. At the beginning 
of his term, the new prime minster showed sympathy towards the villagers' problems. 
But after Thaksin gained popularity and consolidated his powers, the government 
became increasingly hostile to grassroots activism, and the media coverage of the 
movement began to change. It should also be noted that the noticeable decrease in the 
media coverage was also due to the AOP's change of strategy. The villagers believed 
that the government was too strong, which made it very difficult to mobilise, so they 
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decided to emphasise on working in their communities and expand their networks 
(Fieldnotes, 25 September 2010).   
 Not all media outlets gave the same coverage to the AOP. During this period, 
most of the news reports on the AOP come from four major sources, Matichon, Khao 
Sod, Thai Post and Phujadkarn Raiwan. Personal connections with these newspapers 
played a part for these reports. 105  NGIs and academics particularly had close 
connections with the media. 106 Equally important, as McCargo pointed out the Thai 
media was far from neutral (2000: 21): it was clear that the two newspapers from the 
Matichon Group, Matichon and Khao Sod supported the AOP campaign. During the 
Thaksin government, both dailies also took a harsh stance against the government on 
many issues. Two bestselling newspapers, Thai Rath and Daily News, on the other 
hand, covered the AOP activities only when confrontations were involved. These 
different political positions of the media organisations were partially caused by the 
sizes of the subscription. According to Aimpong Boonyanupongsa, the assistant chief 
reporter of Khao Sod, old newspapers with large numbers of loyal readers like Thai 
Rath  and Daily News were more likely to adopt a conservative stance and run stories 
from the side of the authorities. Newer newspapers, in contrast, were more willing to 
take the risk and find new issues, including grassroots politics.107
 Similarly, older reporters may be less likely to support the protesters. According 
to Baramee Chairat, when one senior reporter saw the AOP protesters, she said to her 
fellow reporters, “Go take a look. What do those bastards want?” (pai du si puak hia ni 
ma tham arai). She also told other younger reporters that whoever did the report on the 
  
                                                 
105 Aimpong Boonyanupongsa, Interview, 4 January 2011. 
106 Sometimes, this personal connection can help the activists to gain special access in the 
media. In a personal interview, Baramee Chairat told me that he even saw one of movement 
advisers writing a news report for the newspaper himself. Interestingly, the report also quoted 
the writer as a news source (Baramee Chairat, Interview, 22 December 2010).  
107 Aimpong Boonyanupongsa, Interview, 4 January 2011. 
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protesters would not get to share the news from her. It is worth noted, according to 
McCargo (2000: 57-58), that sharing news, notes, and tape-recordings is a common 
practice among Thai reporters. Positive attitudes towards the movement also came from 
experiences of newer journalists. Younger reporters, such as those from ITV 
(established in 1996), had a close connection with the movement for years. They often 
covered positive aspects of the villagers. Prapas and Uchane (2006: 24) observe that 
many of these younger reporters were former student activists who had previously 
worked with grassroots groups, such as anti-Nam Chon Dam, since the late 1980s, so 
they held positive opinion towards grassroots politics. 
 In terms of content, Prapas and Uchane 2006: 34) argue that during the Thaksin 
government, news reports on the AOP emphasised dramatising the conflicts between 
the protesters and the government. The news reports gave limited attention on the AOP 
demands or the background of their problems. This limitation worked against the 
movement, and it finally allowed the government to use aggressive measures on 
movement. The protest ended after the camp was demolished and villagers were forced 
to go home at the end of January 2003. Over the next two years, news of the AOP only 
occasionally appeared in the papers.   
 After 2005, the elite groups were increasingly divided, which normally would 
leave political space for grassroots mobilisation. But this did not happen for the AOP. 
Despite the elite cleavage, the AOP still found itself unable to mobilise a successful 
political campaign. It is my argument that the political polarisation and colour-coded 
movements took most of the media space from the AOP. As one can see from Graph 
5.1 (below) that the number of news reports about the AOP was noticeably higher 
during the Thaksin than that during the polarised period. This is especially true in the 
period between February 2001 and February 2003. All the dramas and confrontation 
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between the two parties kept the media alert, from the surprise luncheon in the first day 
of premiership to the protest camp being demolished as the final showdown.  
 There are several reasons why the AOP was denied media access. First, as 
mentioned in Chapter II, the movement suffered from a significantly weakened 
mobilising structure. The resources were much more restricted than in the past, and the 
size or the movement was reduced due because many had their cases solved and left the 
movement for good. The political polarisation also divided the movement. Many NGIs, 
who had personal contacts with the media, also left the AOP, notably the Friends of the 
People group. Without them, it became much more difficult to gain media access.108 
Second, since the movement's primary goal was to solve its members' problems, 
because there were so many issues and each case involved legal complications, it was 
always difficult to explain all the details to the public. Unfortunately, most news 
readers were usually not interested in the details of this kind of conflict unless it 
received a great deal of public attention.109
 
 The longer the movement campaigned the 
more difficult it was for the movement to explain why their problems remained 
unsolved. Many simply got tired of the unsolved stories. It was also easier for the 
government to attack the villagers partially because the public tended to believe the 
authorities more than the poor. Stories from the authorities’ perspective usually 
received more attention from the media. 
                                                 
108 Baramee Chairat, Interview, 22 December 2010. 
109 Aimpong Boonyanupongsa, Interview, 4 January 2011. 
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Graph 5.1: Number of News Reports Appearing in Newspapers per Four Months† 
 
Source: Matichon news clipping online database, between January 2000 and December 2010 
† See full timeline in Appendix C. 
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 Third, since 2006, the public perception of street politics considerably 
worsened. The use of radical tactics, including violent means, by the colour-coded 
movements made it more difficult for the AOP to gain public sympathy. Many people 
could not differentiate the people's groups from the colour-coded movements. Even the 
media grew more cynical towards protests as they believed that the strategy of taking to 
the streets was being used by politicians for their own ends.110
c. Political Polarisation and Media Access 
 Moreover, given the 
frequency of the mass protests in recent years, many people were fed up with the extra-
parliamentary politics. As a result, street protests without mass participation or political 
significance would often simply be disregarded by the media. Fourth, the concept of 
newsworthiness after late 2005 became inexorably linked with political polarisation. 
After the formation of the PAD, political developments grew more rapid and intensive. 
These stories simply kept the news desk fully occupied. And as previously mentioned, 
the news values are also connected with other factors, such as the actors, the possible 
dramatisation, and the confrontation. The post 2005 political polarisation had all of 
these factors. These colour-coded groups had strong connection with the elite groups, 
and so they could employ more radical strategies when compared with the AOP. With 
limited radicalism and political goals, AOP's capability to produce newsworthy events 
was much less than that of these political movements, which had vast resources and 
elite support.   
Since late 2005 the krasae kanmaung (the political current) or krasae khao (direction of 
the news) (see McCargo 2000: 76) leaned towards the polarised national politics, and 
political events with no connection with polarisation were consequently seen as 
irrelevant, thereby being given limited or no media attention. The chronological 
                                                 
110 ibid. 
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account of the AOP during this period shows how the media attention on the AOP was 
linked with the polarisation.   
 After the 2005 elections, which saw the biggest electoral victory in Thai history, 
many began to see the emergence of the political cleavage. Thaksin’s political 
domination was seen as a clear threat to old elites. The polarisation began in late 2005 
when groups of conservative royalists, notably the group led Sonthi Limthongkul 
known as mob meuangthai raisapda (literally, Thailand Weekly mob), began their anti-
Thaksin campaigns. Sonthi's campaign was a direct response to the cancellation of his 
show in Channel 9, which he used to fiercely criticised Thaksin. He blamed Thaksin for 
the cancellation. The anti-Thaksin groups accused Thaksin of abuse of power, conflict 
of interests, and violation of royal powers. But it was not until the sale of the 
Shinawatra family's share of the telecommunications giant Shin Corporation to the 
Singaporean Temasek Holdings in late January 2006 that the political divisions became 
critical. Thaksin’s opponents criticised the complex transaction as an attempt to avoid 
taxes and to sell a national asset to foreigners (see Pasuk and Baker 2009: Chapter 9). 
On February 9, anti-Thaksin groups formed the People's Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD), which consisted of a variety of ideological and interest groups, ranking from  
ultra-royalists, conservatives, liberals, leftists, anti-privatisation activists, labour 
unionists, human rights campaigners, and NGIs (see Pye and Schaffar 2006; Kasian 
2006). In February, the PAD staged a series of protest against the government and 
thousands of people joined the protests. From that point onwards, stories about the 
conflict between anti-Thaksin groups and the government dominated the media.  
 As for the AOP, after the demolition of the protest camp in 2003, the movement 
was largely left out of the media spotlights. But in February 2006, the AOP hit the 
headlines again. Around five hundreds of protesters seized the Ministry of Agriculture 
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and Cooperative building and demanded that their grievances be solved. The 
occupation appeared in all major newspapers including Thai Rath  and Daily News.  
 But this attention from the media and government was not from the seizure 
alone. Many suspected that the occupation was part of the anti-Thaksin campaign. It 
took place only three days before the scheduled mass protest by the PAD. This 
speculation was not entirely far-fetched, given that many AOP advisers publically 
supported the anti-Thaksin groups. Furthermore, this occupation was not planned in 
advance.  
 Before the seizure, the AOP had camped at the Royal Plaza for three days 
demanding the government to look into their cases, but it yielded nothing. They then 
decided it was time to take a more drastic action—occupying the state building.111 It 
worked; the move caught the media and government by surprise. Key ministers, 
including Sudarat Keyuraphan, rushed to negotiate with the protesters. According to 
Baramee, before both parties started the negotiation, Sudarat approached him and asked 
him privately if this had anything to do with the anti-Thaksin campaign. 112
                                                 
111 Baramee Chairat, Interview, 22 December 2010. 
112 ibid. 
 The 
government also ordered 800 police officers to be prepared for to disperse the 
protestors. Sudarat suggested to the press that there might be someone behind the 
decision to seize the ministry. She also urged the protesters not to join upcoming anti-
government rally (Bangkok Post, 24 February 2006). Unfortunately for the villagers, 
their collective action hit another dead end; later that day Thaksin dissolved the 
parliament. Without mounting anti-government campaign, the AOP occupation was 
less likely to gain this level of media coverage from all the papers.  
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  On 19th September, the military staged a military coup and installed an interim 
government. The media space of the AOP was restricted further during this period. In 
order to suppress the political activities of the pro-Thaksin groups, the government 
declared martial law on more than thirty provinces—most of which were in the North 
and Northeast where the AOP's most active groups resided. Intimidation measures, 
such as home visits by military personnel, were used to contain grassroots activism.  
 However, it did not stop the movement from staging a protest in Bangkok. The 
villagers claimed that their protest had nothing to do with the political conflict. Around 
thousand AOP members participated in the protest demanding the government to take 
action on the Pak Mun Dam. The EGAT violated the 2004 cabinet resolution to open 
the sluice gates during the rainy season by delaying the opening for almost one month 
late (Bangkok Post, 25 May 2007). The media ran news on the AOP once again. But 
most news reports emphasised on the how the protest was seen as a security concern 
because the timing coincided with the with upcoming Constitutional Tribunal's verdict 
on the dissolution of TRT and the DP. The papers also mentioned about hundreds of 
protesters were stopped by the military officers on their way to Bangkok. Once again, 
the AOP's public visibility in the media was linked with the colour-coded conflict. 
Without such a link, their story would simply be ignored by the media.  
 After the 2007 electoral victory of a pro-Thaksin party (the People's Power 
Party, PPP), the political conflict rapidly worsened. The first prime minister for the 
PPP-led government was the ultra-conservative Samak Sundaravej, who made it clear 
that he wanted to bring exile former Thaksin Shinawatra home and amend the 2007 
constitution. It only took a few months before the anti-Thaksin groups regrouped and 
began their protests in May 2008. Most of them dressed in yellow (the colour of the 
King's birth date, Monday according to the Thai colour code). The PAD then become a 
full-blown yellow-shirt movement, which mainly aimed to protect the monarchy.  
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 The new focus on the monarchy effectively alienated the pro-democracy groups 
as well as radicalised movement. To add more pressure on the government, the PAD 
took a more extreme turn in August 2008, including seizing the NBT (the state TV 
station), Government House, and two international airports (see McCargo 2009). In 
September, Samak was pressured to resign from the post following the Constitutional 
Court decision to disqualify him from the premiership. Thaksin's brother-in-law, 
Somchai Wongsawat was named as the next prime minster. He only stayed in power 
for three more months. The Constitutional Court once again intervened. With an 
unusually rapid procedure, the court ruled against the pro-Thaksin party, and its 
coalition parties. The parties were disbanded (Ockey 2009; 327). 
  The AOP decided not to mobilise during these pro-Thaksin governments. The 
AOP correctly predicted that the governments would not last. They did not want waste 
their limited resources on the failing governments. But more importantly, as the 
political situation intensified, the villagers were afraid to get caught in the middle of the 
violent confrontation 113
                                                 
113 Somkiat Phonphai, Interview, 25 December 2010. 
 One of the villagers expressed his concern that any 
mobilisation, if not carefully carried out, might be interpreted as taking sides, and could 
damage their non-political stance (Fieldnotes, 12 October 2010). The most news reports 
on the AOP during these two governments were about the deaths of its two prominent 
NGO leaders, Wanida Tantiwittayapitak and Nantachote Chairat in December 2007 and 
May 2008 respectively. Newspapers particularly covered the story of Wanida’s 
premature death from cancer, and the nature march (thamma yatra) in March to 
honouring her dedication to the poor. But the stories mostly recognised her life’s work 
as an individual, not as part of the AOP. Many news reports on the event did not 
mention a single word on the AOP.  
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 In December 2008, with help from the courts and the military, the tables were 
now turned. After the collapse of the Somchai government, the PPP coalition partners 
were pressured by the military to switch side from Thaksin to palace-endorsed 
Abhisit.114
 The shift of the political power through ‘special means’ outraged the pro-
Thaksin groups. Now dressed in red, the pro-Thaksin groups kicked off their protests 
against the new government almost immediately. In March 2009, the red shirts 
mobilised a massive protest and surrounded Government House. In April, the protests 
expanded to several locations in Bangkok and Pattaya (the site of the Fourth East Asia 
Summit). The government employed armed troops and dispersed the protesters. 
Dubbed as ‘Bloody Songkran,’
 Despite having lost the 2007 election, Abhisit was chosen by parliament to 
become the next prime minister. The new government was widely dubbed as rattaban 
jak kai thaharn (literally, the government from the army barracks) which suggested its 
lack of democratic legitimacy.  
115
 Although the Abhisit government survived the challenge, the use of military 
force added nothing to improve its diminishing legitimacy and popularity, especially 
among the rural population. In some way, the red shirts also represented the rural 
population, and so the Abhisit versus red shirts conflict created an image of the premier 
 violent clashes were reported in the mainstream 
media and the disturbing images clouded the supposedly joyful occasion. Two civilians 
from neighbourhood watch group were killed in a clash with the red shirts, and at least 
123 people were injured during the ensuing chaos (Human Rights Watch Report 2011: 
40-41).  
                                                 
114 Chief royal adviser General Prem Tinsulanonda, who usually acted on behalf of the palace, 
publically supported Abhisit as he said “Thailand is lucky to have Abhisit as PM. I am 
confident that he will solve the country's problems with support from all Thais. I am glad that 
Abhisit is the prime minister and I think Thais also feel the same” (Manager Online, 4 January 
2009).  
115 Songkran is a Thai water festival, and it is regarded as the traditional Thai new year day. 
The celebration generally takes place between 13 and 15 April.   
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versus the rural people. That was not something Abhisit wanted at the time of crisis. He 
was well aware that he needed some sort a quick fix for improving this bad image.  
 Meanwhile, some AOP leaders saw this as an opportunity to gain more 
bargaining power over the government, so they offered Abhisit a media frenzy event 
that would help to solve this problem.116
 But she never received any compensation over the years until five years later. 
After a brief negotiation with the AOP,
 They proposed a photo opportunity with an 
iconic social injustice fighter, Hai Khanjanta. The 85 year-old grandma, or better 
known as Yai Hai, had continuously fought for the land she unjustly lost to a state 
project over thirty years ago. She became a national sensation overnight after she and 
her family took the matter into their own hands and tried to break the reservoir that 
flooded her land in April 2004. In the days that followed, she also appeared on front 
page of all major newspapers and in many national television programmes. Within a 
matter of months, Thaksin, the prime minister at the time, solved her thirty-plus-year-
old problem and returned the land to her (Prachatai, 10 October 2009).  
117
                                                 
116 I personally talked to one of the villager leaders, who played a crucial role in brokered this 
deal, and he insisted that both parties were well aware of the situation. The AOP leaders knew 
how much the DP needed this event, and that gave the AOP a more bargaining power. An AOP 
adviser, Pornchai Tantiwittayapitak, also admitted that the pressure from the red-shirts on the 
government gave the AOP much-needed bargaining power. It helped to speed up the resolution 
process, which usually would be very slow (Pornchai Tantiwittayapitak, Interview, 21 
December 2010). 
117 Baramee Chairat, Interview, 22 December 2010. 
 the Abhisit government passed a cabinet 
resolution to pay 4.9 million baht to Yai Hai's family and her neighbours for their 
losses over the years on 22 September (Thai Post, 23 September 2009). After some 
AOP leaders learned about the compensation, they immediately called a press release 
urging Abhisit to come to Ubon Ratchathani and hand the money to Yai Hai in person 
(Naew Na, 24 September 2009). Despite his busy schedule, Abhisit immediately 
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welcomed the invitation. To appear on the media with Yai Hai and the AOP members 
would certainly improve his image among rural voters.   
 On 10 October, Abhisit flew to the Thai Ban Local Wisdom Centre in Ubon 
Ratchathani to meet with Yai Hai. Around 1,000 AOP members were also present. The 
event received tremendous media attention. But it was not all about Yai Hai; many 
reporters expected to cover a violent confrontation between the local red shirts and the 
security forces. The government employed 5,000 police and military officers to provide 
the security for the event. Around 1,000 local red shirts showed up to protest against 
the premier (Matichon, 11 October 2009). According to the opposition, the government 
spent almost 100 million baht of the taxpayers' money on the event in order to hand Yai 
Hai and her neighbours compensation money of 4.9 million baht (Lokwanni, 12 
October 2009). 
 The event may be seen as a success for the AOP, judging from the remarkable 
media attention and the increased cooperation from the government. But critics 
slammed the AOP leaders, especially the NGIs, for lending a hand to a government that 
lacked democratic legitimacy. Suree Mingwannalak, for examples, argued that the 
villagers deserved to be fairly compensated, but there was no need for such a public 
event. She added that the event only helped Abhisit, a leader who had failed to uphold 
democratic principles, to restore his damaged image (Prachatai, 11 October 2009). 
Sanan Chusakul, an AOP adviser, argued that the AOP did not soem barami (literally, 
improve the legitimacy) for the government. The government did the right thing 
because the problem had remained unsolved for a long time (The Nation Weekly, 26 
October 2009). The government certainly made the correct decision by paying the 
compensation to Yai Hai, but the trip to Ubon Ratchathani was simply unnecessary. 
Yai Hai and her neighbours would have received the money regardless of Abhisit's visit 
(Prachatai, 28 October 2009).  
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 As for the AOP, did the movement have to host the controversial event to give 
legitimacy to a government that was widely questioned by human rights and pro-
democracy activists? The answer lies in which is the most important objective for the 
AOP: their immediate goals or the long-term development of democracy and human 
rights? For the AOP leaders who supported this event, their priorities appeared to be 
immediate goals, and so their answer would be a yes. But if one sees the AOP as a pro-
democracy organisation with long-term political goals, the answer would clearly be a 
no.  
 Again, the Yai Hai case clearly shows that during this period the media 
coverage was linked with the colour-coded conflict. Without Abhisit's visit, Yai Hai 
story alone could still attract considerable media attention. But when this was combined 
with the public appearance of prime minster and a potential violent confrontation, it 
became a much bigger story. This media coverage was the beginning of a close 
relationship between the AOP, along with other people's organisations, and the Abhisit 
government. After the April-May 2010 massacre, the bond grew even tighter. Many 
NGIs joined the controversial government-appointed reconciliation committees and 
sub-committees, which were widely seen to have been appointed to revive the 
government's damaged image after the violent crackdown in 2010 (see Atchara 2010). 
Under the Abhisit government, some of the villagers' minor issues, such as community 
land title deeds in some areas, were resolved, but important issues, such as the Pak Mun 
Dam, remained unsolved (Assembly of the Poor, Official Statement, 2 May 2013). 
However, given its weaker political position in the recent years, the AOP has been seen 
less as a social force but more as a political quick fix, which governments could use in 
times of legitimacy crisis to gain more public approval.  
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 A stark difference from the above events in terms of media attention can be 
seen in the AOP's 15th anniversary on 12 December 2010. Hundreds of villagers, 
advisers, NGIs, and academics were invited to the event. As the longest-lasting 
grassroots movement in the country's history, the event was expected to attract 
reasonable media attention. But in the reality, only four newspapers, Bangkok Post, 
Post Today, Thai Post and surprisingly Daily News, covered the event. All of the 
reports were hidden away in the back pages of the dailies, and the Thai Post report was 
only a paragraph long. To be fair, this limited media coverage was partially the 
secretariat's fault for not contacting the media effectively (Fieldnotes, 12 December 
2010). But this to a certain extent reflected the political reality of the AOP in the recent 
years. It is safe to say the lack of media attention had to do with the fact that such an 
event had no connection with national-level polarised politics, so it was simply ignored 
by most media.  
 The above sections discussed the chronological events of the AOP and the 
media access. They have shown that the events that were linked with the polarised 
politics generally gained reasonable media attention while the events without such a 
connection failed to gain the publicity. As one can see from the Graph 5.1 that during 
the polarised period (late 2005 onwards), the graph line goes up at times where such 
events occur, which are February 2006, May 2008, October 2009. However, without 
such a connection, the AOP's 15th year anniversary was ignored by most media outlets.  
D. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses a more dynamic aspect of the POS, which has allowed 
grassroots movements, including the AOP, to occasionally develop and mobilise over 
the years. Due to the complexity of the POS theory, it is difficult to define fixed 
components of the volatile political opportunity structure. In this thesis, I singled out 
the elite divisions and the media access as the primary factors that have significantly 
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influenced the AOP's course of struggle in the last decade. Unlike the stable aspects of 
the POS, these elements can rapidly change because the components are not embedded 
within any structure, so the activists can constantly change their fortunes by influencing 
these factors.   
 In terms of elite divisions, this chapter shows that the AOP struggled to carry 
out a successful campaign during the TRT government. At the beginning of the 
government, when the elite remained divided and Thaksin was battling with his 
pending trial at the Constitutional Court, the AOP enjoyed cooperation with the 
government. But soon after he consolidated his powers both inside and outside the 
parliament, the AOP's political campaign began to face obstacles. Inside the movement, 
the mobilising structure was notably weakened by cooptation and mass desertion. 
Externally, the movement struggled to gain public sympathy or support. This inability 
to gain support occurred, despite the reasonable media attention. 
 With the elite groups under control, the government was able to effectively 
produce and implement its pro-poor policies, which proved to be very popular among 
the rural voters. The TRT won two landslide elections in 2001 and 2005. Polls also 
showed that Thaksin personal popularity remained constantly high. The main issue for 
the AOP's campaign during the Thaksin government was to have the Pak Mun Dam 's 
sluice gates open all year round. Throughout their campaign between late 2001 and 
early 2003, the media paid sufficient attention to the movement, but it did not help the 
villagers win their case. The government withstood the pressure and finally won the 
political contest. The villagers were forced to go home empty-handed after their camp 
was demolished in January 2003.  
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 In terms of media access, studies show there was a strong connection between 
the media access and the development of social movements (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 
1993; Koopmans 2004a; 2004b; Vliegenthart et al. 2005; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci; 
Gamson and Meyer 1996). Media access enabled the movement to gain more 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the government during the 99-day protest. The lack of the 
media access during the Chuan government in late 1990s, on the other hand, made it 
difficult for the villagers to carry out their political campaign. The movement gained 
considerable media coverage as the protesters challenged Thaksin, but his government 
was proven to be too strong for the villagers.  
 However, Thaksin's political dominant position ended as was challenged by the 
PAD in early 2006. The political and elite divisions, which were supposed to open up 
more political space, did not help the AOP's mobilisation. The AOP was unable to 
secure media access. This lack of the media access was caused by many factors, both 
internal and external. Internally, the movement grew considerably weaker in the recent 
years. Also, given the complexity of the issues, as time passed it became very difficult 
for the activists to communicate with the public about their grievances. Externally, after 
the emergence of the colour-coded movements, the public grew weary of street politics. 
Street protests without mass participation or political significance would simply be 
ignored by the media. And most importantly, with all the drama and confrontation that 
colour-coded politics produced, the media space was filled with the stories of the 
conflicts. The media as a result tended to ignore AOP activities unless there was a 
connection between the events with the coloured conflicts. Without the media space, 
the movement found it very difficult to carry out a successful political campaign.   
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
Almost two decades after the Assembly of the Poor was founded, today many 
observers have begun to question the movement's formerly well-established credentials 
as an ‘agent of change.’ Some even go as far as to ask whether the AOP is really a 
movement or it is more of an interest group with some unique features (see Uchane 
2007: 164). One AOP adviser suggested to me that it was probably unfair for outsiders 
to have false expectations about the villager members. She insisted that they were just 
ordinary people trying to solve their problems in any way they could. We should not 
expect the AOP to bear the burden of transforming Thai society (Fieldnotes, 24 
December 2010).  
 Though arguably correct, this modest assertion certainly contradicted what AOP 
leaders had long been trying to tell both their villager members and the wider public: 
that the AOP was a movement which aimed to deepen democracy in Thailand. Some 
may view this portrait of the AOP as a pro-democracy movement simply as a 
discursive strategy (see Missingham 2003: Chapter III), but according to many advisers 
I talked to, this was precisely what many people had hoped the AOP might become. 
Unfortunately, this never happened: the AOP failed to act consistently to help develop 
democracy, and ultimately descended into factionalism and irrelevance. So what went 
wrong? Perhaps the answer lies in the nature of people's movements themselves.  
The Assembly of The Poor: Reflections on People's Movements in 
Thailand  
Before the formation of the AOP, various groups of villagers struggled to put pressure 
on successive governments to solve their problems. In the late 1980s, a number of local 
groups were campaigning on livelihood and related issues, but none of them managed 
to have their demands addressed properly. In 1992, many of these groups formed an 
umbrella movement known as the Small Scale Farmers’ Assembly of Isan (SSFAI), to 
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increase their strength. The SSFAI ran a successful campaign for a short period, until 
personal conflicts and corruption scandals led to organisational conflict and mass 
desertion (see Somchai 2006). Then some of these deserting elements along with other 
local groups formed the AOP in 1995. The AOP reached the pinnacle of its 
achievement when it staged a successful 99-day protest and won unprecedented 
compensation packages in 1997 (see Suthy 1997; Prapas 1998; Baker 2000). But soon 
after that, the movement gradually became weakened, and its success has become more 
and more limited over time.  
 After years of struggling, the villagers yet formed another people's movement, 
the People's Movement for a Just Society (P-MOVE) in 2011. Similar to the SSFAI and 
the AOP, P-MOVE is an umbrella movement which consists of several networks and 
local groups. The movement demands that the government address a long list of 
specific issues, such as entitlement to community land title deeds (Prachatai, 1 October 
2012). Some of the local groups in the AOP, notably the anti-Pak Mun Dam group, are 
also part of P-MOVE. In fact, the anti-Pak Mun Dam group has been part of all of the 
above movements. This dynamic of these local groups shows the nature of people's 
movements in Thailand, which has been rather goal-oriented, non-committed, and non-
ideological. Those involved in such groups clearly set their sights on local issues of 
immediate relevance to the well-being and livelihoods of those they represent.  
 The modus operandi of both the AOP and P-MOVE is in line with the work of 
prominent Thai NGIs, which is typically wide-ranging, issue based, and short-term. It 
is also compatible with the majority of NGI's core idea of community culture, which 
emphasises a non-political approach and working on local issues. As suggested in 
Chapter II, NGIs have played an influential role in these movements. In certain 
circumstances, this strategy can help grassroots movements to quickly expand their 
mass base, but in the long run, it is hard for them to sustain their strength. One has to 
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keep in mind that the primary if not sole goals of most villager members are to solve 
their short-term problems. The political activism of most villagers will end as soon as 
their problems are solved. The level of commitment of these members tends to be lower 
than those who work closely with the movements or campaign for structural changes 
(Fieldnotes, 10 October 2010). But those with a long-term commitment to social and 
political change make up only a small minority of the movement participants.   
 Equally important, people's movements in Thailand have struggled to mobilise 
resources to fuel their political activities. Since most of these movement's members are 
from the lower classes with no or little financial stability, their financial contribution to 
the movement is quite restricted. Also, their adoption of an ostensibly non-political 
approach means that these movements are unlikely to gain any meaningful support 
from elite groups, who naturally seek allies at critical junctures in order to help topple 
their political rivals. Moreover, many groups, especially the smaller ones, usually have 
no long-term plan for resource mobilisation (Fieldnotes, 11 October 2010), which 
reflects their main desire to pursue short-term goals. This has therefore limited the 
mobilising structure of these movements to function effectively.  
 The solution of many groups to these problems has largely involved working 
with the NGIs and funding institutions, such as the Thai Health Promotion Foundation 
and the Community Organizations Development Institute (see Gawin 2004). But 
working with the NGIs and the institutions associated with them often comes with 
strings attached. Not only do funding recipients have to fulfil the project requirements, 
which may be time-consuming and distract from the main goals of the groups,118
                                                 
118 Somparn Kuendee, Interview, 26 December 2010. 
 but 
the movements may also risk of being co-opted by these quasi-state funding agencies 
(see Boonlert 2008: 53-54).  
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 This study of the AOP also reflects this reality. It is an attempt to understand the 
dynamic of the AOP from a critical perspective. Unlike previous studies on the AOP, 
this thesis illuminates some of the internal weaknesses of the movement, including its 
loose structure, which have made the movement struggle to run successful political 
campaigns since the early 2000s. The factors that have caused this decline can be found 
inside and outside the movement. The AOP has employed a loose structure that can 
facilitate the cooperation of diverse groups within the movement. But this structure 
may be criticised for concerns over lack of unity and ineffective mobilisation. In terms 
of institutionalisation, the AOP has also been unable to expand its mass strength, failed 
to increase effective centralisation and professionalisation, and has been denied access 
to conventional channels.  
 As the AOP relies on a dual strategy approach, which mainly involves agitation 
and negotiation, mass strength was the key to its earlier success. But, without strong 
mass participation their protests have struggled to gain the public and media attention. 
And without this extra-parliamentary pressure, their negotiation strategy has seen very 
limited achievements. Similar to other people's movements, the NGIs also enjoy an 
influential role in the AOP, although officially they are only expected to play a 
supporting role. Such an inequality causes some criticisms concerning the idea of 
collective leadership.  
 This thesis has also explored the components in the political opportunity 
structure (POS), both the stable and volatile aspects. The stable elements of the POS, 
including cultural structure, institutional structure, and prevailing strategies, have 
paradoxically obstructed the mobilisation of the AOP since its inception. At the centre 
of the AOP’s cultural structure, discourse of Thainess has helped deny political space 
for marginalised groups for decades. The strength of the Thai state under the control of 
the elite has also limited non-elite groups from gaining the access to the system. The 
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use of violence as a prevailing strategy by the state—seen in the violent suppression of 
red-shirt demonstrations in 2009 and 2010–has to some extent deterred grassroots 
groups from developing a clear political platform.  
 However, the volatile elements of the POS have occasionally allowed grassroots 
groups to emerge and develop. This thesis has explored the two components of the POS 
that had the most influential role in partially determining the fate of the AOP during 
and after the Thaksin government. During Thaksin's reign, the government was able to 
control leading elite groups both inside and outside the parliament. Thaksin's dominant 
position allowed the government freely to pursue populist policies such as the thirty 
baht healthcare scheme, and at the same time to contain grassroots groups which had 
proved able to harass and undermine previous elected administrations, especially the 
AOP. Although Thaksin began to lose his control over the military and civilian elites in 
late 2005, the AOP still failed to make gains from the opportunities available. Since the 
emergence of the colour-coded groups in late 2005, the AOP has failed to gain the 
media access, another volatile component to its earlier successes. This limited media 
space considerably restricted the success of the AOP's campaign during this polarised 
period. However, the AOP occasionally gained some media coverage when its 
activities were somehow linked to the colour-coded conflicts.  
Future Prospects for the Assembly of the Poor  
Since the late 1990s, the AOP's achievements have mainly been limited to resolving 
some local problems. In many land encroachment cases, villagers could only stall the 
officials from confiscating their lands. These cases are still far from being resolved 
(Uchane 2007: 174). Most of the AOP’s policy proposals were either entirely rejected 
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or considerably changed by the authorities.119
 On the other hand, some villagers still hoped that somehow local people's 
groups would regroup under the AOP and make an impact again as in 1997 (Fieldnotes, 
12 December 2010), but the emergence of the P-MOVE, which was also an umbrella 
movement in 2011, indicated that this might never happen. Some AOP member groups 
 This was a vivid indication of the AOP's 
limited successes, especially at the structural level.  
 However, the AOP may have been more useful in empowering the villagers 
through grassroots political activism. Many villagers have become confident and more 
aware of their basic rights (Missingham 2003: 159). Grassroots activism fostered by 
working with the movement has significantly transformed many uneducated villagers 
to become politically conscious individuals and community leaders. This is 
extraordinary. But in general. most villager members still have a limited role in the 
movement. Without an effective resource mobilisation, this empowerment process 
remains fairly limited.  
 Given its decline in the recent years, there are serious doubts as to whether the 
AOP could re-emerge as a critical non-elite challenger in the near future. In an informal 
discussion in October 2010, a villager said that the AOP was now kin bun kao (literally, 
‘consuming its old merit,’ in a Buddhist sense)—a Thai expression meaning that the 
AOP was presently simply living off its former glories. To some extent, the AOP could 
still gain bargaining power from making threats to organise massive protests against the 
government or state officials. But the AOP’s store of merit, he added, would soon run 
out. He insisted that some meaningful changes have to be made before the movement 
would once again become a serious political contender as in the past.  
                                                 
119 Baramee Chairat, Interview, 22 December 2010. 
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decided to join P-MOVE's campaigns, jumping ship or at least hedging their options to 
try and maximise their influence.   
 Equally importantly, it is highly unlikely that the permanent components of the 
Thai POS will be radically changed anytime soon. Both formal and informal structures 
have been shaped and maintained by the elites in ways that will benefit their interests 
for decades. The elites would make sure that the existing structures persist. Also, the 
surprisingly high popular support for the 2010 anti-red-shirt crackdown by the military 
indicates that the use of violence against non-elite challengers is likely to continue.    
 Moreover, it is also certain that the current political conflicts will continue to 
have considerable impacts on Thai politics for years to come. The elite divisions and 
the polarisation of the Thai society will therefore persist, limiting political space for the 
AOP and other similar movements because the media will continue to pay more 
attention to colour-coded conflicts tied directly to elite power struggles. News related to 
these groups will permanently dominate the media unless the AOP could somehow link 
their political campaigns into the colour-coded conflicts.  
P-MOVE, for example, successfully organised a two-week protest at 
Government House, which attracted considerable media attention from the media in 
May 2013. The government led by Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin's sister, was under 
strong attack from anti-Thaksin groups. Anti-Thaksin news agencies, such as ASTV 
and TNews websites, gave extensive news coverage to the villagers throughout the 
protest. Anti-government groups showed overwhelming support for the protesters, 
which in turn pressured the Yingluck government (2011 – present) to negotiate with the 
movement (Prachatai, 24 May 2013). But this may be effective only in the short run. 
The support for the P-MOVE was simply a strategic move to emphasise the 
government's inability to solve the problems of the poor.  
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 Last but not least, Chantana also argues that the future of the people's 
movements, including the AOP, will also depend on such factors as the counter-
responses of the state, the state's handling of environmental issues, and the 
implementation of development projects. She adds that if the state continues forcefully 
and aggressively to pursue the implementation of development projects, this may 
radicalise the grassroots activism further (2004b: 250-251). If that happened, Thailand 
might see the emergence of the AOP or another people's movement that campaigns 
primarily on these development-related issues once again.  
Contribution to the Literature 
This thesis makes an important contribution to knowledge and understanding in the 
literature on Thai politics and political opportunity structure theory. The study on the 
Thai POS reveals the elite's dominant position vis-à-vis the non-elite groups in the Thai 
political structure in both formal and informal settings. This analysis of the Thai elites 
shows how the ruling groups have systematically created and maintained their superior 
position through the Thainess discourse, the formal structure, and the use of violence 
against non-elite groups. This analysis helps to explain why the AOP and other non-
elite groups have rarely been able to emerge in the national politics over the years. This 
shows that the limited mobilisation of grassroots politics has not necessarily been a 
result of the culture of obedience, as many would argue (see Attachak 2006); it rather 
suggested that the pro-elite political structure is to blame for attempting to foster 
political passivism in the villages.  
 This study of the AOP's decline also reflects the current political reality that 
political conflicts in Thailand have decreasingly involved ‘non-political’ issues, such as 
development and environment. Issues which had not been discussed in the past, such as 
the human rights and monarchy, have now become widely debated and contentiously 
disputed subjects. If people's movements continue to place sole emphasis on ‘non-
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political’ issues could diminish their political relevance even further, at a time when the 
red-shirt movement–with a strong base in the Northeast, like the AOP–has been able to 
address a wider and more overtly political range of concerns.  
 Moreover, this thesis has contributed to the study of social movements and 
political opportunity structure, which has been based so far largely on the emergence 
and development of social movements in either developed countries or non-democratic 
nations (see Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003). But this study is an attempt to 
understand a grassroots movement in a developing country, which has both quasi-
democratic institutions and elements of an authoritarian structure. Unlike other studies 
on the POS, this study proposes that elite factors be divided into two groups, the 
bureaucratic and elected elites, which represent two aspects of the Thai political 
system, the authoritarian and parliamentary. Without an analysis of these two elite 
groups, the picture of the Thai POS cannot be completed. This to a certain extent helps 
to fill the gap in the POS theory, which has not often been used to explain the 
movements in developing democracies, where both authoritarian and parliamentary 
features exist.  
 More studies on the grassroots movements in developing countries may be 
needed to test the validity of this approach. Developing countries, such as India, which 
have both relatively stable democratic regimes and strong peasant groups (Omvedt 
1994), may require different theoretical adjustments to draw a accurate picture of 
relationships between POS and the movements.  This thesis offers a way forward for 
future studies along similar lines.  
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Appendix A 
List of Interviewees 
1. Somkiat Phonphai, a villager leader (25 December 2010) 
2. Sawat Uppahat, a villager leader, the AOP coordinator (15-16 August 2010, 11 
October 2010) 
3. Put Buntem, a villager leader, a member in the working group (11 October 2010) 
4. Anont Sripen, a villager leader (25 September 2010) 
5. Kessakorn Silarak, a phi liang, an NGI (19-20 August 2010) 
6. Somparn Kuendee, a phi liang, an NGI (26 December 2010) 
7. Prapon Singkaew, a phi liang, an NGI (27 December 2010) 
8. Baramee Chairat, a former member of the secretariat team, an AOP adviser, a phi 
liang, an NGI (10 August 2010, 17 December 2010, 22 December 2010) 
9. Ubol Yoowa, an AOP adviser, an NGI (16 August 2010) 
10. Nitirat Sapsomboon, an AOP adviser, an NGI (14 January 2011) 
11. Hannarong Yaowalers, a former member of the secretariat team, an AOP adviser, 
an NGI (4 August 2010) 
12. Khematas Palprem, a member of the secretariat team (21 July 2010, 4 September 
2010) 
13. Watcharee Phaoluengthong, an AOP adviser, an NGI (23 August 2010) 
14. Suriyasai Katasila, a former AOP adviser, an NGI (28 July 2010) 
15. Pipop Thongchai, a former AOP adviser, an NGI (30 July 2010) 
16. Pornchai Tantiwittayapitak, an AOP adviser, a businessman (21 December 2010) 
17. Sirote Klampaiboon, an academic, a former student activist (12 January 2011) 
18. Naruemon Thabchumpon, an AOP adviser, an academic  (19 January 2011) 
19. Aimpong Boonyanupongsa, an assistant chief reporter of Khao Sod (4 January 
2011) 
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20. Phumtham Wechayachai, a former deputy secretary-general of the TRT, a former 
NGI (19 January 2011) 
 
 
Appendix B 
List of Newspapers and Weekly Magazines 
1. Bangkok Post 
2. Khao Sod 
3. Kom Chad Luek 
4. Krungthep Thurakij 
5. Lokwanni 
6. Phujadkarn Raiwan 
7. Matichon 
8. Naew Na 
9. Thai Post 
10. The Nation 
11. The Nation Weekly 
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Appendix C 
Timeline of the Assembly of the Poor and Related Events 
                                                 
120 Of all these cases, only two cases were solved. One dam project was cancelled and Banharn 
used his own money to buy the land from the villagers as some form of compensation (Uchane 
2007: 155).    
 Date (m/d)                                       Events 
B
an
ha
rn
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
1995 
10 December  
The Assembly of the Poor was officially founded at 
Thammasat University.  
15 December 
Around 500 representatives from the AOP marched to 
ASEAN Summit to submit a petition.  
1996 
26 March – 
23 April  
The AOP staged its first massive protest. Around 1,1000 
joined the protest. The protesters represented 56 cases and 
came from five groups: dam group, forest and land group, 
state project group, slum group, and industrial sickness group. 
The villagers stayed in front of Government House for 5 
weeks and gained extensive media attention and public 
recognition. An agreement was reached between the 
government and the AOP. Several commissions were 
appointed to look into these 56 cases (Uchane 2007: 155).120
13 – 19 
August 
  
Around 500 villagers staged a protest camp in front of 
Government House to remind the government its promise to 
implement the April 1996 agreement (Naruemon 2006: 274). 
14 October –                 
7 November 
Around 5,000 villagers staged a protest camp in front of 
Government House to demand a concrete action following the 
April agreement (Naruemon 2006: 274).  
C
ha
va
lit
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
1997 
25 January – 
2 May 
The AOP’s second massive protest, the 99-Day Protest.  
Around 25,000 protesters staged a camp in front of 
Government House to demand that the government solve their 
problems, The protest lasted 99 day. The protesters, which 
represented 125 issues, came from seven groups: dam group, 
forest and land group, state project group, slum group, 
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industrial sickness group, alternative agriculture group, and 
indigenous group. Overall, the protest was seen as a success. 
The protest received an extraordinary media and public 
attention throughout.  In terms of concessions, the AOP also 
achieved an unprecedented victory. The list included: giving 
compensation packages to almost 7,000 families for their loss 
of land and livelihood caused by dam projects; cancelling one 
dam project and reviewing five others; and ending summary 
eviction from ‘forest’ lands and admitting the principle that 
long-settled villagers should be allowed to stay in ‘forest’ 
zones. In total, the government’s immediate cost was 4,657 
million baht (Baker  2000: 23). 
July 
Financial crisis hit Thailand. Thai baht was devalued. The 
public and media turned their back on street politics and 
wanted a strong government. They were afraid that the street 
protests would damage the investment climate (Rungrawee 
2004: 545). 
C
hu
an
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
1998 
April 
The Chuan government cancelled all agreements, which were 
reached by the previous government, to compensate villagers 
affected by dam construction projects (Naruemon 2006: 275). 
The cabinet resolution specified no compensation would be 
paid to those who were affected by any completed project. 
The government also filed a fraud lawsuit for the villagers 
who already received the compensation in the case of Rasi 
Salai Dam (Baker 2000: 24-25).    
14 July The Thai Rak Thai party was registered. 
1999 
April 
As the political climate changed and the villager protester 
were not as welcome in Bangkok, the AOP adopted a new 
strategy, known as dao krajai (literally, scattered stars). 
Instead of organising one massive protest in Bangkok, the 
protesters now staged several smaller protracted protests in its 
base provinces, such as Ubon Ratchathani (Pak Mun Dam), 
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Sisaket (Rasi Salai Dam), and Khon Kaen (Uchane 2007: 156-
157;  Naruemon 2006: 182-183). The new strategy was a 
failure. More than a year of utilising this strategy, the villagers 
received scant publicity and the government simply ignored 
them (Rungrawee 2004: 546). 
2000 
15 May 
Around 1,000 villagers occupied the Pak Mun Dam's parking 
lot in front of the power plant and blockaded the entrance of 
the office building to demand the dam decommission. Also a 
commission, led by Bantorn Ondam, was appointed to resolve 
16 problematic issues.  (Naruemon 2006: 276).  
28 May 
Around 300 AOP members stormed Government House 
demanding a negotiation with the government (Naruemon 
2006: 276).  
6 July 
Bantorn commission announced its findings, which 
overwhelmingly supported the AOP's demands (Missingham 
2003: 207-208).  
12 July 
The AOP members began their protracted protest in front of 
Government House to pressure the government to follow the 
recommendations of the Bantorn commission (Nareumon 
2006: 226) 
18 July 
225 AOP members stormed Government House demanding 
that the government follow the recommendation of the 
Bantorn commission (Matichon, 19 July 2000). They faced 
criminal charges (Nareumon 2006: 277). 
7 November 
Around 500 AOP members blockaded the road to Government 
House in order to obstruct the cabinet meeting. The villagers 
were dispersed and the AOP leaders were charged for 
breaking the law (Nareumon 2006: 227). 
 
19 
November 
The protest camp at Pak Mun Dam was partly burned down by 
a pro-dam group. Thirty villagers were injured. No one was 
charged with a crime (Nareumon 2006: 227). 
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m
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t 
2001 
6 January The TRT won 248 out of 500 seats in the general elections.  
10 January 
Thaksin showed a public support for the AOP as he had lunch 
with the villagers at their protest camp in front of Government 
House. He promised to help the villagers solve their problems 
and ordered the removal of the fence surrounding the camp 
site. The fence was built by the previous government. Thaksin 
also appointed Deputy Prime Minister Pongpol Adireksan to 
chair a committee to look into the AOP's grievances. The 
number of the protesters also increased to one thousand to 
pressure the government to decommission the dam and 
compensate the affected villagers for their financial losses 
(Naruemon 2006: 158, 277). 
18 January 
Thaksin's asset concealment case was accepted by the 
Constitutional Court.  
April 
Thaksin's populist policies were quickly implemented. The 
government pilot healthcare scheme was launched, and the 
government made the agrarian debt relief scheme available to 
2.3 million debtors (Pasuk and Baker 2008: 66). 
5 April 
Thaksin called NGIs ‘poverty-selling agents’ (naina kha 
khwamjon) (Phujadkarn Raiwan, 5 April 2001). 
12 April 
The villagers ended its 9-month protest in front of 
Government House, but they vowed they would come back if 
the government failed to meet their demands. They hosted a 
ceremony for the prime minister to mark a new beginning of a 
cooperation between the government and the villagers 
(Matichon, 12 April 2001). Meanwhile, the government also 
ordered the EGAT to open sluice gates at Pak Mun Dam for 4 
months. It also commissioned UBU to conduct a 
comprehensive study on the impact of the dam (Naruemon 
2006: 277). 
25 May 
Thaksin visited the AOP's protest camp and demanded that the 
EGAT complied with the resolution. 
16 June The EGAT opened the sluice gates only after the government 
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threatened to sack its governor (Naruemon 2006: 278).  
July 
The anti-Pak Mun Dam started a community-based research, 
known as Tai Ban research. The EGAT also commissioned its 
own research team on the Pak Mun Dam (Naruemon 2006: 
278). Meanwhile, the TRT absorbed the Seritham Party. 
3 August  
The Constitutional Court narrowly acquitted Thaksin on the 
concealment of assets because there was insufficient evidence. 
September 
More populist policies were implemented. The village fund 
scheme was extended to most villages in the country, and 5.3 
million loans were approved (Pasuk and Baker 2008: 66). 
10 
September 
More than one hundred villagers, mostly from the anti-Pak 
Mun Dam group kicked off their ‘long march’ from Ubon 
Ratchathani to Bangkok to collect signatures to support the 
dam decommission campaign.  
19 
September 
Thaksin ordered the government agencies to comply with the 
government's demands in order to solve the AOP cases 
(Matichon, 20 September 2001). 
29 
November 
The attorney general dropped the charge against 225 villagers 
who stormed Government House during the Chuan 
government. He explained that the villagers had no ill 
intention, and the pursuing the case was not in the public 
interest (Matichon, 30 November 2001). 
4 December 
Sulak Sivaraksa and Somkiat Phongpaiboon visited the 
marchers as they reached Nakorn Ratchasima (Matichon, 5 
December 2012) 
11 December 
The government ordered the opening of the sluice gates at Pak 
Mun Dam and Rasi Salai Dam for the entire year after being 
pressured by the AOP's long march as villagers reached 
Nakorn Ratchasima (around 250 kilometres away from 
Bangkok). 
16 December 
The marchers changed their route. Instead of heading to 
Bangkok as originally planned, they decided to circle around 
the provinces in the Northeast. The new route would be 2,000 
kilometres long and take around 8-12 months (Matichon, 16 
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December 2001). 
2002 
January The TRT absorbed the New Aspiration Party.  
6 March 
The AOP and its allies organised rallies in Bangkok, Chiang 
Mai and Ubon Ratchathani to remind the government of its 
promises (Naruemon 2006: 278). 
19 March 
The AOP kicked off its first prolonged protest in during the 
Thaksin government, which would last 64 days (19 March – 
21 May). More than 300 AOP members organised a protest 
camp in front of Government House to put more pressure on 
the government to respond to their demands (Matichon, 20 
March 2002). The protesters, which represented 205 issues, 
came from seven groups: dam group, forest and land group, 
state project group, slum group, industrial sickness group, 
alternative agriculture group, and indigenous group. 
20 March 
Thaksin made a speech about solving the problems of the poor 
at a UN conference on development in Mexico. Meanwhile, 
hundreds of poor villagers were protesting his government in 
Bangkok (Matichon, 21 March 2002).  
25 March 
The government appointed 17 subcommittees to work with the 
Pongpol committee in solving the AOP's problems (Matichon, 
27 March 2002). 
20 April 
Thongchareoan Srihatham, an AOP villager leader, was 
robbed and injured in his own house. Many suspected that this 
had something to do with his role in the anti-Pak Mun Dam 
group (Khao Sod, 22 April 2002). 
18 April 
Around 1,000 AOP members from the Rasi Salai Dam and 
Huana Dam joined the protesters in Bangkok (Matichon, 19 
April 2002).   
22 April 
Yongyuth Tiyapairat, the government spokesman, accused 
three AOP leaders for committing a fraud (Matichon, 23 April 
2002).    
23 April 
The government passed a cabinet resolution that would allow 
local authorities to use force against any illegal protest 
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activities at the local level (Naruemon 2006: 278). 
1 May 
The protesters were no longer allowed to use the toilets in a 
state building (Khao Sod, 2 May 2002). 
21 May 
The AOP ended its 64-day protest after the government 
appoint the Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, to 
chair a committee to oversee the implementation of the 
government's orders by the government agencies regarding the 
AOP cases. Fourteen AOP representatives were given seats in 
the committee (Thai Post, 22 May 2002). 
June 
The Tai Ban research announced its findings (Naruemon 
2006: 278).  
15 
September 
The UBU research group announced its findings and proposed 
4 policy options as follow: 1) the gate was to be permanent 
closed for the whole year (full electricity production), 2) the 
gate was to remain open for 5 months and closed for 7 
months, 3) the gate was to remain open for 8 months and 
closed for 4 months, and 4) the gate was to be permanently 
open (no electricity production). The research itself 
recommended that the sluice gates be open all year round for 
five more years for further study. The study argues that the 
dam was useless in terms irrigation and shutting it down 
would have no significant impact on the electricity supplies in 
the lower north-eastern region. Moreover, without the dam, it 
would be better for the local people (over 8,000 families) 
financially (Krungthep Thurakij, 5 November 2002). 
28 
September 
The Pongpol committee proposed that the sluice gates be 
opened for 4 months and closed for 8 months, as suggested by 
EGAT (Naruemon 2006: 278). This selected choice was not 
one of the four options proposed by the UBU study, which 
was funded by the government.  
1 October 
The government passed a cabinet resolution following the 
suggestion by the Pongpol committee. According to the 
resolution, the gate-opening period was between 1st July and 
31st October and closing period was between 1st November 
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and 30th June (Daily News, 13 November 2002).  
29 October 
Around 300 AOP members, mostly from the anti-Pak Mun 
Dam group, kicked off their second prolonged protest in 
Bangkok to pressure the government to reconsider the cabinet 
resolution (Khao Sod, 29 October 2002). 
4 November 
The Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) and other allied 
organisations publically questioned the government's policy 
choice on the Pak Mun Dam. They supported the UBU study's 
most preferred option to keep the gate open all year round 
(Khao Sod, 4 November 2002). 
December The number of protesters increased to around 1,000 people. 
5 December 
A group of around 30 masked men raided and vandalised the 
AOP protest camp in Bangkok. The damage cost was around 
6,000 baht. The raid was directed by a man, who was on the 
phone with someone he addressed as nai (literally, master). It 
was widely speculated that a general close to the government 
and some state officials were involved (Khao Sod, 7, 10 
December 2002). The raid backfired on the government. Some 
said the government was behind the action. The other blamed 
the government for failing to provide security for the villagers  
(Khao Sod, 7 December 2002). The culprits were never 
identified.  
8 December 
Thaksin visited the protest site unannounced. He spent 7,000 
baht treating the villagers small meals and ice cream. He 
promised he would review the government decision. He said 
he wished to bypass NGIs and talked directly to people who 
were really affected by the dam. He would also like to visit the 
site of the dam to hear the people’s grievances. He urged the 
villagers to be reasonable and base their decision on reliable 
information. Meanwhile, the villagers handed Thaksin a copy 
of the UBU study, which was commissioned by his own 
government. However, the AOP refused to leave the protest. 
They said that they learned their lesson from last year and 
would not leave until their problems were solved (Bangkok 
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Post, 9 December 2002). 
15 December 
Around 40-50 hooded men raided and burned down the AOP 
protest camp in at the Pak Mun Dam. It took them about 30 
minutes to the 255 shacks (Khao Sod, 16 December 2002). 
Later that day, around 200 AOP protesters marched to 
Thaksin's residence and demanded to speak with the prime 
minister about fire. Only 5 AOP representatives were allowed 
to talk to the prime minister on phone for 30 minutes  (Khao 
Sod, 16 December 2002). 
17 December 
Sawek Banthao, also known as Kamnan Sawek, and his men 
turned themselves in. They admitted to the crimes. Sawek was 
reportedly known for having previously worked with the 
EGAT and had conflict with the anti-Pak Mun group. He 
reasoned that he was unhappy with the villagers and their 
protest against the cabinet resolution (Krungthep Thurakij, 17 
December 2002). 
18 December 
Thaksin accused the NGIs of receiving funds from foreigners 
with ill intent. He suggested that he would have an public talk 
with the villagers. No third party, the NGIs, would be allowed 
to be part of the dialogue (Daily News, 19 December 2002).    
20 December 
Thaksin hosted a televised meeting with AOP representatives. 
The meeting lasted five hours. Other than Thaksin himself, 
only the villagers and the researchers were allowed to take 
part of the meeting. The NGIs were not allowed to attend the 
meeting. The villagers appeared to be nervous but they 
adequately presented their cases (Bangkok Post, 21 December 
2002). In several occasions, Thaksin stressed that was not to 
be pressured and he had to make decision based on the interest 
of the majority. He delayed making the decision and claimed 
that he would have to see the dam site himself. Additionally, 
Thaksin had a meeting with the head of National Statistical 
Office (NSO). He wanted the NSO to conduct a survey about 
the opening of the gates at Pak Mun Dam (Matichon, 20 
January 2003).  
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20 – 22 
December 
The NSO had only three days to come up with the survey 
questions. 
24 December 
Thaksin flew to the Pak Mun Dam site along with two villager 
representatives. He insisted again that he had to take the 
interests of the majority into account (Khao Sod, 25 December 
2002). Around 500 villagers, both supporters and opponents of 
the Pak Mun Dam, greeted Thaksin at the Sa Pau rapids (The 
Nation, 25 December 2002). 
24 – 26 
December  
The NSO sent 173 poll takers to 150 villages in the Pak Mun 
basin area to conduct a survey about the opening of the gates 
at Pak Mun Dam. There were 3,750 respondents in the survey 
from three districts in Ubon Ratchathani (Khao Sod, 21 
January 2003). 
2003 
13 January 
Phumtham Wechayachai, the deputy prime minister and the 
chair of the committee on the Pak Mun Dam case, confirmed 
that the government would not change its position on the dam 
decision. The sluice gates would be opened for 4 months and 
closed for 8 months as ordered in the previous cabinet 
resolution (Matichon, 14 January 2003)  
29 January 
The conflict entered the final stage. Samak Sundaravej, the 
Bangkok governor, cited traffic and public health laws and 
personally directed the demolition of the protest camp. The 
government gave the green light to the Bangkok governor. 
Over 1,000 municipal officers from all fifty Bangkok districts 
were deployed to knock down the camp. The protesters, 
mostly elders and children, showed no resistance to the 
officers. Later that day, the protesters left Bangkok for their 
home provinces (Khao Sod, 30 January 2003). 
August 
General Chaiyasit Shinawatra, Thaksin's cousin, was 
promoted to    commander-in-chief replacing General Surayud 
Chulanont as commander-in-chief (McCargo and Ukrist 2005: 
142).  
2004 
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5 January 
The first day for the poor to register with the government as 
part of the TRT populist policies. This policy was hugely 
popular, and a large number of people showed up to register in 
the scheme (Khao Sod, 6 January 2004).  
19 April 
Yai Hai and her family attempted to break the reservoir. The 
action attracted considerable media attention.  
15 August 
Withitat Institute hosted a panel discussion on the negative 
impacts of Thaksinomics. Many academics, NGIs, including 
the AOP advisers took part of the event (Matichon, 16 August 
2004).  
15 
September 
Some AOP leaders publically announced their opposition to 
the TRT government (Khao Sod, 16 September 2004).  
September The TRT absorbed the Chart Pattana Party. 
2005 
23 January 
The AOP and the Campaign for Popular Democracy hosted a 
panel discussion focusing on the upcoming election. The AOP 
advisers and the NGIs strongly criticised the TRT's populist 
policies and how the politicians destroyed the country (Thai 
Post, 24 January 2005).    
6 February 
The TRT won a landslide election victory of 375 out of 500 
seats. In Bangkok, the DP's stronghold, the TRT won 32 seats 
while the DP received only 4 seats. The TRT was the first 
party to win election with this margin.   
15 – 17 
March 
Around AOP 1,000 members, led by Yai Hai, rallied in front 
of parliament to raise awareness about plight of the villagers 
(Bangkok Post, 16 March 2005). Abhisit, the opposition 
leader, also visited the protesters (The Nation, 17 March 
2005).    
13 - 20 May 
Around 300 AOP members, mostly from the anti-Pak Mun 
Dam, rallied in Bangkok. They demanded that the government 
order the EGAT to open the sluice gates as it was specified by 
the resolution (Khao Sod, 21 May 2005).   
2006 
8 February The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) was formally 
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established. The PAD organised its first protest in 11 
February, and a series of protests were staged thereafter. The 
PAD also announced that it would organise another massive 
protest in 26 February.   
20 – 23 
February 
Around 500 AOP members organised a protest in front of 
parliament to criticise the government's policies. The AOP 
leaders announced that they had to organise the rally because: 
1) they wanted to reveal what the TRT government lied to the 
public, 2) they demanded that the government solve their 
grievances, and 3) they called for a political reform for the 
poor. The protest had been planned since 10 December 2005 
(the AOP's 10th year anniversary). Some AOP leaders even 
threatened the government that if it did not address their 
problems seriously, the AOP members could join the anti-
Thaksin groups (Bangkok Post, 21 February 2006).  
24 February 
Around 500 protesters seized the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperative building and demanded that their problems be 
solved. The occupation appeared in all major newspapers 
including Thai Rath and Daily News. Key ministers, including 
Sudarat Keyuraphan, rushed to negotiate with the protesters 
because they were afraid that the protesters were part of the 
anti-Thaksin groups. The government ordered 800 police 
officers to be prepared for their dispersal. Sudarat suggested to 
the press that there might be someone behind the decision to 
seize the ministry. She also urged the protesters not to join 
upcoming anti-government rally (Bangkok Post, 24 February 
2006). Later that day, Thaksin dissolved parliament and called 
a snap general election. 
2 April 
The TRT easily won 460 out of 500 seats in the election. 
Other major parties, including the DP, boycotted the race. But 
in many constituencies, a new round of voting was required 
because the election law specified that a candidate needed to 
win more than 20 percent of the total votes in an unopposed 
race. Many TRT candidates failed to meet the requirement in 
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many Southern provinces, which were the DP strongholds. 
Also, more than 9 million people (37.9 percent) went to the 
poll and voted ‘no vote’ to show their opposition to the TRT.     
 
25 April 
The King, who appeared on television, called the election 
undemocratic and asked the court to solve the ‘mess.’     
 
8 May 
The Constitutional Court declared the election result was 
invalid. New elections were set for 15 October. 
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19 
September 
The military led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin overthrew 
the Thaksin government. The general later appointed Surayud 
Chulanont, a member of the privy council, to become the next 
prime minister.   
2007 
24 – 30 May 
Around 1,000 AOP villagers organised a protest in Bangkok 
to pressure the government to reconsider its position the 
opening of the sluice gates at Pak Mun Dam. Also, the protest 
came after the EGAT violated the 2004 cabinet resolution to 
open the sluice gates during the rainy season by delaying the 
opening for almost one month (Bangkok Post, 25 May 2007). 
A number of protesters were stopped by the military on their 
way to Bangkok because the timing of the protest coincided 
with the with upcoming Constitutional Tribunal's verdict on 
the dissolution of TRT and the DP. The protest was seen as a 
security concern (Thai Post, 24 May 2008). Nidhi Eoseewong, 
a highly respected historian, also visited the protesters and 
urged them to vote against the draft of the 2007 constitution 
(Krungthep Thurakij, 28 May 2008).  
30 May 
The Constitutional Tribunal dissolved the TRT  
Party, along with other minor parties, for what the judges 
viewed as the violation of electoral laws. 
 
19 August 
In the constitution referendum, 57.8 percent of the voters 
voted in favour of the new constitution, while 42.19 percent of 
the voters said no to the charter. The referendum was severely 
criticised for its unfairness since many provinces were still 
under martial law, and the opponents to the draft were also 
227 
 
 
deterred to speak their mind because the martial law allowed 
the authorities to arrest those who campaigned against the 
draft. 
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23 December 
People's Power Party (PPP) led by Samak Sundaravej won the 
general election with 233 out of 480 seats. The PPP was a pro-
Thaksin party, which was originally founded in 1998. But 
after the TRT was disbanded, many TRT former MPs joined 
the party and made it a reincarnation of the TRT party.     
6 December 
Wanida Tantiwittayapitak, an AOP iconic leader and an NGI, 
passed away prematurely from cancer.  
2008 
15 January 
The AOP successfully pressured the government to 
discontinue its pursuit of two dam projects (Matichon, 16 
January 2008).  
15 – 17 
March 
The AOP hosted a three-day event honouring the late Wanida 
Tantiwittayapitak in Thai Ban Local Wisdom Centre in Ubon 
Ratchathani. The activities included a nature march (thamma 
yatra) and panel discussions. The event was joined by many 
high profile figures, such as Sulak Sivaraksa, Anand 
Panyarachun, and  Kasian Tejapira.  
28 March 
The PAD regrouped and vowed to topple the Samak 
government. 
2 May 
Nantachote Chairat, a respected AOP leader and an NGI, 
passed away. 
25 May 
The PAD kicked off their anti-government campaign and 
organised its protest on Ratchadamnoen Road. 
5 June 
Samak announced his intention to pursue the construction of 
Kang Seuaten Dam. The announcement incensed a fierce 
debate on the issue. The project has been put on hold for over 
a decade because it faced strong opposition from the NGIs and 
local people (Kom Chad Luek, 7 June 2008).  
20 June 
The PAD's protest camp moved to a site near Government 
House.    
26 August The PAD seized Government House and the NBT television 
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station.    
 
9 September 
Constitutional Court ruled that Samak was guilty of violating 
a law which prohibited government ministers from receiving 
payment from another job. Samak received money from a 
cooking show (Human Rights Watch Report 2011: 38), and so 
was ousted from office. 
So
m
ch
ai
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
7 October 
Thousands of anti-government protesters attempted to hold the 
MPs and senators hostage inside the parliament building. 
Thousands of police officers were deployed to secure the 
building. The clashes between the protesters and the police 
continued into the night. These resulted in several serious 
injuries, including the loss of arms and legs. But it was never 
clear what caused the dismembering, the tear gas rounds or 
ping pong bombs. Two protesters also died during the clashes.  
13 October 
The queen made a surprise move by attending in a funeral of 
one of yellow-shirt protesters. Many high-ranking generals 
also attended the event.  
16 October 
General Anupong Paochinda, the army chief, appeared on 
television called the prime minister to resign (McCargo 2009: 
19).  
 26 
November 
The PAD seized the Suvarnabhumi International Airport and 
Don Muang Airport.  
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2009 
2 December 
The Constitutional Court dissolved the PPP and two other 
parties. Many MPs were under the pressure from the army to 
switch side and support the DP's leader, Abhisit, to become 
the next prime minister. Meanwhile, the PAD declared their 
victory and ended the airports seizures.   
7 – 14 April 
The red-shits began its campaigns against the new Abhisit 
government. As the anti-government protests escalated, the 
clashes expanded to several locations in Bangkok and Pattaya 
(the site of the Fourth East Asia Summit). The red-shirts used 
radical tactics as the protesters attacked Abhisit's convoy and 
stormed the hotel where the ASEAN summit took place. The 
229 
 
 
government also employed armed troops and used live 
ammunition to disperse the protesters. The clashes resulted in 
two civilian deaths from a neighbourhood watch group and 
123 reported injuries (Human Rights Watch Report 2011: 40-
41). 
22 
September 
The Abhisit government passed a cabinet resolution to pay 4.9 
million baht to Yai Hai and her neighbours for their loss over 
the years (Thai Post, 23 September 2009).  
10 October 
Abhisit flew to the Thai Ban Local Wisdom Centre in Ubon 
Ratchathani to meet with Yai Hai. Around 1,000 AOP 
members were also present. Because of the security concern 
from the local red-shirt groups, the government employed 
5,000 police and military officers to provide the security for 
the event. Around 1,000 local red-shirts showed up to protest 
Abhisit (Matichon, 11 October 2009). According to the 
opposition, the government spent almost 100 million baht of 
the taxpayers' money on the event in order to hand Yai Hai 
and her neighbours compensation of 4.9 million baht 
(Lokwanni, 12 October 2009). 
2010 
March 12 – 
19 May 
The red-shirts regrouped and mobilised more than 100,000 
protesters from the provinces, especially the Northeast, to 
Bangkok. The protesters took Phan Fa Bridge as their first 
protest site for a month. After failing to achieve their goal of 
getting an election, the protesters took a more radical approach 
by moving the protest camp to the central commercial centre 
on Ratchaprasong road. The first violent clash took place at 
the evening of 10 April, which resulted in more than 20 deaths 
and thousands of injuries. The government blamed the ‘men in 
black’ for the violence. The May crackdown was even more 
deadly. As the government attempted to end the prolonged 
protest, some areas were declared a ‘live ammunition zone.’ 
The use of heavy arms resulted in more than 50 deaths and 
hundred more injuries (Human Rights Watch Report 2011: 47-
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101).        
12 December 
Around 300 villagers, advisers, NGIs, and academics attended 
the 15th year anniversary of AOP at Thammasat University. 
Reporters, NGIs and villager leaders took part in the panel 
discussions on many issues, including the political struggle of 
people's groups and the AOP in the recent years.  
